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EMERGENCY CARE AND MANAGED CAREA DANGEROUS COMBINATION
Diane E. Hoffmann*
Abstract: Managed care plan subscribers in need of emergency medical treatment often
face unduly restrictive plan practices. These practices may result in life-threatening injury or
significant financial obligations on the part of plan subscribers. They are the result of a
managed health care system that is inadequately regulated and overly concerned with cost
control. Economic incentives lead plans to deny approval for emergency medical treatment
or to deny retroactively coverage for such treatment. Emergency medical providers also are
harmed by these practices, often forced to treat patients under federal law but denied
payment for their services. This Article describes this problem in more detail and argues that
the existing legal framework for preventing and addressing harms to managed care
subscribers due to denial of emergency medical care or coverage is wholly insufficient.
Moreover, the author argues that current law leads to an unjust apportionment of the cost of
emergency care among providers, subscribers, and plans and that federal legislation to
address these injustices is necessary. The Article critically examines the ability of the
proposed Federal Access to Emergency Medical Services Act to protect consumers from
harms due to plan denial of approval for emergency medical treatment and fairly apportion
the cost of emergency care among the relevant stakeholders without significantly increasing
health care costs. It advocates the passage of the Act with minor revisions.
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Dear Doctor:
I'm writing to you because ofmy experience with my liMO. Let me
start with a history of my situation .... I have a blood disorder
called anticoagulant lupus. This causes my blood to clot easily. I
have had about 6 clots in my legs. I am 24 and have been on
coumadin since I was 18. One evening [two months ago] I was
experiencing some numbness and loss of circulation in my wrist
and hand. Considering my particular problems I was concerned
and called my HMO. Because it was after hours I talked with the
[physician] on call. I told him my history and explained the
problem. He told me that it probably was not a blood clot and to
follow-up with my regular doctor in the morning. After discussing
it with my family, we decided not to risk it and went to the
emergency room at [a nearby hospital]. When I got there, I filled
out the usual paperwork. When the hospital called my HMO to get
approval, the doctor on call asked to speak with me. He said he
thought he had explained to me that he did not feel it was a clot. I
asked him if he was positive it wasn't a clot. He said no he was not,
but he really felt it probably wasn't. He also told me that the only
way he would approve this emergency visit was if it turned out to
be a clot. If not, it was up to me to pay the bill. Fortunately, it was
not a clot, but now I have a medical bill which I feel my HMO
should pay for. Why was that doctor willing to risk my health?
Isn't it better to be safe than sorry? I am very disturbed by this
practice. I work and pay for my insurance. I feel I am entitled to
the best care that they can [provide].
A Dissatisfied HMO Member1

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

In an effort to control costs, many managed health care plans require
that their members obtain authorization before seeking care in a hospital
emergency department (ED). Some members claim they have been
unable to reach their plans during emergencies2 or have been denied

1. Letter from HMO patient to David S. Davis, M.D., J.D., Chair, Public Policy Committee,
Maryland Chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians (Sept. 6, 1993) (punctuation
altered) (on file with Washington Law Review).
2 See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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prior authorization inappropriately.3 Others claim their plans have
retroactively denied coverage for emergency care.4 These practices may
be endangering the lives and health of managed care subscribers as well
as inappropriately shifting costs of emergency care from plans to
patients or, more often, to EDs.
Administrators of managed care plans argue that the cost of
emergency care is very high and that the services provided are often
unnecessary.5 In many cases, they say, patients can wait to see a plan
physician for treatment.6 Emergency care providers and some consumer
groups counter that managed care plans are taking advantage of hospital
EDs.7 The plan managers know that, under the Federal Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA),8 all hospitals offering
emergency services must screen all persons who come to the hospital to
determine if an emergency exists and, if so, must provide them with
treatment until they are stabilized, whether or not they can pay for the
treatment.9 Therefore, a plan member who goes to a hospital offering
emergency services must be screened and stabilized, even if the member
could not obtain prior plan authorization for the emergency care. 10
These practices create significant dilemmas for both patients and ED
providers. For example, consider the patient who experiences chest pain
in the middle of the night and cannot reach his or her managed care plan
3. See, e.g., Loren A. Johnson & Robert W. Derlet, Conflicts Between Managed Care
Organizations and Emergency Departments in California, 164 W. J. Med. 137, 139 (1996) ("Using
the rationale that the claim can always be reviewed and paid later, if necessary, [managed care
plans] have been known to publish policies advocating the routine denial of 'treatment
authorization,' and, in some instances, patients with obvious life·threatening conditions have been
denied authorization.").
4. Id.
5. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 76.
7. See, e.g., Letter from David S. Davis, M.D., J.D., Chair, Public Policy Committee, Maryland
Chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians, to Governor Parris Glendening (May 9,
1995) (regarding "HMOs-Reimbursement-Services in Hospital Emergency Facilities," H.B. 615,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 1995)) (on file with Washington Law Review). Plans often send their members (or
desire that their members go) to the ED even when their condition is not of an emergency nature.
Reasons why this might be done are convenience to HMO providers who have abbreviated hours,
financial incentives to physicians paid on a capitation basis, lack of specialists within the HMO
network, fear of misdiagnosis of high risk cases, and cost shifting to patient and ED. Id. at 1-2.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, dd (1994).
9. § 1395dd(a), (b).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h); see also Helen Lippman, The Games Plans Play withER Bills,
14 Bus. & Health 20,21 (June 1996) (quoting Lauren Dame, attorney and co·author of report on
patient dumping for Public Citizen Health Research Group, as stating that federal mandate is "one
of the reasons HMOs can get away with refusing to pay" for ED visits).
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for "preapproval" for out-of-network care. The patient, ·mcertain as to
whether the pain is indigestion or a heart attack, must choose between
waiting perhaps an hour or more trying to contact the managed care
plan, potentially risking health or life, or going imm(~diately to the
closest emergency facility. At the ED, the physician may attempt to
reach the patient's plan again and, if the plan does not respond, the
patient may still be reluctant to be treated, concerned that the plan may
not pay the bill if the condition is not determined to be an emergency. 11
Emergency physicians feel tom because, on the one hand, EMTALA and
their own professional ethics require them to perform the diagnostic
exam and tests needed to rule out heart trouble. 12 On the other hand,
emergency physicians also are sensitive both to a patient's reluctance to
be strapped with a large ED bill for tests that will not be covered by
insurance, and to the possibility that if the patient cannot pay the bill,
they and the hospital will incur the costs of the patient's care. 13
At least twelve states recently have enacted legislation that attempts
to remedy this situation by eliminating some of the obstacles managed
care plans have placed in the way of members seeking emergency care,
and/or by making it more likely that plans will reimburse patients or
providers for ED treatment. 14 Bills attempting to address this issue also
have been introduced in Congress. 15
11. Other examples of conditions that may appear to a layperson to be an. emergency, but on
retrospective review may not be, include:
1. A young woman with pelvic pain, who fears she may have a miscarriage, bleeding ovarian
cyst, tubal pregnancy or infection.
2. A patient with an unusual and severe headache, with vomiting and arm numbness.
3. A patient with 12 hours of vomiting, diarrhea and abdominal cramps, not better despite the
phone advice of the HMO.
4. A patient who fell and cannot use her arm.
5. A middle-aged patient with chest pain and trouble breathing, whose father died of a heart
attack.
Maryland Chapter of the Am. College of Emergency Physicians, Fact Sheet on H.B. 1203 and S.B.
701 (Aug. 23, 1993). If, on ultimate diagnosis, these conditions respectively tum out to be (1) a
urinary tract infection; (2) a migraine headache; (3) viral gastroenteritis or food poisoning; (4) a
wrist sprain; or (5) chest wall pain or esophageal reflux, they may not be covered by the HMO. /d.
12. See Public Citizen Health Research Group, Emergency Doctors Faced with Catch-22 as
HMOs Impede Access to Emergency Care, 11 Health Letter I (Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe ed., Feb. 1995)
[hereinafter Health Letter].
13. /d. at 2.
14. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 20-821,-923,-1068,-1137,-2801 to -2804 (West Supp. 1996);
Ark. Code Arin. § 20-9-309 (Michie Supp. 1996); Cal. Health & Safety Cod~§ 1371.4 (Deering
Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 641.513 (West Supp. 1997); Ga Code Ann. §§ 31-11-80 to -82
(1996); Ga Code Ann. §§ 33-20A-1 to -10, 33-21-1, -13, -18 (Supp. 1996); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 22:2018(DX1) (West 1995); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II §§ 19-705.1(b}, -712.5, -716 (Supp.
1996); Va Code Ann.§ 38.2-4300 (Michie Supp. 1996); W. Va Code§ 33-25A-8d (Supp. 1996);
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This Article explores the conflict between managed care and
emergency care in detail, first analyzing it from the perspective of the
various stakeholders-the managed care industry, the consumer, and the
ED provider. In Part ill, the Article examines the root causes of the
conflict, focusing on (1) the clash between managed care philosophy and
the nature of emergency care and (2) the allegation of "inappropriate"
ED use. Part IV describes and analyzes the limitations of proposed
solutions to the problem, including the limitations of reliance on the
market, the courts, and recent state statutes. The last section of the
Article, Part V, argues for a federal solution to the conflict16 and
critiques the ability of proposed federal legislation to address adequately
the problem in a way that discourages unnecessary emergency care but
does not significantly increase health care costs or penalize patients who
are truly in need of emergency services.
II.

THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE STAKEHOLDERS

A.

The Managed Care Industry

1.

An Overview

With an eye toward controlling the rising cost of health care, this
country has boldly embraced the concept of managed care. 17 Employers
Act of Apr. 14, 1996, § 13, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 169; New York Regulation of the Delivery of
Managed Care Act, S. 7553, 219th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996); Pennsylvania Hospital
Emergency Insurer Reimbursement Act, 1996 Pa. Legis. Serv. 112 (West). Some states, such as
Minnesota and Texas, have attempted to address the issue through regulations. See Minn. R.
4685.1010 (1996); 25 Tex. Admin. Code, tit. 28, §§ 119.51, 119.52, 28 Tex. Admin. Code §
3.3704 (1996). Another half dozen states are considering legislation to address the problem. See
Milt Freudenheim, HMO's Cope With a Backlash on Cost Cutting, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1996, at
AI.
15. Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, H.R. 815, 105th Cong. (1997); Access
to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, S. 356, 105th Cong. (1997); Access to Emergency
Medical Services Act of 1995, H.R. 2011, 104th Cong. (1995); Access to Emergency Medical
Services Act of 1995, S. 1233, 104th Cong. (1995); Graham Amendment No. 3014 to S. 1357,
104th Cong., 141 Cong. Rec. S16,007, S16,130 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995); see infra note 249.
16. The argument assumes that existing relevant federal statutes-EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. §§
1395cc, dd (1994}, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA}, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1994)-will not be repealed or amended in the near future.
17. Studies have shown that managed care has slowed the growth of health care costs in the
private market. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems
and Antitrust, 19 Cornell L. Rev. 1507, 1514 (1994) (''There is widely-accepted evidence that
associates managed care with significant cost savings as compared to fee-for-service or traditional
indemnity insurance."). Greaney cites numerous reports confirming this statement but also qualifies
the statement by clarifying that different managed care organization forms "vary significantly in
their capacity to control costs." /d. at 1514. For example, empirical studies reveal that HMOs and
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and states (through their Medicaid programs) 18 are rapidly moving
individuals into managed care plans. In addition, over four million
Medicare patients (twelve percent of the Medicare population) have
joined managed care plans. 19
Although managed care has no precise definition, it refers to
"programs that attempt to control the utilization as well as the pricing of
health care services."20 In doing so, managed care plans often limit the
independent practice associations (!PAs) achieve appreciably greater cost recuctions than preferred
provider organizations (PPOs) and IPA point-of-service systems.Id.; see aL;o Editorial, Managed
Care Beats Medicare Any Day, Bus. Wk., Feb. 27, 1995, at 136.
IS. As of March 1996, 71% of the nation's employees in companies with 10 or more workers
were enrolled in managed care plans. Steven Findlay & Wendy J. Meyeroff, Health Costs: Why
Employers Won Another Round, Bus. & Health, Mar. I996, at 49, 49-50. As of mid-1995,
approximately 28% of the Medicaid population nationwide was enrolled in managed care plans.
Office of Managed Care, Health Care Fin. Admin., National Summary ofMEdicaid Managed Care
Programs and Enrollment, tbl. II (Sept. 20, I996) (listing percentage as of June 20, 1995) (on file
with Washington Law Review). Most state efforts to move their Medicaid population into managed
care plans have involved only a portion of the state's Medicaid population and are considered
regional "demonstration projects." See The Nat'! lnst. of Health Care Management, States as
Payors: Managed Care for Medicaid Populations, at ES-4 (Feb. 1995). However, at least 14 states
have received approval from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) for a state-wide
demonstration project to move most of their Medicaid population (with the exception of the
disabled and long-term care population) into managed care. See Peter Ma·~Pherson, Measure by

measures: A Commercial Version of HEDIS Has Been Adapted for Use by Medicaid, but It's
Weaknesses May Outweigh-And Outlast, Hosp. & Health Networks, Mar. 20, I996, at 53, 53.
A recent study synthesizing over IOO reports, studies, and articles on Medicaid managed care
found that Medicaid managed care plans can produce savings of between S% and 15% over feefor-service plans. The Kaiser Comm'n on the Future of Medicaid, News Release: Study Finds That

Medicaid Managed Care Can Save Money and Improve Access but Big Cost Savings are Unlikely
(May 3I, I995) (on file with Washington Law Review). However, the study also found that the
overall savings potential from Medicaid managed care is limited because mznaged care enrollment
in most states is restricted to the least costly of the Medicaid population gro·Jps-children and low
income adults who account for only 23% of total Medicaid spending.Id.; see also Fred Schulte &
Jenni Bergal, Doubts Raised About HMO Savings, Sun Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 26,
I995, at 7A (casting doubt on state health officials' claim that Florida has saved as much as $50
million per year in Medicaid costs by shifting beneficiaries to HMOs).
19. Health Care Fin. Admin., Monthly Medicare Managed Care Contr.zct Report l (Sept. l,
I996) (stating that actual number of enrollees as of Sept. I, 1996 was 4,:548,113) (on file with

Washington Law Review).
20. Michael G. MacDonald eta!., Health Care Law: A Practical Guide § 6.05[3][c][iii], at 6-36
(I994); see also George W. Rimier & Richard D. Morrison, The Ethical Impacts ofManaged Care,
I2 J. Bus. Ethics 493, 493 (1993) ("Managed care is a term in common use-but often used
without precision-to refer to forms of health benefits coverage and health s·~rvice delivery that are
alternatives to traditional fee-for-service medicine."). Rimier and Morrison compiled other
definitions of managed health care from several authoritative sources:
Managed care is a comprehensive approach to health care delivery that en:ompasses planning,
education, monitoring, coordinating, and controlling quality, access, and cost considering the
interests of patients, providers, and payors. American Managed Care and Review Association.
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number of providers who service beneficiaries, negotiate favorable
prices from those providers for the right to participate in the managed
care plan, and require each beneficiary to have his or her health care
needs screened by a primary care physician (PCP), often called a
gatekeeper.21 "Capitation" is often a primary feature of managed care
plans. Under a capitation arrangement, a health care facility or physician
agrees to provide all or nearly all of the health care needs of a defined
patient population for a flat amount that is fixed in advance. By limiting
or fixing total revenues in relation to the total health care needs of a
specific group of beneficiaries, the facility has a great economic
incentive to limit utilization and the content of the health care product.22
Managed care plans vary greatly. A number 'of authors have described
them as existing along a continuum from "least managed" to "most
managed."23 On the "most managed" end are closed panel or staff model
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in which members must see
plan physicians who typically are salaried and operate out of a central
facility. 24 On the "least managed" end are traditional indemnity plans
with a few managed care features, as well· as preferred provider
• . • A variety of interventions in health care delivery and financing intended to
eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate care and to reduce cost, including: reviewing and
intervening in decisions about health services to be provided, either prospectively or
retrospectively; limiting or influencing patients' choice of providers; and negotiating different
payment tenns or levels with providers. Congressional Budget Office.
Managed care is a set of techniques used by or on behalf of purchasers of health
benefits to manage health care costs by influencing patient care decision-making through caseby~e assessment of the appropriateness of care prior to its provision. Institute of
Medicine/National Academy ofSciences.

!d. at 494 (footnotes omitted).
21. MacDonald et al., supra note 20.
22 !d. § 7.02(2Xf), at 7-15; see also David Segal, A Closer Look at Plan English, Fine Print in
HMO Contracts Spurs Lawsuits, Legislation Requiring Clarity on What's Covered, Wash. Post,
Mar. 27, 1996, at Fl.
23. See, e.g., Peter R. Kongstvedt, Essentials ofManaged Care 25 (1995); R. Danielle Federa &
Tracey L. Camp, The Changing Managed Care Market, in Managed Care 3, 3 (Seth B. Goldsmith
ed., 1995).
24. See Kongstvedt, supra note 23, at 25. According to Federa and Camp:
[These more "managed" models are more likely to have] formalized utilization review
monitoring procedures, provider utilization profiling, and peer review; more selective provider
subpanels, frequently including a group setting of physicians or staff providers; less freedom
or no freedom in consumer choice of providers .•• ; more comprehensive coverage, including
preventive care with little consumer out-of-pocket expense; and more shifting of risk to the
provider (e.g., capitation) or salaried arrangements rather than fee-for-service.
Federa & Camp, supra note 23, at 3.
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organizations (PPOs). In a PPO, the plan provides its members with
incentives to use designated health care providers (prefe:rred providers).
Members also may use non-preferred providers but typically must pay a
higher cost for their services.25 In general, all models share a number of
common cost containment features including provider selection,26 access
procedures, physician financial incentives, and peer and utilization
review.27 However, the specifics of each of these features differ from
plan to plan.

2.

Competitive Pressures

The competitive environment in which managed care plans operate
has intensified dramatically in many regions of the cmmtry in the last
few years.28 In the market for employer contracts, where the competition
is most fierce, plans are competing primarily on the basis ofprice.29 This
means that plans must cut premiums and, to remain profitable, must
operate more efficiently, negotiate favorable contracts with providers,
and cut unnecessary costs where possible. The most important factors
cited by managed care administrators for turning a profit include low
hospital utilization, favorable contracts with hospitals, control of
administrative costs, and increased enrollment.3 For many plans,
however, the intense nature of the competition has meant profit declines,
and survival has required a store of capital, typically available only to
the larger and for-profit plans.3 1 Thus, competitive pressures are forcing
plans to become bigger and, if they have not done so aJieady, to switch
to for-profit status.32 Incentives to cut costs created by the excessive
competition within the industry also have created a backlash among

°

25. See Kongstvedt, supra note 23, at 25.
26. Provider selection means that plans rather than members choose the physicians that members
can see. These physicians are part of a ''provider panel" or "network" and a.--e selected, in part, for
their ability to limit unnecessacy health care expenditures. See Linda J. Havlin & Larry J. Tucker,
Managed Care Benefit Design, in Making Managed Health Care Work 265, 270 (Peter Boland ed.,
1993).
27. See infra Part II.A.3.a.
28. See John Lombardo, Fever Pitch Competition has Managed-Care Companies Fighting to
Stay on Top, Wash. Bus. J., May 31, 1996, at 19.
29. William H. Nelson, Customers Demand Managed Care, 49 Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. 10, 10
(1995).
30. Michael Pretzer, The Managed-Care Juggernaut: Explosive Growth Nationwide, Med.
Econ., Apr. 15, 1996, at 64, 69.
31. Lombardo, supra note 28.
32 Pretzer, supra note 30, at 74. A number of analysts predict that ultimately the market will
consist of only a "handful oflarge regional managed-care players." Lombardo, supra note 28.
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consumers and state legislators in favor of consumer protections from
managed care plans.33

3.

Keeping the Lid on Expenditures

Internally, plans attempt to control costs in large part by managing or
controlling provider behavior so that providers will make cost-effective
decisions in the care and treatment of the plan's members. Perhaps one
of the most controversial aspects of some managed care models are
financial incentives to member physicians to increase efficiency and
productivity. These incentives take the form of bonuses or "salary
withholds."34 For example, in some plans, physicians may receive
bonuses for keeping patients out of the hospital, ordering fewer tests and
procedures for their patients, and lowering the use of expensive
specialists.35

a.

Utilization Review

Another mechanism common to managed care plans to ensure that
care provided is cost-effective is utilization review (UR). UR consists of
an evaluation of ''the necessity and appropriateness of medical care."36 It
is based, in part, on the assumption that "careful review of medical care
can eliminate wasteful, unnecessary ... or harmful care.'m Although UR
has been used in traditional indemnity plans, its use in the managed care
setting is distinctive:
In contrast to traditional insurance plans and Medicare, which
generally rely on retrospective review, [many managed care plans]
decide whether to reimburse care prospectively and concurrently.
The reviewer may be the [plan] itself or a third party contractor
(commonly a for-profit company). First-level reviewers are usually
33. See Thomas Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash-Righteous or Reactionary?, 335 New Eng.
J. Med. 1601, 1601 (1996) ("In 1996 alone, 1000 pieces of legislation attempting to regulate or
weaken HMOs were introduced in state legislatures, and 56 laws were passed in 35 states.").
34. See Segal, supra note 22.
35. See Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important Distinctions Among Managed Care
Organizations, 23 J. L. Med. & Ethics 223, 224 (1995); see also Bodenheimer, supra note 33, at
1602 (''The trend in managed care is toward the 'capitation-plus-bonus' method of paying
physicians. High-profile managed-care consultants suggest that physicians, whose use of hospitals
and expensive ambulatory care services is low receive 30 to 50 percent of their income in
bonuses.'') (footnotes omitted).
·
36. Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law 322 (1995).
37. Id.
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non-physicians who apply plan-specific criteria for medical
necessity and determine whether to authorize a particular
procedure ordered by the treating physician.38
If the first level reviewers are uncertain as to how to rule on a request for
coverage, they "may refer a case to a physician advisor before denying
authorization for treatment."39

b.

The Gatekeeper and Prior Approval

In addition to the UR process, many plans also pro,::edurally limit
access to care by requiring physician or plan preauthorization for certain
kinds of care or treatment. Typically care or treatment subject to
preauthorization includes hospitalization, specialty car.e, and use of
ancillary services. Without preauthorization from a primary care
physician (PCP) or other plan representative, the plan ¥.ill not pay for
the services or will reimburse at a substantially reduced rate.40 A
preauthorization system is considered key to managing costs in most
managed care plans. Authorities on managed care assert that there are
many reasons for an authorization requirement:
One is to allow the medical management function of the plan to
review a case for medical necessity. A second reason is to channel
care to the most appropriate location (e.g., the outpath;:nt setting or
to a participating specialist rather than a nonparticipating one).
Third, the authorization system may be used to provide timely

38. Susan J. Stayn, Comment, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organizations:
Toward a Uniform Model ofGrievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1674, 1680-81
(1994) (footnotes omitted).
39. /d. at 1681.
40. Kongstvedt, supra note 23, at 184. In an HMO, payment can be completely denied for
failure to obtain required preauthorization. In most PPOs, however, if a subscriber does not obtain
required preauthorization of a covered benefit, payment may not be denied, only significantly
reduced. For example:
[A plan may pay] 90% of charges for authorized services but only 50% of charges for
nonauthorized services or perhaps impose[ ] a flat dollar amount penalty for failure to obtain
authorization.•.. In a PPO where a contractual relationship exists bet.veen the provider
physician and the plan, the penalty may fall solely on the provider, who may not balance bill
the member for the amount of the penalty. In the case of ..• a PPO in which the member
received services from a nonparticipating provider[ ], the penalty falls on the member, who
must then pay more out of pocket.

/d.
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information to the concurrent utilization review system and to
large case management.41
Plans differ in terms of exactly what services will require prior
authorization. The more tightly controlled the system, the more services
that require preauthorization and the greater the plan's ability to manage
utilization. Plans also differ in terms of who may authorize use of
services outside of the plan. In plans that are tightly controlled, the
patient's PCP must authorize the service.42 In more loosely controlled
plans, authorization may also come from plan personnel and not solely
from the PCP or another physician.43
For non-emergency care, the preauthorization role of the physician
and that ofUR often overlap.44 In the context of emergency care, the two
functions generally remain separate as there is often no time to consult
UR for a decision before care is received. As a result, the plan or
physician decision whether or not to preauthorize treatment precedes the
UR determination. The UR determination typically is made
retrospectively, and that determination is the basis for deciding whether
the patient's care will be covered by the managed care plan.

4.

Emergency Care: Controlling Access and Denying Reimbursement

As stated above, emergency care is one area that managed care plans
often try to restrict. In part, this is because "ED visits generate higher
charges [to plans] than comparable visits to physicians,'>4s and because,

41. !d. at 182.
42 However, authorization may be required from the plan's medical director for very
"expensive procedures such as transplants and for controversial procedures that may be considered
experimental or of limited value except in particular circumstances." /d. at 183.
43. !d. A study offederally-qualified HMOs found that in 41% of the plans surveyed, approval
for ED use had to be obtained from a physician. Hany Davidson, Access to Emergency
Departments: A Survey ofHMO Policies, 18 Annals Emergency Med. 274, 276 (1989). In the other
plans (59%), approval could be obtained from other plan employees such as nurses, emergency
medical technicians, or administrative personnel. /d.
44. In fact, some see UR in that context as the usurpation of the medical judgment of the
attending physician. See Helene L. Parise, Comment, The Proper Extension of Tort Liability
Principles in the Managed Care Industry, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 977, 983-84 (1991) (noting that one
view ofUR is that it acts "as the effective 'practice of medicine' under which the medical judgment
of the attending health care professional is confirmed, modified or rejected by the persons
implementing the [UR] plan") (quoting Gazy Scott Davis, Managed Health Care Primer,
Introduction to National Health Lawyers Ass'n, The Insider's Guide to Managed Care: A Legal
and Operational Framework 31 (1990)).
45. Gazy P. Young et al., Ambulatory V"ISits to Hospital Emergency Departments: Patterns and
Reasons for Use, 216 JAMA 460,460 (1996). High costs of care in an ED are attributed to:
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in some cases, emergency care at a hospital is not necessary. Some
patients, for example, inappropriately use EDs for thei:r primary care
needs. Plan administrators also are concerned about the "hidden costs"
associated with ED use. In the ED, care is typically provided by the ED
medical staff, and if the patient needs to be admitted he or she may be
assigned to a physician who is not participating in the managed care
plan. When that happens, the plan loses control of the care of the patient
and the cost associated with that care.46 Some managed care advocates
argue further that "[p]atients admitted to the ED are a 'caJ?tive audience'
subject to any costly diagnostic test or treatment that the emergency
physician chooses to order. The emergency physician has no incentive to
control costs and will in fact make more money if excessive testing is
done.'>47
Plan managers say ''their costs could run out of control if they
allowed patients unlimited access to hospital emergency rooms.'>48 The
mechanisms used by managed care plans to control ED utilization vary
[A]cquiring and maintaining (1) expensive specialized equipment used in the ED and (2)
highly trained ED staff for 24 hours a day. A 1992 report on nine states ..• found that the
average charges for treatment of a nonurgent condition in an ED were from one to five times
the average charge for a Medicaid visit to a clinic or physician's office in the- community.
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/HRD-93-4, Emergency Departments: Unevenly
Affected by Growth and Change in Patient Use 21 (1993) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter GAO
Report]. A similar report by the Office of the Inspector General found that emergency room visits
normally cost at least three times the charge for a community-based physicim for the same care.
Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Pub. No. OEI 06-90-00180, Use of
Emergency Rooms by Medicaid Recipients app. B, at 1 (1992) [hereinafter OIG, Recipients]. But
see Robert M. Williams, The Costs of V"ISits to Emergency Departments, 334 New Eng. J. Med.
642,642 (1996) (finding in study of monthly data on costs of hospital and physician services from
1991 to 1993 in six Michigan hospitals that "[t]he true costs ofnonurgent care in the emergency
department are relatively low ..• [and that] [t]he potential savings from a diversion of nonurgent
visits to private physicians' offices may therefore be much less than is widely believed''). In large
part, the discrepancy may be explained by the difference between costs and charges for emergency
care. Though costs may be low, charges to private third-party payors may be high as they are often
cross-subsidizing costs of care to the uninsured and Medicaid population. /d. at 643-44.
46. See Kongstvedt, supra note 23, at 147.
47. Maryland Chapter of the Am. College of Emergency Physicians, Physicians' Guide to State
Legislation: Case Study-Definition of Emergency Services 3 (1994) (describing managed care
objections to legislation regulating plan coverage of emergency services); see also Johnson &
Derlet, supra note 3, at 140 ("At present, most emergency departments treat evetyone no matter
how trivial the problem. This has resulted in strained relations between [managed care plans] ...
and emergency departments."); MartinS. Karpiel, Capitated Contracting for Emergency Services,
SO Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. 33, 33 (1996) ("[Managed care organization( believe emergency
services are overutilized and too expensive, and that emergency department physicians are risk
averse, order too many ancillary services, and over-admit.").
48. Robert Pear, HMO's RefUsing Emergency Claims, Hospitals Assert, N.Y. Times, July 7,
1995, atAl.
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from plan to plan. Many plans require preapproval for emergency care.49
In cases where preauthorization is not possible, plans typically require
notification within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of receipt of
emergency services.50 If preapproval is not received or notification is not
given, coverage may be denied automatically.51 Some discourage use of
911 telephone calls to summon an ambulance and paramedics.52 Often
plans retrospectively scrutinize claims for emergency care to determine
if the patient's condition was truly an emergency. If the condition was
not an emergency, claim reimbursement may be denied.
·

B.

The Consumer

1.

The Choice ofManaged Care

Consumer enrollment in managed care plans in many cases has been a
result of voluntary choice. But in others, consumers have had no
alternative. The latter happens when employers offer only one health
insurance option53 or only managed care options, and when states
mandate that Medicaid beneficiaries enroll in managed care plans.54
\

49. Prior approval is most often required for "out of network" care, that is, care at a facility with
which a managed care plan does not have a contractual relationship to provide services to the
plan's members. However, it may also be required for facilities with which the plan has a
contractual relationship. The prior approval requirement and the degree to which prior approval is
granted may depend on the contractually-agreed-upon rate of payment for services rendered. See
Kongsvedt, supra note 23, at 147 (stating that many plans contract for special discounted rates with
both free-standing urgent care centers and hospital EDs and that if "discount is deep enough, the
plan may be more willing to allow urgent care visits than if it is paying full charges at an ED").
50. Some plans recognize that in a true emergency, it may not be possible to obtain
preauthorization. !d. at 183. In those circumstances, the plan may require notification within 24 to
48 hours of the emergency. Even in those cases, however, payment for the services may not be
automatic. Notification simply may trigger review of the case to determine medical necessity. !d.
51. See Gregory Henry, Emergency Care Under Managed Care: A Fatal Distraction, Health
Sys. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 55, 55 (relating story of 46-year-old woman rushed by ambulance to
Detroit ED in full cardiac arrest).
Her husband had called 911 after she collapsed while getting out of the car. Despite heroic
attempts to revive her over a 30-minute period, the woman died. ... Some months later, [the
woman's husband] received a notice from the patient's HMO denying the claim because the
patient hadn't called for authorization prior to going to the [ED].
!d.
52 According to the American College of Emergency Physicians, "[P]lans do not inform
patients about the availability of the 9-1-1 emergency system and sometimes discourage or even
prohibit patients from calling 9-1-1." American College of Emergency Physicians, Talking Points:
Managed Care 3 (1995) [hereinafter ACEP, Talking Points].
53. See Julie Kosterlitz, Unmanaged Care?, 26 Nat'l J. 2903, 2905 (1994) ("[M]any people
don't have a choice of health plans. According to a survey by the accounting and employee
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Consumers who have a choice often opt for a managed care plan
because of the cost.55 Managed care plans have considerably lower
premiums than fee-for-service plans. What influences consumer choice
among these different plans is not well documented but mlevant factors
are likely to include cost, location and convenience, whether their
physician or a physician they know is affiliated with the plan, and
reports from friends, relatives, and neighbors. 56

2.

The Uncertain Nature ofthe Benefit

Although many consumers report satisfaction with their managed
care plans,57 others describe significant problems. These problems
highlight what some call the "dark side" of managed care.58 In signing
up for a managed care plan, employees do not know what is in the fine

benefits consulting finn of KPMG Peat Marwick, 45 percent of Americans who get their health
insurance through their employers are offered only one plan."); see also Robin Toner, Harry and
Louise Were Right, Sort Of, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1996, at 4:1 ("[A]mong mid-size employers, 52
percent now offer their workers only one plan.").
54. States may obtain what are referred to as Section 1915 ''program" waivers to exempt them
from certain statutory requirements set forth in the Social Security Act of 1935, § 1915, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396n (1994). Section 1915(b) waivers "enable states to mandate participation [of Medicaid
beneficiaries] in a managed care program and restrict the providers from whom recipients receive
Medicaid-covered services ...• Section 1915(b) waivers [have been] used extensively by the
states." Suzanne Rotwein et al., Medicaid and State Health Care Reform: Process, Programs, and
Policy Options, 16 Health Care Fin. Rev. 105, 106 (1995).
55. See How Good is Your Health Plan?, Consumer Rep., Aug. 1996, at 28, 30.
56. See Martin Gottlieb, Picking a Health Plan: A Shot in the Dark, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1996,
at 3:1.
57. See Member Satisfaction Exceeds 90 Percent for Blues-Related H!ofOs: Survey, Nat'!
Underwriter, June 8, 1992, at 14, 14 ("[S]tudy conducted by the Gallup Organh:ation, which polled
11,179 members of 47 Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plan-related HMOs ... found that HMO
members are as satisfied with their health care coverages as those who have traditional
insurance."). Ninety-three percent of consumers surveyed were satisfied with the overall quality of
their HMO. Id.; see also Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance
Since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1516 (1994). But see Charles S. Clark,
Emergency Medicine, CQ Researcher, Jan. 5, 1996, at 3, 7, 9 (noting 1994 Harris poll of 3348
adults in three cities commissioned by Commonwealth Fund "found greater dissatisfaction levels
among managed-care enrollees than those still in fee-for-service health plans"); see also Consumer
Rep., supra note 55, at 29 (stating 10% of their readers said they did not get medical care they felt
they needed because their HMO discouraged it, while only 2% of readers who had traditional
indemnity insurance felt they did not get necessary care).
58. See, e.g., Health Letter, supra note 12, at 3; see also Carolyn M. Clanc!' & Howard Brody,
Editorial, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde?, 273 JAMA 338 (1995); Suzann·~ Gordon & Judith
Shindul-Rothschild, The Managed Care Scam: Playing the Denial Game, 258 Nation 657 (1994);
Freudenheim, supra note 14, at AI; Fred Schulte & Jenni Bergal, Profits from Pain, Sun Sentinel
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 11, 1994, at 1A.
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print of their contract with the plan.59 Typically, subscribers are given a
certificate that provides a brief description of the policy, or they may be
given a "Summary Plan Description.'.oo They do not receive a copy of
the "Group Contract" between their employer and the plan. This contract
provides the details of plan coverage.

3.

Obstacles to Care

A primary complaint of managed care consumers is the incentives
within the system for undertreatment and subsequent treatment denial or
delay. Horror stories from patients harmed by delays in receiving
appointments with PCPs or specialists make consumers particularly
suspicious of the motives of managed care plans.61
Receipt of emergency care has proved especially problematic for
some consumers.62 Plan members have complained that they have not
been able to reach their plan for several hours when attempting to obtain
preapproval for ED treatment. 63 In some cases, a secretary or bookkeeper

59. See Segal, supra note 22, at Fl ("Lured by low co-payments associated with HMOs, many
consumers sign on the dotted line without understanding the limits of their coverage, and critics
say the policies often disguise such limits in a morass of fine print.").
60. The Federal Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) imposes a requirement
that beneficiaries of employee group benefit plans be issued a "Silll1lllli1Y Plan Description."
Employee Retirement Income and Security Act§ 102,29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1994).
61. See, e.g., Edward Dolnick, Death by HMO-One Woman's Horror Story, Glamour, Feb.
1996, at 158; Spencer Rich, Managed Care, Once an Elixir, Goes Under Legislative Knift: CostCutting Focus Feared Harmfol to Patients, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1996, at AI; Elizabeth Rosenthal,
Patients With Difficult Illnesses Fight New H.M.O. 's [sic] to Get Help, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1996,
at AI; Fred Schulte et al., Audit Calls for Crackdown on Medicare HMOs, Sun Sentinel (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla), Aug. 4, 1995, at IA.
62 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 57, at 7, 9 (citing Harris poll finding that access to emergency
care was rated as fair or poor by 12% of managed care patients compared with 5% in fee-forservice plans); see also Henry, supra note 5 I.
63. The American College of Emergency Physicians alleges that patients in some plans "must
follow a very cumbersome preauthorization process. This means a patient who is suffering from
very alarming and possibly painful symptoms must make several phone calls and experience
prolonged waits before getting permission from their insurer to go to the emergency department."
ACEP, Talking Points, supra note 52, at 3; see also Lippman, supra note 10, at 23 (quoting Leslie
Zun, Chairman of Emergency Medicine at Milwaukee's Mount Sinai Hospital, as saying, "You call
the HMO and you get an answering machine" and that hours can go by without return call).
Although some plans are not available when called, other plans offer 24-hour urgent care. This type
of arrangement usually obviates the need for patients to travel to an ED unless they happen to live
considerably closer to the ED than to the urgent c.are center. Some plans also provide 24-hour oncall response to phone calls from patients or EDs requesting authorization for emergency care. This
feature also reduces the difficulties for some patients in reaching their managed care provider.
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rather than a trained health care provider denies preapproval.64
According to one source, "[g]atekeeping responsibilities have been
relegated to nonmedical personnel answering remote 800 telephone
numbers during partial hours of service. Lacking a detailed knowledge
of patients' signs and symptoms and of local medical resources, these
gatekeepers are nonetheless empowered to make critical authorization
and referral decisions, further imperiling patients and providers. •>6s

4.

Retroactive Denial ofCoverage

Consumers also have complained of plans that deny coverage
retroactively even when plan approval was granted. In th1ese cases, plans
have determined that the treatment received was not for an emergency
condition although it initially appeared to be an emergency to the
consumer.66 Although there is little empirical evidence o:fthe number of
patients who are experiencing denials of claims for emergency care,
there is much anecdotal evidence and a few "small scale" studies
suggesting that the practice is widespread. For example, a study of
"emergency claims at Connecticut hospitals found that one out of every
three was denied," although half of those were reversed on appeal. 67 A
recent study by the Pennsylvania Department of Health found that one
managed care plan rejected forty-three percent of emergency claims.68
Furthermore, in Oregon, a plan was fined for denying ED claims without
a reasonable investigation. The state's Department of Consumer and
Business Services found that the plan had denied fiv•e thousand ED
claims over a two-year period.69

64. The American College of Emergency Physicians contends that the decision for
preauthorization is typically "made over the phone, not based on an examination, and often by a
clerk using some predetermined criteria." ACEP, Talking Points, supra note 52, at 3.
65. Johnson & Derlet, supra note 3, at 139 (footnote omitted).
66. The study by Davidson found that 96% of federally-qualified HMOs reviewed ED visits
retrospectively prior to payment. Davidson, supra note 43, at 274.
67. Lippman, supra note 10, at 23.
68. /d.; see also Lori Sham, Cost-Control Efforts Lead to Claim Disputes, USA Today, Apr. 22,
1995, at IA. According to Sham, based on an analysis of claims handled by Emergency Physicians
Billing Service in Oklahoma City, "[s]ome plans deny less than 1% of emergency room claims as
non-authorized or norr-urgent, while other plans deny 15% or more .•.. Some plans are denying
two to three times as many claims as other plans at the same hospital." /d. The article also reported
that some plans deny payment even after they authorize the ED visit: The reporter found that one
independent physicians' association in California had been "retroactively denying 20%-25% of
claims as non-urgent, even when the visits were authorized beforehand." /d.
69. Lippman, supra note 10, at 23; see also Heruy, supra note 51, at 53 (reporting that one
hospital in South Bronx found that "in one month alone, July 1995, more truill 48 percent of their
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The American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) also has
collected examples from its members of cases where patients have been
denied coverage. Table 1 sets out some of the types of claims that have
been denied and the reasons for denial.

Table 1: Examples of Cases in Which Managed Care Patients Were
Denied Coverage for Emergency Room Care10
Chief Complaint
17-month-old male
with earache and
vomiting presented at
ED at 1:11 a.m.
Sunday.

Patient Outcome
Patient could not sleep since
11:00 p.m. Saturday and had
vomited up his medication
(I'ylenol). Child required an
evaluation to assure no
dehydration and no evidence
of toxicity. He was diagnosed
with acute bilateral otitis
media.

Status ofinsurance Review
PCP approval was obtained
prior to the visit. However,
HMO subsequently denied the
visit [stating that] 'Emergency
Services are covered under this
member's contract only when
the condition requires
immediate medical attention.'

8-year-old male with
infection in his fingers
presented at ED at 7:24
p.m. Sunday.

Parents had tried soaking
fingers at home, but there was
no improvement after one
day. They came to the [ED].
The infection required
incision and drainage in the
ED setting.

Claim was denied because
there was no written referral
from the PCP, even though
there was an approval obtained
from the PCP at the time of the
ED visit.

31-year-old male with
complaint of shortness
of breath presented at
ED at 8:52p.m. Friday.

Patient had history of asthma
that required nebulization
treatment.

Visit was approved by the PCP
and subsequently denied by the
HMO for lack of a referral.

patients in managed care plans were denied emergency care by their HMOs, or authorization for
treatment was denied pending review''). Moreover, "[m]any of the HMOs involved gave nc
telephone number to request permission, or callers simply got answering machines. Yet very few
agreed to cover urgent treatment for their patients." Id..
70. Examples of retroactive denial of coverage for ED care. American College of Emergency
Physicians, Hospital "A" Examples/Hospital "B" Examples (1994-1995) (on file with Washington
Law Review).
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17-year-old female
presented at ED at
11:20 p.m. Tuesday
with increasing
headache, shaking
spells, tonic-clonic
activity.

Patient's mother stated that
patient had shaking spells
with her eyes rolling back.
The patient was evaluated by
the ED physician who ordered
extensive blood work, a blood
culture and a cat scan of the
head. A lumbar puncture was
attempted but not successful.
The patient was given a large
N dose of rocephin and was
admitted to the hospital. The
ED physician ruled out
meningitis and seizure
disorder.

No gatekeeper was called since
this patient's insurance did not
require pre-approval. The plan
retroactively denied
authorization and stated this
was not considered to be an
emergency.

64-year-old male
presented at ED at 7:10
a.m. with abdominal
pain.

Patient was admitted to the
intensive care unit and died
less than 24 hours after
admission.

Claim was denied because of
no referral from the PCP. ED
attending physician recalls
patient referred to the ED by
patient's physician.

7-month-old male with
fever presented at ED at
9:00a.m. Friday.

Patient had fever of I 06 with
histozy of fevers and increased
crankiness. Child was
diagnosed as having a urinazy
tract infection. Patient had
fever for two days and had
seen PCP one day prior to ED
visit where they were told to
wait and see. The night before
coming to the ED, patient had
vomiting and diarrhea.

Claim was denied because
condition "did not require
immediate medical attention."

50-year-old male with
chin laceration
presented at ED at 1:35
p.m. Sunday.

Patient had a 2 centimeter
chin laceration requiring
suturing.

Claim denied because no
physician referral. PCP was
called in the ED but never
returned call.

5.

Definitions ofEmergency Services

In general, managed care plans provide that emergency services are
covered only when they are for an emergency medical condition and are
medically necessary.71 For example, a typical plan policy defines
"Emergency Services" as:
71. Federally-qualified HMOs must provide basic and supplemental health services to their
members. Section 1302 of the Public Health Service Act defines basic health services as including
"medically necessazy emergency health services." Public Health Services Act of 1986, § 1302,42
U.S.C. § 300e-l (1994). Federally-qualified HMOs were established in 1973 when Congress
enacted legislation to promote HMOs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 280c, 300c (1994). IDIIOs that met certain
requirements including the provision of a "prescribed range of basic health se-_'Vices" and consumer
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Medically [n]ecessary [h]ospital or medical services for a
[m]edical [e]mergency or accidental injury requiring immediate
[m]edical [c]are. Immediate [m]edical [c]are is required if the lack
of it would permanently endanger your health, cause other serious
conditions, damage your bodily functions, or cause serious and
permanent damage to any of your bodily organs or parts.72
The policy further defines "Medical Emergency'':
[T]he sudden and unexpected onset of an acute medical condition
requiring immediate [m]edical [c]are. Medical [e]mergencies
include heart attacks, strokes, loss of consciousness or respiration,
convulsions, and other acute conditions which we determine to be
[m]edical [e]mergencies.73
The plan often reserves the right to determine whether, in its
judgment, a service is medically necessary and appropriate. 74
Furthermore, "[t]he fact that a physician has prescribed, performed,
ordered, recommended or approved a service [may] not in itself make it
medically necessary [or] appropriate."75

6.

Risks to Health and Pocketbook

In large part, rules established by managed care plans regarding
receipt of emergency care are problematic because emergencies are an
indeterminate class and plans can define them overly narrowly. For
example, many plans use the term "life-threatening" to define an

choice to purchase optional health seiVices were deemed "federally qualified." Health Ins. Ass'n of
Am., Source Book ofHealth Insurance Data 25-26 (1994). In order to encourage the establishment
of federally-qualified HMOs, the law initially "gave federally qualified HMOs substantial
advantages over non-qualified HMOs." Bany R. Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials, and
Problems 716 (2d ed. 1991).
72 Kelley v. HMO Health Ohio, No. 68812, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5200, at *11 (Nov. 22,
1995) (unpublished opinion) (describing HMO policy offered by Terms of Health Ohio).
73. /d. at *11-*12 (emphasis added).
74. Medically-necessacy care is defined by one typical plan as care:
[C]onsistent with the symptoms or diagnosis of the [m]ember's condition, disease, ailment or
injwy; appropriate with regard to standards of good medical practice; [sic] not primarily for
the convenience of a member, physician, hospital, or other provider; and the most appropriate
supply or level ofseiVices which can safely be provided to the [m]ember.
Fort Sanders Loudon Med. Ctr. v. Bump, No. 03A01-9207-CV-00262, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86,
at *5-*6 (Jan. 28, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (describing policy offered by Tennessee Health
Care Network).
75. /d. at *6.
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emergency medical condition.76 Without medical expertise, consumers
are at the mercy of managed care plans that decide over the phone
whether they or their children77 appear to need emergency care,78 or that
retrospectively decide whether the patient's condition was an
emergency.79 The potential effect on consumers of "guessing" wrong
may be devastating: "If they go to an [ED] without tht~ permission of
their managed care plan, they go at their fmancial peril. If they ignore
their symptoms, they may be risking their lives ...." 80 In fact, plans that
require preapproval or define emergency very narrowly "may deter
requests for necessary care with potentially fatal results.":ll
Plan screening by telephone can also be problematic for patients:
Because of time constraints and absence of physical interaction,
telephone medical conversations are necessarily less revealing than
the usual physician-patient encounter. During a personal visit,

76. In a study of federally-qualified health plans, researchers found that:
[T]he vast majority (92%) [of plans] stated that their policy was to distinguish between lifethreatening and non-life-threatening situations. Members could proceed by any means to EDs
without obtaining permission if the problem was life threatening.... In non life-threatening
situations ... (80%) [of plans] required members to obtain permission from their physician, or
from the HMO triage officer, prior to visiting an ED. [A] member's ability to define "life
threatening'' and "non life-threatening'' determined whether he called 911 or the [plan's] triage
number first. Understandably, these terms have not been easy to define, except in
retrospect . . . . Much may depend on the ability to define "life threat1:ning," and HMO
members [are] expected to use their brochures or common sense for guidance.
Davidson, supra note 43, at 275-76. If a condition is not life-threatening, pati,nts may have to wait
several days to see a plan physician. For example, one article described a case in which the parents
of a three-year-old child who had gotten a ''pea-sized" pebble stuck in her nose on a Saturday
morning were told by their managed care plan that the child could wait until Monday to see a plan
physician. See Debra Lumpe, Lifo Under Managed Care, 15 Emergency Med. News 14, 14 (1993).
77. It is especially "difficult for parents to know when their child is suffering from a 'potentially
life-threatening emergency."' Kathy N. Shaw et al., Indigent Children Who Are Denied Care in the
Emergency Department, 19 Annals Emergency Med. 59, 62 (1990); see also Young et al., supra
note 45, at 464 ("Telephone triage may be particularly risky for pediatric patients.'').
78. Although many plans use a telephone screening system to assess a patient's need for ED
services, others do not believe such screening is appropriate. See Davidson, supra note 43, at 276
(citing study that found that medical directors of 10 plans "believed that telephone triage systems
introduce undue delay in ED access and for that reason were not used by their HMOs").
79. In many cases, it is not possible to determine prior to a medical exant whether a patient's
condition is an emergency. See Young et al., supra note 45, at 463 ("There is no consensus about
what constitutes a nonurgent ED visit, and it is difficult to classify patients accurately [even for
health professionals] without a complete examination or access to diagnostic t<:sts.'').
80. Henry, supra note 51, at 56.
81. According to the Maryland Chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians,
''patients are scared of coverage denial to the point of harm, including a death in Baltimore City in
February [1995].'' Letter from DavidS. Davis to Governor Parris Glendening, supra note 7, at 3.
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much of the meaning behind what a patient says derives directly
from the sound, pitch, and resonance of the voice and from
physical posture, eye direction, and facial expression. Much of this
is absent or distorted in telephone conversation. 82
Plans that require patients to justify their need for emergency services
over the phone present unique difficulties for individuals whose
"primary language is not English, who are illiterate or intoxicated,
elderly, or who are frightened." 83 Some individuals, Medicaid
beneficiaries in particular, may not even have a phone.84

C.

The Provider

1.

Squeezed on Both Sides-The Dilemma ofEMTALA

Emergency providers also face dilemmas in treating managed care
patients who appear at the ED because the providers must comply with
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA).85
EMTALA was enacted as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985.86 The law and subsequent amendments were
aimed at addressing concerns that "because of increasing financial
pressures, hospitals were denying emergency medical care to financially
undesirable patients-a practice often referred to as 'patient
dumping. "'87 Both patient health and the viability of public hospitals
were being threatened by the private hospital practice of transferring
uninsured emergency patients to public hospitals.
Under EMTALA, if a hospital provides emergency services,
screening must be provided to any individual who comes to the hospital
82. Davidson, supra note 43, at 276.
83. ld.; see also Clark, supra note 57, at 3 (''The effectiveness of telephone triage 'depends on
the patient, their ability to respond, their education level and whether or not they are language
impaired."') (quoting Diane Rowland, Executive Director, Kaiser Commission on Future of
Medicaid).
84. One study-of indigent children denied approval by their managed care plan for emergency
~attempted to contact families for follow up after plan denial. The study concluded that
"managed health care systems for indigent patients that rely on ... good telephone communication
with [primacy care physicians may have a problem.]" Shaw et al., supra note 77, at 61. Many of the
families the study attempted to contact "either had disconnected or no telephones." /d.
85. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 § 9121, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100
Stat. 82, 164 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered U.S.C. titles). Certain provisions of the Act
.were expanded in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989 §§ 6018, 6211, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
103 Stat. 2106,2165, 2245 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered U.S.C. titles).
86. § 9121, 100 Stat. at 164.
87. MacDonald et al., supra note 20, § 20.01[2][b], at 20-8.
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and requests examination or treatment for a medical condition.88
Screening has become a significant dilemma for a number of emergency
care providers who have questioned whether they must screen a patient
when the managed care plan has denied approval or preauthorization for
the ED treatment. Hospitals in a number of states have violated
EMTALA regulations by failing to adequately screen patients upon
admission to the ED when emergency treatment was not authorized by
the patient's primary care physician.89 EMTALA gives clear guidance as
to the responsibility of a provider in these circumstances: "[A] hospital
that has a hospital emergency department . . . must provide for an
appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of [its]
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available .
. . to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition . . .
exists."90 The only statutory reference to insurance states that "[a]
participating hospital may not delay [providing] an appropriate medical
screening examination . . . in order to inquire about the individual's
method of payment or insurance status."91 Thus, a hospital that "triages a
patient, then calls the patient's managed care plan for approval to further
screen/treat, followed by discharge and referral to the managed care
plan, risks a violation of the [EMTALA] regulation for f:nlure to provide
an appropriate medical screening examination and/or a delay in
treatment." 92
If, upon screening, medical personnel determine that the individual
has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must either treat and
stabilize the individual or, in certain narrowly-defmed situations,
transfer the individual to another facility. 93 EMTALA defines the term
"emergency medical condition" as:
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
89. Health Care Fin. Admin., Department of Health & Human Servs., Statements ofDeficiencies
and Plans of Correction, Form HCFA 2567 (Sept. 1992) (sample statements on file with

Washington Law Review).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
91. 42 u.s.c. § 1395dd(h) (1994).
92 Letter from Rosell1lii)' Feild, Health Insurance Specialist, Health Care Financing
Administration, to Linda DeFeo, M.D., J.D., Mruyland Chapter of the American College of
Emergency Physicians (Oct. 16, 1995) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(cX3) (1994)) (on file with
Washington Law Review). This puts some hospitals in a legal bind as many have contracts with
managed care plans that require that emergency physicians call the plan before screening patients.
Henry, supra note 51.
93. The law provides that a patient may be transferred prior to stabilization only if (I) the patient
has requested the transfer in writing, after having been informed of (a) the hospital's obligation
under EMTALA and (b) the risks of the transfer to the patient; or (2) the physician has certified in
writing that, based upon the information available at the time of transfer, the medical benefits
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(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity ... such that the absence of immediate medical
attention could reasonably be expected to result in-(i) placing the
health of the individual ... in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious
impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any
bodily organ or part; or (B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic]
who is having contractions-(i) that there is inadequate time to
effect a safe transfer ... or (ii) that transfer may pose a threat to
the health or safety of the woman or the unborn child.94
There are significant penalties for failure to comply with EMTALA.
Health care facilities or physicians ''that negligently violateD a
requirement [are] subject to a civil money penalty of [up to] $50,000"
per violation. 95 In addition, any individual who is personally injured as a
result of a hospital's failure to comply with the statute, or any medical
facility that suffers a financial loss as a result of a hospital's violation,
may bring a civil suit against the hospital and obtain civil damages to the
extent such remedies are available under the law of the state where the
hospital is located.96

2.

Left Holding the Bag-A Fair Placement ofBurden?

Hospitals and physicians have taken EMTALA very seriously and
thus are reluctant not to treat patients even if they do not receive
preapproval from managed care plans for treatment. As a result,
hospitals and physicians may be left with the fmancial burden of caring
for those patients. This is often the case either because a patient's
managed care plan prohibits "balance billing"97 or because a patient is
judgment-proof and cannot pay the bill. Hospitals feel this burden
acutely as they must absorb these costs on top of costs they already incur
for care they provide to individuals who lack any health insurance.
ED doctors also claim that they are burdened inappropriately by the
task of obtaining prior approval. They allege they are required to spend
inordinate time on the phone ''wrangling for approvals with insurers or
expected from the provision of treatment at the other facility outweigh the increased risk the
transfer presents to the patient. 42 U.S.C. § 139Sdd(cX1) (1994).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 139Sdd(eX1) (1994) (footnote omitted).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(dX1) (1994).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 139Sdd(dX2) (1994).
97. Physicians or hospitals "balance bill" when they charge the patient over and above what the
patient's managed care plan or other insurer pays for the visit or treatment. See Kongstvedt, supra
note 23, at 184.

339
HeinOnline -- 72 Wash. L. Rev. 339 1997

Washington Law Review

Vel. 72:315, 1997

trying to find specialists 'in-network' for further treatment."98 Some
claim they spend hours doing the work of the plan to keep plan members
in network. The placement of this type of burden on ED physicians
raises questions of fairness and responsibility for the "managed care"
function.
III. THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT
A.

A Clash ofCultures

1.

The Philosophies ofManaged Care and Emergency Care

Some have argued that the philosophy of managed care is at odds
with the nature of emergency care. They have, in fact, referred to it as a
"clash of missions and cultures."99 Managed care traditionally has
emphasized regular preventive care and continuity of care wherein a
physician coordinates all the medical services that a patient might need.
In every sense of the word, the care is managed. In conm.st, emergencies
by their very nature are difficult if not impossible to m<mage. They are
unexpected and episodic. Emergency physicians provide intermittent
care to patients they have never seen before. The two modes of practice
have different histories and different purposes.
Emergency medicine did not become a specialty until the late 1970s.
Prior to that time, most hospital emergency facilities Wt::re staffed on a
short-term basis by physicians with other specialties and other practice
commitments. 100 Emergency rooms were considered a weak link in

98. Sham, supra note 68, at lA; see also Deborah Glotzer et al., Prior Approval in the Pediatric
Emergency Room, 88 Pediatrics 674, 678 (1991). In a study of HMO prior approval in a pediatric
ED, Glotzer found that when ED staff were asked to name one major advantage of prior-approval
policy, staff most commonly (33%) said:
[I]ncreased continuity of care ... [and many (27%) said] reduced inappropriate [ED] use.
[Others (20%)] saw no apparent advantage. The disadvantage[s] most frequently mentioned
[were] the burden of telephone calls and paperwork involved in implementing the system
(42%) ... [and] decreased access to care and frequent failure to educate or inform patients
about the system before reaching the emergency room.... [A large majority (70%)] did not
think that the prior-approval system was worth the trouble.
Glotzer, supra, at 678.
99. Pear, supra note 48, at A22.
100. Jack Landry, Federal Legislative Impact on Emergency Medicine Practice, 5 Prac. Mgmt.
& Admin. 31 (Emergency Clinics ofN. Am. ed., Feb. 1987); see also Birth of a Specialty, CQ
Researcher, Jan. 5, 1996, at 10, 10 (noting that during late 1950s and 1960s emergency room care
was "often provided by nurses or moonlighting physicians from a hodgeptldge of specialties in
poorly equipped rooms").
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hospital care. 101 Emergency care was "low-tech" and messy. Emergency
rooms were actually called "pits":
They were named after the gory arenas in which bulldogs ravaged
other dogs or mangled rats, or where gamecocks fought to the
death on blood and offal-splattered floors. Even though hospitals
euphematized them "accident rooms," they were "pits." In them,
frightened interns waited while low, sleek, shiny red or jet black
vehicles hauled in their cargoes of human misery. 102
There were a number of reasons for this ad hoc approach to
emergency medical care. Most notably, there was not a widespread
recognition of the need for specialization in this area. The variety of
conditions seen and the range of care given in emergency rooms
"obscured the complex and intensive nature inherent in emergency
medical practice."103 Second, physicians did not believe that there was
any money in caring for emergency patients. Most were uninsured and
seeking charity care. 104
Emergency medicine began to change significantly during the 1960s.
More people began to use the emergency rooms for sudden and episodic
health care needs. According to one article describing this time,
"[p]atients in large numbers turned to hospitals and their ERs as full
service health care providers." 105 American Hospital Association
statistics showed that, in 1960, forty-two million patients received
emergency medical treatment. 106 By 1970, that number had increased to
nearly sixty million, and by 1984 it had grown to seventy-eight
million. 107
It was also during this time that medicine in general was becoming
more specialized. Emergency medicine was officially recognized as a
101. Landry, supra note 100, at 31; see also Paul Glastris, Lift and Death in the Emergency
Room-Part 2, Wash. Monthly, Feb. 1986, at 19, 21 (reporting that at time, "[f]ew [emergency
rooms] had physicians staffing them around the clock, and many doctors who worked the ER beat
had reputations, even among their peers, for incompetence").
102 Landry,supra note 100, at 31 (citingJ. Am. College Emergency Physicians, Dec. 1979).
103. /d.
104. /d.
I 05. /d. at 32.
106. !d.
I 07. /d. More recent statistics indicate that in 1993, there were 97.4 million visits to EDs. See
Clark, supra note 57, at 3. Also fueling the growth in emergency care was the health care payment
system. In 1965, the federal government passed legislation establishing the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. These programs made it possible for many who had previously been unable to receive or
pay for medical care to do so. See Landry, supra note I00, at 32-34.
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specialty by the American Medical Association in 1979 108 and became
one of the fastest growing specialties in the 1980s. During that decade
''what were formerly called emergency rooms (ERs) were upgraded to
emergency departments (EDs)." 109

2.

Different Approaches to Medical Practice

The focus of the specialty of emergency medicine i:3 ''to evaluate,
stabilize, and treat illnesses and injuries that require immediate care." 110
As a result, most EDs are set up to see patients with a wide spectrum of
illnesses and injuries twenty-four hours a day. Individuals may present
with life-threatening emergencies or with conditions :requiring little
treatment. Patients do not require an appointment and often are treated
on an outpatient basis.
Once at the ED, patients are seen initially by a trained provider for the
purpose of ''triaging'' them. This involves determining the severity of
their illness or injury relative to that of other patients who are waiting
for care. Typically, patients are designated as having a condition that is
either emergent, urgent, or nonurgent:
Emergent conditions are illnesses or injuries that could be life- or
limb-threatening and require immediate attention. Urgent
conditions are not life- or limb-threatening, but are time-sensitive
and need prompt medical attention, for example, a broken bone or
injury that requires sutures. Nonurgent conditions are neither lifeor limb-threatening nor time-sensitive. 111
The specialty of emergency medicine differs significa:ntly from other
specialties such as family medicine and internal medicine that
predominate in the managed care setting. In emergency medicine,
[skill] involves not only the differentiation of patients who are sick
from those who are worried but well, but also the recognition of
patients who appear well but are candidates for sudden
deterioration, as well as those who have a significant underlying
illness that is not readily apparent. The initial assessment must be
based on rapid evaluation of the patient's appearance, chief
complaint, and vital signs. This must lead to a rapid decision
108. Clark, supra note 57, at 5.
109. /d. at 5.
110. GAO Report, supra note 45, at 12.
111. /d. at 12-13.
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concerning the stability of the patient and the necessity for early
therapeutic intervention. 112
In contrast to internal medicine, in emergency medicine, "diagnosis
and assessment of problems are not in order of probability, with the
most likely diagnosis listed first, but are rather in order of the 'worst
possible diagnosis. "'113 By its very nature then, emergency medicine
may require ''unnecessary'' diagnostic tests in order to rule out lifethreatening possibilities.
The "practice" of managed care, in contrast to that of emergency care,
grew out of an effort to control our nation's increasing health care costs.
While many plans tout a focus on preventive care and health
maintenance, the motivation for this emphasis has been the cost saving
potential of identifying a condition or potential for illness before it
becomes symptomatic and costly to treat. 114 As data have emerged
indicating that preventive efforts do not necessarily reduce costs, 115
many plans are focusing less on preventive care and more on other ways
to keep costs down. 116 Thus, managed care plans, as discussed above,
attempt to keep patients out of hospitals and away from specialists and
direct them to less expensive sources of care such as outpatient primary
care physicians.

3.

Duty Versus Economics

Clearly, the practice philosophy of managed care is heavily
influenced by economics. This economic "mindset" is further
exacerbated by plans that pay physicians on a per capita basis. Although
most managed care plans traditionally paid their physicians for each
service provided (much like a fee-for-service system but at a
significantly discounted rate), more and more plans are attempting to
negotiate per-person (per capita) rates with physicians (whether they see

112. Barry E. Brenner & Robert R. Simon, The Specialty of Emergency Medicine, I J.
Emergency Med. 349, 350 (1984).
113. Id.
114. See Mark Merlis, Congressional Research Serv., CRS Report: Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMO) and Employer Group Health Plans l (Mar. 19, 1991 ).
115. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, The H.M.O. Catch: When Healthier Isn't Cheaper, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 1997, at 4:1 (While studies have shown that preventive care is generally good for your
health, they have also shown that it often does not save money.").
116. Consumer Rep., supra note 55, at 29 (citing survey finding that for some preventive
measures, HMOs were no better than traditional health insurance arrangements, "which supposedly
give short shrift to preventive care").
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the patients they are responsible for or not).m Physicians who accept per
capita payments take on the same sort of risks that insurance companies
assume. Their hope is that the payments they receive from the managed
care plan will be greater than the costs associated with caring for the
plan's patients. If it costs physicians more to care for the patients than
their per capita fees, the physicians will lose money. This can happen if
their patients are sicker than they anticipated or use unnecessary
services. 118 Critics of per-person payment agreements argue that the
arrangements may provide incentives for physicians to "pay attention to
things other than the best medical treatment" for the patient. 119
The era of managed care is not the first encounter emergency
physicians have had with concerns about payment for care. EDs have
had a long history of providing charity care and treating Medicaid
patients. 120 This history, and the fact that under EMTAJ. ..A, EDs have a
duty to screen all who come to their doors, has made EDs sources of
"bad debt" within hospitals. 121 Hospitals in some parts of the country
have closed their EDs because of their drain on institutional resources. 122
The EDs that remain open are required to take all "comers" and, as a
result, continue to incur bad debt. In some cases, this has put the
financial viability of the hospital in jeopardy. 123 Prior to the growth of
managed care, hospitals were able to shift much of the cost of treating

117. See Michael Quint, Health Plans Are Forcing Change in the Method for Paying Doctors,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1995, at AI; see also Segal, supra note 22, at F3 ("About 60 percent of
managed-care plans limit the number of referrals to specialists by paying physicians a 'capitated
fee' .... In effect, the fewer referrals to specialists that such doctors make, the more money they
earn.").
118. Quint, supra note 117, at AI.
119. /d. at D5 (quoting Sidney Wolfe, Public Citizen Health Research Group in Washington). As
a result of such incentives, in 1996 voters in at least one state (Oregon) considered an initiative that
would have outlawed capitation altogether. See Bodenheimer, supra note 33. at 1602. The Oregon
ballot measure-Measure 35-failed, with 35% of voters in favor, but 65% opposed. See Oregon
Ballot Measures, Oregonian (Portland), Nov. 6, 1996, at C5.
120. However, prior to EMTALA, there were many reports that EDs denied care to many who
lacked insurance or could not pay for their care. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The
Evolution ofthe Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 21,60 n.292 (1989).
121. Frank Welsh, Cost Containment in Emergency Departments, 49 Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. 42,
42 (1995) ("Unlike most hospital departments, which are expected to break even or tum a profit,
[EDs] traditionally have been run as a service to the community without much concern for the
bottom line.").
122 See, e.g., Robert E. Tranquada, Emergency Medical Care and the Public Purse, 276 JAMA
945, 946 (1996) (stating that financial pressures have resulted in decrease in number of hospitalbased EDs in Los Angeles County "from 103 in 1982 to 85 today").
123. See Jennifer Preston, As Reserves Drop, Hospitals Talk of Forsaking Charity Care, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 14, 1996, at AI.
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the uninsured in their EDs to paying patients. With managed care
forcing hospitals to cut rates and reduce hospitalization, hospitals'
ability to cover the costs of caring for the uninsured and underinsured
has reached its limits. 124

B.

Inappropriate Use ofEmergency Departments

1.

Empirical Evidence

Advocates for managed care plans argue that, without stringent
controls on ED use, some plan members will inappropriately use EDs
when other, less expensive care options are available. Historically, some
groups have relied on hospital emergency facilities as a source of
medical care even for non-emergent problems because they have lacked
alternative sources of medical care and have known they cannot be
turned away by EDs. But studies of the percentage of inappropriate
visits to EDs have varied significantly in their findings, from as low as
eleven percent125 to as high as ninety-three percent, with most
somewhere between thirty-eight and sixty-seven percent. 126
Rates of ED misuse also have been shown to vary considerably
among different groups of patients. For example, there is little, if any,
evidence that the privately-insured population inappropriately uses the

124. ld. In addition, the shift of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care may be creating greater
strains on hospital EDs. For those beneficiaries who continue to use the ED for nonurgent care,
rather than receive some payment for these services through Medicaid, EDs may be denied any
payment at all if the ED use was unauthorized or retrospectively deemed ''unnecessary by a
managed care plan." ld.; see also Tranquada, supra note 122, at 945.
125. Don P. Buesching et al., Inappropriate Emergency Department Visits, 14 Annals
Emergency Med. 672, 673 (1985) (using guidelines established by American College of
Emergency Physicians, authors found overall inappropriate visit rate to ED at three community
hospitals to be 10.8%).
126. See GAO Report, supra note 45, at 20 (finding that, in 1990, approximately 43% of care
provided at EDs was not for emergency or urgent condition, and that, in some rural areas, visits for
nonurgent care were as high as 93%); Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs. Pub. No. OEI 06-90-00181, Controlling Emergency Room Use: State Medicaid Reports 1
(1992) ("[R]ecent studies show non-emergency visits for the general public range from 11 percent
to 38 percent of all emergency room visits.'') (footnotes omitted); J. Thomas Badgett, Can
Medicaid Format Alter Emergency Department Utilization Patterns? 2 Pediatric Emergency Care
67, 67 (1986) ("Greater than two thirds of those receiving care in emergency departments do not
qualify as clinical emergencies.''); Robert Steinbrook, The Role ofthe Emergency Department, 334
New Eng. J. Med. 657, 657 (1996) ("The majority (55.4 percent) [of visits to emergency
departments in this countly in 1992] were classified as nonurgent.''); William C. Stratmann &
Ralph Ullman, A Study of Consumer Attitudes About Health Care: The Role of the Emergency
Room, 13 Med. Care 1033, 1033 (1975) ("Estimates ofnonurgent visits as a proportion of total ER
visits range from one to two-thirds.'').
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ED. 127 In addition, "[t]he elderly have been shown to have low rates of
inappropriate use in several studies, while high rates of inappropriate use
have been noted in the pediatric age group, in patients who did not have
private physicians, and in patients with lower socioeconomic status." 128
More recent studies attribute the use of EDs for nonurgent care to
whether the patient has a primary care physician. A recent General
Accounting Office (GAO) report found, in 1990:
Of the 38 million nonurgent ED patient visits, about 42 percent (15
million) did not have a primary health care provider. About 6
million of these patients were unable to find primary care providers
willing to treat them because the patients were either uninsured or
their medical care costs were covered under a government-assisted
program, such as Medicaid. 129
Much attention has been given to the Medicaid population and their
"overuse" of the ED. 130 Several reports by the Office of the Inspector
General have focused on the problem. The most recent report found that
Medicaid recipients "consistently make a significantly hi,gher proportion
of non-emergency and marginally appropriate emergency room visits" 131
than that among the general population. While non-emergency visits

127. In fact, a recent study found that, although the difference was not statistically significant,
members of managed care plans were more likely than others to use the ED for emergent or urgent
problems. See Young et al., supra note 45, at 462-63.
128. Marc Afilalo et al., Emergency Department Use and M'ISUSe, 13 J. Emergency Med. 259,
262 (1995) (parenthetical information in quotation omitted). Afilalo relies on the following studies
in drawing these conclusions: Buesching, supra note 125; A.G. Davison et al., Use and Misuse of
an Accident and Emergency Department in the East End of London, 76 J. Royal Soc'y Med. 37
(1983); D.J.E. Eagle eta!., Misuse ofthe Emergency Department by the Elde•ly Population: Myth
or Reality? 19 J. EmergencyNursing212 (1993); S.R. Lowenstein et al., Care ofthe Elderly in the
ED, 15 Annals Emergency Med. 528 (1986); T.F. Oberlander et a!., Advice Seeking and
Appropriate Use ofa Pediatric Emergency Department, 147 Am. J. Disabled Children 863 (1993);
M. Prince et al., A Study of "Inappropriate" Attendances to a Pediatric Accident and Emergency
Department, 14 J. Pub. Health Med. 177 (1992); E. Vayda et al.;Emergenc<v Department Use at
Two Hamilton Hospitals, 112 Can. Med. Ass'n J. 961 (1975); M. Walsh, Patient's Choice: GP or
A&E Department? 5 Nursing Standard 28 (1990); B.W. Wolcot, What is an Emergency? Depends
on Whom You Ask, 8 J. Am. C. Emergency Physicians 241 (1979).
129. GAO Report, supra note 45, at 21. Medicaid patients often lack primaty care physicians
because such physicians choose not to participate actively in the Medicaid program due to its low
level of reimbursement. Furrow et al., supra note 71, at 745.
130. See, e.g., Richard I. Haddy et al., Nonemergency Emergency Room Use in Patients With
and Without Primary Care Physicians, 24 J. Fam. Prac. 389 (1987); Robert E. Hurley et al.,
Emergency Room Use and Primary Care Case Management: Evidence /rom Four Medicaid
Demonstration Programs, 79 Am. J. Pub. Health 843 (1989); The Medicaid Access Study Group,
Access ofMedicaid Recipients to Outpatient Care, 330 New Eng. J. Med. 1426 (1994).
131. OIG, Recipients, supra note 45, at 1.

346
HeinOnline -- 72 Wash. L. Rev. 346 1997

Emergency Care and Managed Care
among the general public, including Medicaid recipients, ranged
between eleven percent and thirty-eight percent, those for Medicaid
recipients alone were estimated from seventeen to sixty-one percent. 132
In an effort to control costs while insuring quality and access, many
states have turned to managed care approaches for their Medicaid
population. 133 Although there is some evidence that managed care is
reducing ED visits by Medicaid beneficiaries 134 not all plans have been
successful at steering patients from the ED, 135 finding that it is difficult
to break old habits. 136 Some plans have also found it difficult to change
physician practices regarding approval for emergency care. One study
found that even an elaborate gatekeeping system was largely ineffective
at preventing ED visits by pediatric Medicaid beneficiaries in managed
care plans. 137 In addition, the majority of primary care physicians and
ED staff surveyed found the gatekeeping policies, at least for after-hours
visits, "burdensome and inappropriate." 138

132 /d.
133. In 1994, "all states except Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont and
Wyoming reported having at least one Medicaid managed care program." The Kaiser Comm'n on
the Future of Medicaid, Medicaid and Managed Care: Discussion Brief2 (Feb. 1995). In 1995,
over a quarter of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in some type of managed care program. See
Office of Managed Care, supra note 18.
134. See, e.g., David Brown, Deluged by Medicaid, States Open Wider Umbrellas, Wash. Post,
June 9, 1996, at A1 (reporting shift of Medicaid population in Tennessee to managed care).
In one year, the rate at which Medicaid patients under age 21 visited hospital emergency
rooms was cut nearly in half. (It dropped from 900 visits per 1,000 Medicaid patients in 1993
to about 500 visits per 1,000 TennCare patients in 1994.) For people between age 21 and 64,
ER visits dropped more than one-third.
!d.; see also Bettina French, The Urgent Care Crunch: Medicaid Managed Care Tackles
Emergency Use-With Mixed Results, 69 Hosp. & Health Networks 34 (1995) (noting that in

Arizona, first state to move all Medicaid patients into managed care, "ED use and the growth in per
capita costs for care for the indigent are significantly lower than in states with traditional Medicaid
programs'').
135. See Robert E. Hurley et al., Gatekeeping the Emergency Department: Impact ofa Medical
Primary Care Case Management Program, 14 Health Care Mgmt. Rev. 63, 70 (1989).
136. See French, supra note 134, at 38; see also Shaw et al., supra note 77, at 61 (finding, in
their follow up study of indigent children in managed care plans who were denied authorization for
ED care, that 58% of those contacted said they did not plan to change their use of ED, and only
one-third said they would call their prinuuy care physician before coming to ED in future).
137. Glotzer, supra note 98, at 674.
138. /d. Physicians surveyed indicated a reluctance to deny care to a child who had already been
brought to the ED because of"clinical, ethical, and legal concerns." /d.
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But Just How Big Is the Problem?

Despite strong evidence that there is inappropriate use of EDs, the
extent of that misuse is questionable. Some attribute the differences in
study results to inconsistent methodologies. One study attributed its low
findings of an eleven percent inappropriate-use rate to its definition of
"appropriate."139 The study was based on guidelines developed by the
ACEP. These guidelines included thirteen clinical circum:;tances as well
as the following introductory statement:
We feel that a patient has made an appropriate visit to an
emergency department when: An unforeseen condition of
pathophysiological or psychological nature develops which a
prudent lay person, possessing an average knowledge of health and
medicine, would judge to require urgent and unscheduled medical
attention most likely available, after consideration of possible
alternatives, in a hospital emergency department. 140
The authors point out that previous studies of ED utilization h1d
relied on ''urgency ratings based on physicians' retrospective assessment
of disease process or 'threat to life and limb' criteria." 141 Other studies
have found that physician and patient perceptions of what constitutes an
emergency differ dramatically. 142

139. Buesching, supra note 125, at 675-76; see also Afilalo et al., supra note 128. Afilalo and
his co-authors similarly concluded that the variability in the rates of nonurgent ED use-which
they found to be between 7% and 94% worldwide-was largely attributable to the differences in
the operational defmitions of appropriate ED users. ld. at 262. According to the authors, "[s]tudies
that use only the physician's perception will generate data suggesting high levels of misuse (2594%)." ld. (footnotes omitted). They cite a study by Hansagi and colleagues as an illustration of
how perceptions of what is an emergency can vary.ld. (citing H. Hansagi et al., Trial ofa Method
of Reducing Inappropriate Demands on a Hospital Emergency Department, 101 Pub. Health 99
(1987)). Hansagi and colleagues "found that 45% of patients originally assip1ed to a nonurgent
group by ED assistant nurses were later reclassified as emergency cases upon reassessment by a
senior nurse advisor." ld. Also, "Davison and colleagues reported a 39% rate of inappropriate use
based on a retrospective review of the medical records by a physician." ld. (citing Davison et al.,
supra note 128). However, "12% of the cases considered inappropriate were patients referred to the
ED by a family physician." ld.
140. Buesching, supra note 125, at 672 (footnotes omitted).
141. ld.
142 See David W. Baker et al., Determinants of Emergency Department Use by Ambulatory
Patients at an Urban Public Hospital, 25 Annals Emergency Med. 311, 313 (1995) (finding 89%
ofER patients thought they needed to be seen immediately, but only 43% req(lired care within 24
hours according to physician reviewers); see also Marilyn J. Gifford et al., Emergency Physicians'
and Patients' Assessments: Urgency of Need for Medical Care, 9 Annals Emergency Med. 502
(1980); Wolcot, supra note 128.
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
A number of potential solutions have been implemented or suggested
to mitigate the harms to consumers and the economic burden to EDs
imposed by current managed care practices. These include relying on the
market, suing plans for inappropriate denial of preapproval or coverage,
and a variety of regulatory approaches, some taken by Medicare and
others enacted as part of recent state statutes. This section summarizes
each of these approaches and argues that all are significantly limited in
their effectiveness.

A.

Relying on the Market

Those who believe that government regulation should be kept to a
minimum might argue that the best method to address this problem is
through the market-competition among managed care plans for
enrollees will lead to practices that take into account consumer concerns.
Unfortunately, that is not likely to happen in the context of managed
care. In large part, this is because consumers often do not have much
choice when it comes to selecting a health insurance plan; it is their
employers who make most of the choices. Additionally, there is little
evidence that employers take into consideration consumer concerns
when selecting health coverage and some evidence that they, in fact,
ignore such concerns.
1.

Limitations on Consumer Choice

An essential feature of a market-driven system is consumer choice.
But consumers in our current health system often do not have any option
but a managed care plan. Nor do they have the option to ''take their
business elsewhere" if they do not like a certain feature of their plan.
According to recent studies, forty-five percent of individuals who get
their health insurance through their employers are offered only one
plan, 143 and fifty-two percent of midsize employers "now offer their
workers only one plan." 144 In other cases, where employees can choose
among a number of plans, there is a dearth of good information about
plan quality.

143. See Kosterlitz, supra note 53, at 2905.
144. See Toner, supra note 53, at 4:1.
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Typically, employee information about the quality of various plans is
by word of mouth. Consumers do not have access to comprehensive
"report cards" about specific areas of plan services. Althcugh there have
been efforts to develop such consumer information, the quality of the
information is not generally good or detailed enough to be of much
assistance to most consumers. 145 For example, such information does not
describe plan decisions regarding emergency care. Also, because
emergencies are relatively "rare" events, consumers may not know of
others who have experienced problems with emergency care; they may
assume that how plans deal with emergencies is not of primary
importance to them because they are unlikely to need emergency care.
Such thinking, however, ignores the possible catastrophic harm that can
occur in an emergency situation and is evidence that most individuals
have difficulty accurately weighing the importance of rare events with
potentially devastating outcomes. 146
Finally, even if there was good information about plans and an
employee wanted to switch to another plan, employees are limited in
their ability to shift from one plan to another. Typically, employers
provide an open enrollment period during which employ•ees can make a
change among plans, but only at twelve-month intervals. Thus,
consumer influence on plan behavior is likely to be negligible.

2.

Employers Show Little Interest in Quality

Alternatively, the market might work to improve the behavior of
managed care plans in a way that was more responsive to consumer
concerns if employers, who do most of the selecting of plans, took into
account the concerns of their employees. Unfortunately, the limited
studies available indicate that that is not how employen; make choices
among plans. For most employers, it is a question of cost, not quality, of
care that is important. For example, in selecting managed care plans,
employers have been shown to give relatively little weight to a plan's
accreditation for achieving certain quality standards by the National
Committee for Quality Assurance, a private accreditation association for
145. See Consumer Rep., supra note 55, at 30 (stating that despite emergence of industry to give
consumers relevant information about quality of plan services, "the tools for measurement are
primitive at best, and the 'report card' movement is promising more than it can deliver").
146. Statisticians have pointed out that many individuals have difficulty evuluating probabilistic
events. See, e.g., Richard Zeckhauser, Procedures/or Valuing Lives, 23 Pub. Pol'y 419, 441 (1975)
(arguing that we have great deal of difficulty thinking about very small probability levels); see also
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics .md Biases 3 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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HM:Os. 147 One study found that such certification was not one of the
factors employers of large- and medium-sized companies considered
most important when shopping for an HMO. 148
In addition to placing a premium on the cost of health insurance, there
are other reasons why employers generally do not consider quality in
selecting health insurance plans. Many employers, especially small- to
medium-sized businesses, do not have the expertise or resources to
evaluate the quality of managed care plans. 149 Moreover, quality is
difficult to measure: data collection on quality of care indices is still in
its infancy. 150 The larger employers that do have the resources and
expertise, in many cases, are still reluctant to make decisions based on
quality because they believe they are '•crossing over the line" into
making medical judgments and questioning the practice patterns of local
physicians and hospitals. 151

B.

Taking Plans to Court

1.

Recovery for Physical Harm

One potential or partial solution to the problems created by conflicts
over emergency care between managed care plans and their members is
for members who have been adversely affected by plan decisions to sue
their plans for redress. Such actions could provide subscribers with some
compensation for their harms and, ideally, would deter plans from

147. See David Segal, HMOs: How Much, Not How Well: When Companies Go Shopping For
Plans, Quality Ratings Are Given Short Shrift, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1996, at F3.
148. /d. (reporting that study found 'just 20 percent [of 197 midsize to large companies
surveyed] consider the industty's most respected seal of approval 'extremely important' when
shopping for health care coverage''); see also John K. Iglehart, The National Committee for Quality
Assurance, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 995, 997 (1996) (noting that according to Prudential Health Care
System's chief medical officer, company's gain in business as result of gaining NCQA
accreditation probably has not offset millions of dollars company spent obtaining accreditation).
149. See Peter Boland, Market Overview and Delivery System Dynamics, in Making Managed
Healthcare Work: A Practical Guide to Strategies and Solutions 3, 9 (Peter Boland ed., 1993);
Laird Miller & Joanne Miller, Why Employers Are Not Using Quality to Select Providers and Plan,
in Making Managed Health Care Work: A Practical Guide to Strategies and Solutions, supra, at
116-17; see also Iglehart, supra note 148, at 996 (explaining that NCQA estimates that although
more than half of all large employers, that is, those with more than 5000 employees, ''use data from
accreditation surveys .•. in deciding which health insurance products to purchase," small
employers use accreditation surveys only 17% of time to purchase health insurance plans).
ISO. See, e.g., Iglehart, supra note 148, at 998; Consumer Rep., supra note 55, at 34-35; see
also Boland, supra note 149, at 10 (noting that even if employers agree on quality of care indices,
many employers are not willing to pay added cost of documenting quality care).
151. See Boland, supra note 149, at 8.
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making future inappropriate decisions to deny coverage. Yet several
obstacles to this traditional common law approach limit its effectiveness.
In some cases, HMOs require that disputes over treatment are subject to
binding arbitration, thus keeping such disputes out of court. 152 Also, such
suits may be preempted under the Federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). 153

a.

The Roadblock Called ERISA

Under current law, many patients who are harmed. because their
managed care plan denies them preauthorization or access to benefits
have little recourse against their plan. If an individual receives health
insurance through an "employee benefit plan," a suit against the plan
may be preempted under ERISA. 154 Most individuals in the United
States receive their health insurance through such employee benefit
planS. ISS
152 See Richard C. Reuben, In Pursuit ofHealth, A.B.A. J., Oct 1996, at 54, 56.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). ERISA "was adopted to provide for national unifonn
administration of employee pension and health plans through federal legislation and to promote the
growth of these private plans by freeing them from the scramble of state laws that unnecessarily
complicated employee benefit administration." Robert L. Roth, Recent Developments Concerning
the Effect of ERISA Preemption on Tort Claims Against Employers, Insurers, Health Plan
Administrators, Managed Care Entities, and Utilization Review Agents, Health Law., Early Spring

1996, at 3, 7.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Employees are part of an employee benefit plan if their employer
provides medical benefits to its employees "through an insured plan, an uninsured plan, an HMO
or PPO, and memorializes [its] decision to do so through a memorandum distributed to employees,
and provides copies of benefit booklets or outlines of available benefits." W. Eugene Basanta et al.,
Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 31 Tort & Ins. LJ. 357, 362 (1996).
155. As of 1994, 60.5% of the U.S. population received their insurance through an employee
benefit plan. Employee Benefit Research Inst, Issue Brief 5 (Feb. 1996). A larger group may
receive their health insurance through their employer, but not every purchase of group health
insurance by an employer constitutes an "employee benefit plan" within the meaning of ERISA.
See, e.g., Blue Cross/Blue Shield v. Weiner, 543 So. 2d 794 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
ERISA plan did not exist where group health insurance policy was sold to individual through
independent marketing company and plaintiff was merely sole proprietor who bought group policy
for his family). According to one author:
Weiner underscores the proposition that an ERISA plan is not created by the mere marketing
of group health-insurance policies by insurance brokers or other such entrepreneurs who often
try to capture the market of small businesses with too few employees to enjoy favorable group
rates on the open insurance market.

Theresa A. DiPaola, WrongfUl Denial ofHealth Insurance Benefits, Trial, Mar. 1990, at 74, 75; see
also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-l(j) (1995). These regulations, promulgated by the Department of Labor
under ERISA, exclude from ERISA group insurance programs offered to employees
under which (1) [n]o contributions are made by an employer or employee organization; (2)
[p]articipation •.• is completely voluntary for employees or members; (3) the sole functions of
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Although ERISA does provide some remedies for wrongs committed
by ERISA plans, 156 awards of damages "for bodily injury, emotional
distress, property damage, lost wages, or punitive damages" by a plan
member who claims to have been harmed by improper denial of benefits
are not authorized under ERISA. 157
Numerous federal courts have considered whether patients who are
enrolled in ERISA plans may bring state common law claims against the
plan or whether such claims are preempted. 158 Most have held that where
a plan member is injured because a managed care organization denied a
necessary benefit or was negligent in administering benefits-for
example, by negligently delaying a patient's access to necessary
treatment-the claim is preempted. 159 Four federal courts of appeals
the employer or employee organization with respect to the program are, without endorsing the
program, to permit the insurer to publicize the program to employees or members, to collect
premiums through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer; and
(4) [t]he employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the form of cash or
otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable compensation, excluding any
profit, for administrative services ... [for] payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.
§ 2510.3-l(j).
156. The Act provides a "detailed system of filing suit, the grounds for such suits, and the relief
to which the litigant is entitled." Basanta, supra note 154, at 362.
157. !d. at 362-63 (''Nor can a plan participant who alleges that he has suffered physical injury
because his medical condition deteriorated as a result of a denial of benefits recover compensatory
damages. Recovery is limited to the value of the benefits that should have been provided.").
158. See, e.g., Anderson v. Humana, Inc., 24 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 1994) (preempting employee's
claim under state law that HMO fraudulently induced participants to choose plan); Visconti v. U.S.
Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that vicarious liability claim preempted
by ERISA), rev'd sub nom. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 564 (1995); Rollo v. Maxicare, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. La. 1988) (preempting claims
for breach of contract, tortious interference with physician-patient relationship, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and consumer fraud because claims related to employee benefit
plan). However, there are also cases in which managed care entities have been found liable for state
law actions under either a theory of vicarious liability or corporate negligence. See Independence
HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that state law malpractice claim for
negligent treatment by ostensible agent not preempted). Under the theory of corporate negligence,
at least one court found that the claim that an HMO was negligent in selecting and retaining
physician was not preempted. See Elsesser v. Hospital of the Phila. College of Osteopathic Med.,
Parkview Div., 795 F. Supp. 142, modified, 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992). A second court
held that the issue of preemption was one that could not be resolved by the court (but could be
raised again on remand). McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053 (Super.
1992), aff'd, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996). Fora more detailed discussion of this issue see Robert Roth,
The Effect of ERISA Preemption on Tort Claims Against Employers, Insurers, Health Plan
Administrators, Managed~ Care Entities, And Utilization Review Agents, Health Law., Winter
1994-1995, at 7; and Roth, supra note 153.
159. See Wendy K. Mariner, Liability for Managed Care Decisions: The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Uneven Playing Field, 86 Am. J. Pub. Health 863, 864
(1996); see also Roth, supra note 153, at 4 ("In general, state law claims against managed care
entities arising out of their nonprovider roles are preempted by ERISA."). These claims are brought
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have agreed with this interpretation of the federal law. 160 In Corcoran v.
United HealthCare, Inc., 161 the Fifth Circuit held that a "malpractice"
claim against an HMO for denial of benefits was preempted by
ERISA. 162 The plaintiff had a high-risk pregnancy and her obstetrician
had ordered her hospitalized shortly before her delivery date so that he
could monitor her condition. Her health plan required preapproval for all
hospitalizations. The plan denied the request for hospitalization on the
ground that it was not medically necessary. Instead, it authorized ten
hours per day of home nursing care. During a time when there was not a
nurse on duty, the fetus went into distress and died. 163 The Sixth, Eighth,
and Ninth circuits have all followed the approach taken in Corcoran. 164

b.

One "Success" Story

In the context of emergency care, there are few reported cases where
a plan member, injured as a result of a plan decision not to give
preapproval or to delay receipt of care, has sued the plan. This may be
due in large part to ERISA preemption of such suits. One of the only
reported cases of this type where a plaintiff has been successful involved
James Adams, a six-month-old boy from Fairburn County, Georgia.
James and his family received their health care through the Kaiser
under a number of theories including bad faith, coverage denial, breach of contract,
misrepresentation of available benefits, and many of the corporate issues involved in the provision
of care by managed care plans. Basanta, supra note 154, at 363. A number of district courts have
distinguished between these types of "malpractice" cases and those based on the quality of care
provided in delivering a covered benefit, and have found that the latter are not preempted under
ERISA. See Mariner, supra (discussing Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare., Inc., 57 F.~·d 350 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Pacificare of Okla.,
Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (lOth Cir. 1995)); see also Roth, supra note 153, at 4 (concluding that
recent trend "appears to be for courts to find that state law tort claims against ERISA managed care
entities in their capacity as arrangers for the provision of care and providers are not preempted by
ERISA'').
160. See Mariner, supra note 159, at 865.
161. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
162 Id. at 1331.
163. Id. at 1322-24.
164. See Mariner, supra note 159, at 865; see Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937
(6th Cir. 1995) (holding that family's claims of malpractice arising from Biodyne's refusal to
authorize psychiatric benefits pursuant to utilization review related to employee benefit plan and
were preempted by ERISA); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
family's state law claim for wrongful death based on plan's delay in approving autologous bone
marrow transplant was preempted by ERISA because it was based on negligence in administering
benefits); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that health
plan's refusal to preapprove heart surgery was denial of benefits so that ERISA preempted
malpractice claim).
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Foundation Health Plan of Georgia. James's mother called Kaiser's
emergency line one morning at "3:50 and reported that James was
"moaning, panting, limp and running a 104-degree temperature." 165 The
emergency line nurse told Mrs. Adams to place James in a tepid bath
and then, after checking with a doctor, directed that the child be taken to
a hospital forty-two miles from his home. The plan received a fifteen
percent discount for patients treated at this hospital. On the way to the
hospital, James' heart stopped beating. He was revived at another
hospital with CPR "but circulation ceased to his extremities and he
developed gangrene." 166 His physicians subsequently diagnosed a blood
infection, and both his hands and legs had to be amputated as a result of
the gangrene. 167
In a malpractice suit against the health plan, the plaintiffs' attorney
argued that the child would not have been harmed if the plan had
directed his parents to take him to the closest ED. A jury awarded the
child forty-five million dollars-the largest verdict in a Georgia
malpractice case. 168 The award was appealed by the health plan, which
claimed that it would have made no difference if James had been sent to
the nearest ED, but the parties settled prior to an appellate decision. 169
The claim was permitted to proceed because James's family did not
receive their health insurance through an ERISA employee benefit plan
and thus their claim was not preempted by the federal law.

2.

Recovery for Economic Losses

Plan members who are not physically harmed as a result of plan
denial of preapproval for ED care, because they sought the care in any
case, may be left with significant medical bills. In these situations, plan
members also may seek redress in court. Unlike cases involving claims
for personal injury, however, ERISA does not bar claims for economic
loss based on coverage denial. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary
may bring a civil action under ERISA ''to recover benefits due to him

165. See Mark Silk, $45 Million Malpractice Verdict Fulton County Jury Award Against HMO
Largest Ever in State, Atlanta J. & Const., Feb. 4, 1995, at C10; see also Plaintiffs' Complaint for
Damages at 3, Adams v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan (Ga. Ct. Fulton County 1995) (No. 93-VS7985E) (on file with Washington Law Review).
166. See Silk, supra note 165, at CIO.
167. /d.
168. /d.
169. Telephone conversation with Deborah Haas Thaler, Esq., Law Offices of Thomas William
Malone, attorney for plaintiffs in Adams v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (July 10, 1996).
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under the terms of his plan." 170 Benefit claims litigation under ERISA is
in the nature of an action to enforce beneficial rights under a trust. 171
Damages are typically limited to the amount of the services in dispute
(that is, contractual damages). 172
In cases brought under either ERISA or state common law, the court
looks to the language in the health care agreement and "as with general
contract terms [attempts] to ascertain and carry out the true intention of
the parties."173 The intent of the parties is presumed to reside in the
language they chose to employ in the agreement and common words
appearing in the contract are "given their plain and ordinary meaning." 174
There are relatively few court opinions involving disputes over
managed care plan coverage for ED care. In three of the half-dozen
cases reported, the plaintiffs lost because of clear noncompliance with
the contract language-they failed to comply with the contract
provisions requiring notification of the plan within a certain number of
hours after receipt of the emergency services. 175 In cases where terms
required judicial interpretation, however, plan members were more
likely to win.

170. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aXlXB) (1994).
171. See Therese M. Connerton, Suits by Beneficiaries Against Plans or Employers to Recover
Benefits, CA23 ALI-ABA 207,213 (Feb. 1, 1996), available in WESTLAW, A.L.l.-A.B.A. CLE
Materials File (explaining that principles of common law of trusts are incorporated into federal
common law of employee benefits to guide courts in absence of express ERISA rules). The
standard of review in cases involving benefits is a de novo standard unless the plan's governing
documents vest the plan fiduciary with discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits
or to construe the tenns of the plan documents, in which case the court applies an abuse of
discretion standard. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
172 See Basanta, supra note 154, at 362-63.
173. See White v. Keychoice Welfare Benefit Plan, 827 F. Supp. 690, 696 (D. Wyo. 1993)
(applying ERISA); see also Kelley v. HMO Health Ohio, No. 259003, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS
5200, at *7 (Nov. 22, I 995) (unpublished opinion) (applying state common law).
174. See Kelley, !995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5200, at *7.
175. See Glass v. Complete Health Inc., No. 93-0938-RV-C, 1994 U.S. Dirt. LEXIS 14510 (S.D.
Ala Oct. 12, 1994) (unreported opinion) (dismissing plaintiff's claim, among other reasons, for
failure to notifY plan within 24 hours after receipt of emergency services as required by Group
Master Contract), affd, 74 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1996); Humana Hospital-B.1yside v. Lightle, 407
S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1991) (denying coverage for emergency services to HMO subscriber for failure to
notifY HMO within 48 hours of any hospitalization for emergency services in out of area hospital
as required by plan); see also Kelley, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5200, at *14 (affirming trial court's
summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff was seeking coverage for emergency treatment for
head injuries on grounds that plaintiff's extended inpatient stay for alcohol
detoxification/rehabilitation did not constitute emergency services within terms of health plan and
even if it did, coverage was not warranted because plaintiff failed to give ?ian required 24-hour
notification).
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a.

Judicial Interpretation ofContract Terms-Favorable to the
Insured

In cases involving interpretation of contract terms, courts have
appeared to construe the language "as a reasonable person in the position
of the HMO participant, not the actual participant, would have
understood the words to mean."176 In White v. Keychoice Welfare Benefit
Plan, 171 the case to articulate most clearly this standard of review in a
dispute over emergency care, the plaintiff, Jerry Lee White, became
seriously ill and was taken to the ED at Wyoming Medical Center. He
was diagnosed as having a pelvic diverticular abscess that had
penetrated into the supradural region of his spinal cord. His physician
believed this was a severe, life-threatening infection and directed that
White be airlifted to Denver to expedite therapy for a life-threatening
problem and to minimize any neurological damage that might occur as a
result of prolonged ground transport to Denver. 178
White's HMO denied coverage for the cost of the air ambulance$4185.15.179 The denial was based on the language in the plan's Group
Contract, which only covered ambulance services for surface
transportation. The court noted that the Group Contract was not provided
to employees. Instead, they received a Summary Plan Description
(SPD), which did not indicate that air ambulance services were not
covered. The SPD also stated that, "If any conflicts arise between the
[SPD] and the plan documents (contracts), the plan documents will
govem." 180
Because the plan in question was an ERISA plan, the court looked to
the provisions of ERISA requiring that an SPD must "be written in a
manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and
be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the
plan." 181 The court cited prior case law interpreting ERISA to hold that
in reviewing the SPD and Group Contract, ''the standard to be applied
will be that of a reasonable person in the position of an employee
welfare benefit plan participant."182 Based on this standard, the court
176. See White, 827 F. Supp. at 696.

177. /d.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

/d. at 692.
/d.
/d. at 693.
!d. at694(citing29U.S.C. § 1022(aX1)(1994)).
/d. at 696.
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found that the air ambulance cost was covered under the plan. The court
quoted from precedent in explaining its decision:
The ambiguity in the summary plan description must be resolved
in favor of the employee and made binding against the drafter. Any
burden of uncertainty created by careless or inaccurate drafting of
the summary must be placed on those who do the drafting, and
who are most able to bear that burden, and not the individual
employee, who is powerless to affect the drafting of 1he summary
of the policy and ill equipped to bear the financial hardship that
might result from a misleading or confusing document. Accuracy
is not a lot to ask. And it is especially not a lot to ask in return for
the protection afforded by ERISA's preemption of state law causes
of action-causes of action which threaten considerably greater
liability than that allowed by ERISA. 183
Although White was based on ERISA, the few non-ERISA cases
apply similar long-standing common law rules of contract and insurance
policy interpretation. 184 Where policy language is clear., it is generally
enforced as written, even where enforcement disadvantages the insured.
Where there are questions of interpretation the terms are generally
construed to protect the reasonable expectations of the insured. 185
However, such a standard is not always expressly articulated. 186 Nor
does its application mean that the plan member will always succeed in
his claim.

b.

A Decision for the Plan

In Fort Sanders Loudon Medical Center v. Bump, 187 plan subscriber
Richard Bump was denied coverage for several ED visits because the
183. /d. at 697-98 (quoting Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991)).
184. See Kelley v. HMO Health Ohio, No. 259003, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5200 (Nov. 22,
1995); Fort Sanders Loudon Med. Ctr. v. Bump, No. 03A01-9207-CV-00262, 1993 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 86 (Jan. 28, 1993).
185. Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law § 6.3(aX3), at 633 (1988). But see
Robert H. Jeny, II, Understanding Insurance Law 143 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that ''the existence of
an ambiguity in the policy is not a predicate for the .•• application [of the doctrine of the
reasonable expectations of the insured]" and that at least 16 states have applied doctrine in absence
of ambiguous policy terms).
186. See, e.g., Medical Ctr. Health Plan v. Brick, 572 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that plan arguably covered two out of three of plaintiff's ED visits, presumably because
plan agreement was somewhat ambiguous regarding circumstances that would support emergency).
187. No. 03A01-9207-CV-00262, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Jan. 28, 1993) (unpublished
decision).
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court found that the treatment afforded Bump did not "qualify under the
policy as emergency services which may be rendered without
authorization of the primary care physician." 188 Bump had been
experiencing migraine headaches and had been assigned by the plan to a
primary care physician.189 When Bump sustained headaches after his
primary care physician's normal office hours, he would go to the ED for
treatment. 190 The medical charges in question were for fifteen ED visits
from January 22, 1989 through November 20, 1989. 191 The visits were
not preauthorized. 192 The plan stated that emergency services rendered
under circumstances for treatment of an accidental injury or a medical
emergency would be covered if not authorized. 193 Medical emergency
was defined as "a serious health-threatening or disabling condition
manifested by severe symptoms occurring suddenly and unexpectedly
which could reasonably be expected to result in serious physical
impairment or loss of life if not treated immediately."194 Although not
express in its reasoning, the court apparently felt that Bump's
expectations that the visits were covered were not reasonable given the
terms of the policy.
Thus, if the terms of an individual's coverage regarding emergency
services are unclear, he may recover in court for the cost of such services
if his use of the services was "reasonable" in light of the language in the
insurance policy. This, however, assumes individuals have the resources
necessary to bring a legal action in the first place to prove their
reasonableness-an obstacle that many individuals will not be able to
overcome. Moreover, if the case involves an ERISA plan, individuals
may have a difficult time securing a lawyer to represent them, due to
"ERISA's limited damage and attorneys' fees." 195

3.

Suing the Plan (Gatekeeper) Physician

Although ERISA preempts most suits against managed care plans, it
does not preempt suits against managed care physicians. Yet,
/d. at •8.
/d. at •6.
/d.
/d.
Id. at •8.
/d.
/d. at •4.
Patricia Butler & Karl Polzer, Private-Sector Health Coverage: Variation in Consumer
Protections Under ERISA and State Law 26 (1996).
188.
189.
190.
191.
192
193.
194.
195.

359
HeinOnline -- 72 Wash. L. Rev. 359 1997

Washington Law Review

Vol. 72:315, 1997

remarkably, few such suits have been brought or, perhaps more
accurately, have resulted in published opinions. 196 One stumbling block
to such suits has been an argument that physician gatekeepers have not
established a physician-patient relationship with the managed care
member. 197 Often, such physicians never meet the plan member and may
never have spoken to them on the phone. Typically, the gatekeeper
speaks directly to ED personnel.
This argument, however, was discredited in Hand v. Tavera. 198 In
Hand, Lewis Hand, an enrollee in an HMO in San Antonio, Texas, and
his wife, sued his primary care physician for failure to approve his
treatment by an ED. 199 Hand, forty-nine years old with a history of high
blood pressure, came to the ED of Humana Hospital complaining of a
three-day headache.200 The ED physician, Dr. Daniel Boyle, was told
that Hand's father had died of an aneurysm.2° 1 Boyle also observed that
Hand's symptoms rose and fell with his blood pressure and that his
blood pressure dropped periodically in response to medication.202 Boyle,
after observing Hand for a few hours, determined that Hand could be
"on the brink of a stroke and should be admitted to the hospital."203 Dr.
Boyle called Dr. Robert Tavera, who was Hand's primary care physician
and who was responsible that evening for authorizing admissions for his
practice's HMO patients.204 Boyle briefed Tavera by telephone and
recommended hospitalization.205 Tavera, however, disagreed with
Boyle's assessment and "concluded that Hand could be treated as an
outpatient" with medication and follow-up. 206 Hand "was sent home,

196. Id. at 50 ("One ERISA expert noted that, due to lack of potential remuneration, few lawyers
have developed expertise representing employees in ERISA health plan litigation.").
197. Another explanation for the small number of suits of this type is that plaintiffs' attorneys
perceive managed care plans rather than the plan physicians as ultimately responsible for decisions
to deny care. Id.
198. 864 S.W.2d 678 (fex. Ct. App. 1993).
199. ld. at 679.
200. Id. at 678-79.
201. Id. at 679.
202. Id.
203. Texas Malpractice Case Clarifies Liability ofGatekeeper Physicians, Med. & Health, May
I, 1995, at 3, 3.
204. Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 679.
205. ld.
206. Id.
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where he suffered a stroke a few hours later."207 He remains disabled
from the stroke.208
Hand subsequently sued Tavera, Boyle, the health plan, and the
hospital. He ultimately settled with the health plan209 and the hospital
and dropped the case against Boyle after finding no negligence on his
part.210 At a hearing on the suit against Tavera before the District Court
of Bexar County, Texas, Tavera moved for summary judgment "on the
sole ground that he and Hand never established a physician-patient
relationship and therefore he owed Hand no duty" of care.211 The lower
court granted the summary judgment.212
On appeal, the decision was reversed.213 The court of appeals found
that ''when the health-care plan's insured shows up at a participating
hospital emergency room, and the plan's doctor on call is consulted
about treatment or admission, there is a physician-patient relationship
between the doctor and the insured."214 The contract between the
Humana plan and Tavera was determined to be the basis for the
physician-patient relationship. 215 The court found that:
[T]he contracts ... show[ed] that the Humana plan brought Hand
and Tavera together just as surely as though they had met directly
and entered the physician-patient relationship.... In effect, Hand
had paid in advance for the services of the Humana plan doctor on

207. /d.
208. Texas Malpractice Case Clarifies Liability ofGatekeeper Physicians, supra note 203.
209. Humana Health Care Plans successfully argued "that as agents for Hand's employer-who
was self-insured-they were shielded under ... ERISA." Don Finley, Malpractice Suit to Have
Impact-Ruling in Case Having Ripple Effect in Medical, Legal Community, San Antonio ExpressNews, May 14, 1995, available in 1995 \VL 5561172.
210. Telephone conversation with Randall Jackson, Esq., Attorney for Lewis Hand (July 13,
1995). In addition, Hand could not have sued Boyle for a violation of EMTALA because the Act
does not provide a private civil action for damages against individual doctors who violate the
federal statute. It provides only a civil fme against offending physicians. In contrast, the Act
provides for civil damage suits against offending hospitals. See Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 680 (referring
to Hand's additional claim against Tavera); infra note 208 and accompanying text.
211. Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 679.
212 /d. at 678.
213. Id. at 678, 681.
214. /d. at 679.
215. The contract provided that "PHYSICIAN agrees to provide or arrange for covered health
care services for ENROLLEES in accordance with ATTACHMENT B [Attachment B specifies
various physician responsibilities, including 'emergency care of a covered ENROLLEE who has
been assigned to PHYSICIAN']." /d.
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duty that night, who happened to be Tavera, and the physicianpatient relationship existed.216
The court also found that, under the contract between the HMO and the
medical group that employed Tavera, the physicians in the group were
"obligated ... to treat Humana [plan] enrollees as they would treat their
other patients." 217
4.

The Limited Reach ofEMTALA

Although ED physicians and hospitals that provide emergency
services may be penalized under EMfALA for failur,;: to screen and
stabilize managed care patients who appear at the hospital seeking
emergency care, and hospitals may be sued for harms suffered by
patients for refusal of care, EMfALA does not allow for administrative
or private actions against managed care plans.218 Thus, patients have not
been able to use EMTALA against managed care plans that deny
authorization for ED services.
C.

The Medicare Approach: A Possible Model?

Although private managed care plan members have few protections or
remedies regarding receipt of emergency care, those in public insurance
programs do enjoy some protections. Those safeguards have been
developed most extensively for Medicare beneficiaries.219 These
216. !d.
217. !d. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine negligence on the part of Tavera
but the case was settled prior to trial.
218. See Deannas v. Av-Med, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that
EMTALA does not apply to HMOs or similar health plan providers). However, in limited
circumstances, administrative actions might be brought against managed care physicians. See
Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 680. In Hand, the plaintiff's brief also argued that Tavera, as an "on-call"
physician, violated EMTALA. Plaintiff's Brief at 16, Hand (No. 04-92-00618-CV). EMTALA
requires hospitals to maintain a list of on-call doctors to treat emergency patients. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395cc(aXl)(I)(iii) (1994). Furthermore, "doctors accepting 'on-call' co•rerage are required to
provide timely treatment in accordance with anti-dumping requirements." Plaintiff's Brief at 16,
Hand (No. 04-92-00618-CV) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(l) (1994)). Although the court rejected
this claim because the statute does not include a private right of actior for damages against
physicians who violate it, an administrative enforcement action, arguably, could be brought against
physicians in these limited circumstances (that is, where the gatekeeper is also the "on-call"
physician). See Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 680.
219. There ar.: several arrangements that allow Medicare beneficiaries to ~~nroll in managed care
plans. HMOs offer coverage through two types of Medicare contracting options. The first are "riskbased contracts" under which an HMO accepts a per capita payment for each Medicare beneficiary
who chooses to enroll. The second type of HMO option is a cost-based contJact. Under this option,
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protections include regulations stating that plans cannot require prior
authorization for emergency services220 and an interpretation of coverage
for emergency services that is favorable to the enrollee.221
Medicare law provides that disputes between beneficiaries and
managed care plans over emergency care or other benefits are subject to
an appeal process.222 An initial appeal is provided by the plan itself. But
if this appeal is not totally favorable to the enrollee, the case is
automatically referred to the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA). 223 In 1989, HCFA hired a contractor, Network Design Group,
Inc. (NDG),224 to conduct a prospective review of requests by Medicare
beneficiaries for reconsideration after disputes with their managed care

an HMO is paid a predetennined monthly amount based on an estimate of the total cost of
Medicare covered services for enrolled beneficiaries. At the end of the year, adjustments are made,
based on the amount of services actually provided. Medicare beneficiaries may also join a third
type of managed care organization called a competitive medical plan (CMP). A CMP is a
prepayment organization that does not meet the strict requirements of the HMO provisions of the
Public Health Service Act for federally certified HMOs but that still is capable of providing
services to Medicare beneficiaries on a prepaid basis. 42 C.F.R. § 417.407(c) (1996).
220. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.414(cXl) (1996) ("An HMO or CMP must assume financial
responsibility and provide reasonable reimbursement for emergency services and urgently needed
services .•• that are obtained by its Medicare enrollees from providers and suppliers outside the
HMO or CMP even in the absence of the HMO's or CMP's prior approval.").
221. See discussion infra notes 269-271 and accompanying text.
222 The Medicare managed care appeals process was modeled after, "and is comparable to, the
multi-level due process procedures in the Medicare [fee-for-service] program. These appeal
SYStems derived from a long histozy of Congressional efforts to protect Social Security Act
beneficiaries from inappropriate adverse benefit decisions." David A. Richardson et al., Network
Design Group, Inc., HCFA Cooperative Agreement No. 17-C-9007012-01, A Study of Coverage
Denial Disputes Between Medicare Beneficiaries and HMOs 9 (Sept. 1993) (on file with
Washington Law Review).
223. In this respect, the appeal process under Medicare for managed care enrollees is unique.
"By comparison, employer group HMO programs rely almost exclusively on the HMO's internal
grievance SYStem to address disputes." ld. at 11. There are at least two significant implications of
this type of independent third-party review. First, "[p]lans are aware that evezy (appealed) benefit
denial will come under the direct scrutiny of its payor (HCFA). Consequently, the Medicare appeal
program may act to deter inappropriate or marginal claim denials. Secondly, the system generates a
census of benefit denials contested by enrollees." ld. These data are not readily available in
employer group programs.ld. Once HCFA has made its determination, the beneficiazy may appeal
the decision to a Social Security Administration administrative law judge (AU) if the amount in
controversy is more than $100.ld. at 10, fig. 2.1. The beneficiazy may request subsequent Appeals
Council review of the AU's decision as well as judicial review if the amount in dispute exceeds

$1000.ld.
224. In August 1996, NDG changed its name to the Center for Health Dispute Resolution, but it
will be referred to as NDG in this Article.
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plan.225 From 1989 to 1992, the contrac~or processed more than ten
thousand reconsideration cases to determine if the plan had "correctly''
or "incorrectly'' denied the initial request for payment.226 In
approximately sixty percent of the cases, the contractor determined that
the plans correctly denied benefits, but in forty perce:tJ.t of the cases
benefits were incorrectly withheld.227 Disputes over emergency care
were a significant number of the reconsideration cases.228
The contractor also completed a more detailed analysis of a sample of
over seven hundred reconsideration cases.229 Approximately sixty
percent of the sample cases involved disputes over either in-area
emergency services or "urgent" out-of-area services.230 In these cases,
plan denials were upheld seventy-five and sixty percent of the time,
respectively. 231
The authors of the study concluded that these case types were
"dispute prone" and most often decided against the beneficiary in part
because of HCFA's regulatory definitions of "emergency" and
''urgent."232 The regulations define "emergency services" as:
[C]overed inpatient or outpatient services that are furnished by an
appropriate source other than the HMO or CMP and 1hat meet the
following conditions:
(1) Are needed immediately because of an injury or su.dden illness.
(2) Are such that the time required to reach the HMO's or CMP's
providers or suppliers (or alternatives authorized by the HMO
or CMP) would mean risk of permanent damage to the
enrollee's health.233
According to the authors of the study:
These definitions place [enrollees] in the unreasonable position of
making quasi-clinical evaluations of their symptoms and
conditions and do not, expressly, make allowance for subjective
experience (e.g., pain or suffering). As a consequence, enrollees
225. Subsequently, HCFA contracted with NDG to serve as the outside reviewer for all
Medicare HMO requests for reconsideration. Telephone conversation with David Richardson,
President, Network Design Group (Apr. 1996).
226. See Richardson, supra note 222, at 53.
227. ld.
228. !d. at 51.
229. ld. at 65-66.
230. ld. at 3.
231. ld.
232 ld.
233. 42 C.F.R. § 417.401 (1996).
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who appear to act prudently from a lay perspective may face
substantial or even catastrophic out-of-pocket liabilities.234
They further determined that "some denials place enrollees who make
'honest and reasonable' mistakes" at great financial risk, which may
ultimately benefit providers.235 These penalties, they concluded,
"seem ... out of proportion to the offense while creating perverse
provider incentives."236
In January 1992, HCFA revised its manual regarding emergency care
for Medicare managed care beneficiaries.237 Although the definition of
"emergency services" was not changed, the new guidelines provide that:
An emergency is determined at the time a service is
delivered. ... If it is clearly a case of routine illness where the
patient's medical condition never was, or never appeared to be, an
emergency as defined above, then [the plan is] not responsible for
payment of claims for the services. [Plans may] not retroactively
deny a claim because a condition, which appeared to be an
emergency, turns out to be non-emergency in nature.238

Moreover, the guidelines provide that "[a]ll procedures performed
during evaluation and treatment of an emergency condition related to the
care of that condition must be covered."239 In the period between January
1992 and June 1994, HCFA also began to rethink its definition of
emergency services and make some refinements to the definition in
terms of guidelines for their contractor, NDG, in reviewing claims.
These guidelines provided that an emergency should be determined from
the perspective of the beneficiary.240
Based on these refinements, in June 1994, NDG distributed a
newsletter, Reconsideration Notes, to Medicare managed care providers,
describing how they would be reviewing disputes regarding emergency
care services and hoping to educate plans as to how to assess these cases

234. Richardson, supra note 222, at 3.
235. /d. at 4.
236. /d.
237. HMO!CMP Manual§ 2104 (9th rev. eel. Jan. 1992).
238. CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide~ 13,960.22, at 5842 (1996).
239. /d. For example, the guidelines state that where a member who is treated in an ED for chest
pain and the attending physician orders diagnostic pulmonruy angiography as part of the
evaluation, the plan may not decide, upon retrospective review, that the angiography was
unnecessruy and refuse to cover this service. /d.
240. See infra notes 241-244 and accompanying text.
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on their initial review.241 The Notes state that, when applying the
definition of emergency care, a key issue is the risk to th.e health of the
enrollee that would result if access to medical treatment was
significantly delayed.242 In determining that risk, NDG stated that it
recognizes that plans will likely apply "expert medical judgment" but it
warned plans that they cannot expect enrollees to have clinical expertise;
rather enrollees ''will generally make the assessment of risk as lay
patients."243 Specifically, the Notes explain that:
[T]he HCFA HM:O/CMP Manual § 2104.1 makes c:lear that [a
managed care plan] must base its determination on th.e member's
presenting symptoms and conditions, not the diagnosis established
after medical evaluation....
Accordingly, NDG will begin its evaluation of emergency/urgent
cases by giving consideration to the expert medical assessment of
the Plan. However, NDG will not ignore credible member
testimony-particularly contemporaneous to the emergency/urgent
care
seeking-in
judging
whether
"risk''
exists.
"Contemporaneous" testimony includes, for example: member
statements recorded in ambulance vendor notes; statements made
to family or friends; and ER Department notes. Testimony NDG
would weigh strongly includes statements like: "I thought I was
having a heart attack"; "it felt like a stroke"; ''there was so much
blood, I didn't think I should wait." In each of these statements, the
member has stated or clearly implied their lay assessment that risk
of permanent damage existed.244
On March 27, 1995, HCFA sent out a letter to all current MedicareContracting HMOs reminding them of policies relating to the provision
of emergency services for Medicare beneficiaries.245
241. Reconsideration Notes (Network Design Group, Inc., Health Care Fin. Admin., Pittsford,
N.Y.}, June 1994, at 2.
242 /d.
243. /d.
244. /d.
245. See Letter from Rodney C. Armstead, M.D., Director, Office of Manag:d Care, Health Care
Financing Administration, to current Medicare-Contracting Health Maintenance Organizations and
Competitive Medical Plans (Mar. 27, 1995) (on file with Washington Law Review). On October 13,
1995, HCFA sent a similar letter to state Medicaid directors regarding Medicaid Managed Care
Plans and Emergency Services. See Letter from Gale A. Drapala, Deputy Director, Office of
Managed Care, HCFA, to Managed Care Plans and Emergency Services (Oct. 13, 1995) (on file
with Washington Law Review). Although the Medicaid state and federal regulations do not address
this issue directly, HCFA has interpreted the requirement for Medicaid coverage of emergency
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During the period January 1992 to December 1995, the number of
reconsideration requests regarding Medicare managed care and
emergency care declined significantly from approximately one in two
thousand enrollees in 1992, to one in five thousand enrollees in 1995.246
During the same time frame there was also a decrease in the percent of
plan decisions upheld from seventy~eight percent in 1992 to seventy~two
percent in 1995 and a corresponding increase in percent of plan
decisions overturned-from nineteen to twenty~five percent.247
The downward trend in the number of plan decisions upheld may be
attributable to the more recent application of the "patient~centered"
definition of emergency services applied by NDG. However, there has
been no systematic effort to study this question, and it is difficult to
interpret the data in light of the decline in total number of requests for
reconsideration of plan decisions to deny coverage of emergency care.
The latter decline may mean that plans are doing a better job at the
initial plan level of appeal in interpreting the definition of emergency
condition and/or of educating enrollees about the appropriate use of
emergency services. This would mean that the bulk of cases being
submitted for reconsideration are those where plans believe the use of
EDs is unreasonable from the perspective of the plan member. Thus,
these cases would be more difficult to decide at the reconsideration level
and one might expect a fairly even number of cases overturned and
upheld. On the other hand, the reduction in number of requests for

setvices to parallel the Medicare requirements, that is, that a Medicaid HMO must "assume
financial responsibility and provide reasonable reimbursement for emergency setvices and urgently
needed setvices ••• that are obtained by its Medica[id] enrollees from providers and suppliers
outside the HMO ..• even in the absence of the HMO's ... prior approval." 42 C.F.R. §
417.414(cXl) (1996). The letter from Drapala, however, did not inform Medicaid Directors of how
HCFA interprets emergency setvices for Medicaid beneficiaries based on the reasonable perception
of the beneficiacy. Letter from Gale A. Drapala, supra. More recently, HFCA has drafted another
letter on this issue to All Medicare-Contracting Health Maintenance Organizations and
Competitive Medical Plans. The letter clarifies the definition of Emergency Setvices, by stating
that the "determination of whether an emergency exists should be made from the perspective of the
patient and within the context of the circumstances existing at the time the patient sought
emergency care. Beneficiaries, therefore, have a right to emergency setvice if they have symptoms
of sufficient severity and sudden onset and they are acting reasonably given their knowledge,
experience and state of mind." Memorandum from Bruce M. Fried, Director, HCFA Office of
Managed Care, to All Medicare-Contracting Health Maintenance Organizations and Competitive
Medical Plans, Draft (Apr. 3, 1997) (on file with Washington Law Review).
246. Network Design Group, Inc., Medicare HMO/CMP Reconsideration Project, Computer
Printouts ofReconsideration Statistics (Sept. 23, 1996) (on file with Washington Law Review).
247. /d. According to statistics provided by the Reconsideration Project on September 23, 1996,
the percentages of ED cases upheld and overturned in 1996 were approximately two-thirds and
one-third, respectively, indicating a continuing trend. /d.
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reconsideration could mean that plans are not making enrollees aware of
the appeals process.248
·Although there is some evidence that the Medicare approach has been
responsible for helping to reduce the number of beneficiaries who are
retroactively denied coverage for emergency care, the ~:uidelines for a
patient-centered standard for review are limited to Medicare enrollees,
and they are simply guidelines-they have not been included in the
Medicare statute or adopted as formal regulations.249

D.

Recent State Legislation

1.

Limited and Comprehensive Approaches

During the last three to four years, a number of states also have
recognized the problem of emergency care for managed c~are subscribers
and have passed legislation to deal with it. Much of the earliest
legislation focused narrowly on the problem, simply changing the
definition of emergency condition in the state's HMO Act or health
insurance laws. Many of the more recent state statutes, however, have
taken a more comprehensive approach, attempting to address various
248. Medicare law requires that Medicare HMOs have a comprehensible and publicized
grievance and appeals process. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Managed Care from the
Beneficiary's Perspective, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1163, 1178 (1996). Their internal grievance
procedures must be clearly described in written membership rules. !d. at 1179. Despite these
requirements, some Medicare beneficiaries do not know about the appeals process. One study
found that 25% of beneficiaries who were plan members did not know that they had the right to
appeal their HMO's refusal to provide or pay for seJVices. See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human SeJVs., Pub. No. OEI-06-91-00730, Beneficiary Perspectives ofMedicare Risk
HMOs 8 (Mar. 1995).
Even if members know about the appeal process, however, they may be stymied by its slowness
and defeated by its "arbitrariness." In some cases, enrollees may not be able to get past the plan for
a third-party review of their claim. According to the opinion in a recent class a:tion suit brought by
Medicare beneficiaries denied medically-necessary services, in many cases "the HMOs hide the
ball [and fail to inform Medicare patients that they have] a right to present additional evidence to
the HMO for reconsideration. This omission violates [federal regulations]." Grijalva v. Shalala, 946
F. Supp. 747, 758 (D. Ariz. 1996); see also Robert Pear, Medicare Patients in H.M.O. 's [sic] Win a
Case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1996, at B15.
249. In the 104th Congress, Sen. Bob Graham (Democrat representing Florida) offered an
amendment to the Medicare budget appropriation that would have required plan coverage for ED
visits if a "prudent layperson" would have thought he or she was experiencing an emergency
medical condition. Although the amendment passed on the Senate floor, negotiations on the budget
appropriation package collapsed and the bill was vetoed by President Clinton. See 141 Cong. Rec.
H14136-H14137 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (veto message of President Clinton). In his most recent
Medicare budget proposal, however, President Clinton has incorporated the "prudent layperson"
standard. President's Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Proposal (last modified Apr. 7, 1997)
<http://www.hcfagov/~gs/fy98.html> (on file with Washington Law Review).
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aspects of the problem, from preauthorization requirements to who
should be required to pay for services received.
a.

The First Round

Maryland was the first state to pass legislation addressing this
problem. In 1991 and 1992, emergency care physicians in the state
began to notice what they considered to be a pattern of abuse on the part
of HMOs in the use of EDs. They felt that HMOs and other managed
care plans were sending their patients to out-of-network EDs in order to
satisfy their legal mandate to provide emergency services to their
subscribers.250 They also believed that liMOs had an incentive to do this
under the payment provisions of the state's HMO Act.2Sl Under the Act,
non-HMO providers in emergency facilities who treated HMO patients
were required to accept a fee for their services that was determined by
the HMO and state insurance commission, without input from or review
by non-HMO providers.252 These rates were significantly below the
customary fee charged by EDs for their services. In some cases,
emergency physicians also observed that plans would retroactively deny
coverage for the services provided by the ED.
In response to these practices, emergency physicians in the state
proposed legislation that would: (1) require that HMO emergency rates
be established in an open process-subject to public review and
comment, and not based on Medicare and Medicaid rates; 253 and (2)
change the definition of emergency services in the HMO Act so that it
would be more beneficial to patients. They proposed that "emergency
services" be defined as:
[1]hose health care services that are provided in a hospital
emergency facility after the sudden onset of a medical condition
that manifests itself by symptoms of sufficient severity, including
severe pain, that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected by a prudent lay person, who possesses an
average knowledge ofhealth and medicine, to result in:
Placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy;
Serious impairment to bodily functions; or
250. See Intetview with DavidS. Davis, M.D., J.D., Chair, Public Policy Committee, Maryland
Chapter of ACEP, in Baltimore, Md. (July 14, 1995).
251. See Maryland Health Maintenance Organization Act, Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II §§
19-701 to -735 (Supp. 1996).
252 See Intetview with David S. Davis, supra note 250.
253. S. 701, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1993) (codified at Md. Code. Ann., Health Gen. II§ 19-716).
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Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.254
The definition was taken, in part, from HCFA's revised interpretation
of emergency services.255 Maryland's HMO Act provides that HMOs
practicing in the state must provide emergency services.256 Thus, the
change in definition would require HMOs to cover emergency services
as defined in the statute. They would no longer be able to decide
unilaterally how emergency would be defined. The state emergency
physicians, with the help of the state hospital association, were
successful in getting both bills passed. The changes became effective on
October 1, 1993. Within the first eighteen months after the law took
effect, a representative from the State Insurance Commission stated at a
hearing at the State Legislature that the Commission had seen a
significant decline in the number of complaints against HMOs involving
emergency care.257
In 1995, two additional states-Virginia and Arkansas-passed
legislation in this area. Both followed the Maryland model of including a
statutory definition of emergency services that would apply to HMO
services and of basing that definition on a "prudent layperson" standard.
The Arkansas Legislature passed a free-standing bill entitled "Definition
of Emergency Medical Care Act."258 The Virginia Legislature, like the

254. S. 701 (codified at Md. Code. Ann., Health Gen. II§ 19-701(d) (emph-asis added)).
255. See Interview with David S. Davis, supra note 250.
256. Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II§ 19-701(f)(2)(1996).
257. See telephone interview with Randy Reichel, Associate Commissioner, Maryland Insurance
Administration (July 18, 1995). The statement was made on February 16, 1994 in Ms. Reichel's
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on S. 450, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1994). Although Ms.
Reichel made this statement, the Insurance Commission has no empirical evidence to confirm her
impressions.
258. The law defines "emergency medical care" as:
[H]ealth care services provided in a hospital emergency facility to evaluate and treat medical
conditions of a recent onset and severity, including, but not limited to, severe pain that would
lead a prudent layperson, possessing an average knowledge ofmedicine and health, to believe
that his or her condition, sickness, or injury is of such a nature that failure to get immediate
medical care could result in: (A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy; (B) serious
impairment to bodily functions; (C) or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
Ark. Code Ann.§ 20-9-309(cX1) (Michie Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). The Legislature stated in
the policy and purpose section of the new law,
Because of the need for rapid assessment and care, in order to protect the lite and health of the
people of Arkansas, during a medical emergency, it is hereby found and declared necessary:
1) To establish a definition for emergency medical care
2) To ensure that emergency medical care is provided in a timely manner by
licensed and qualified personnel at a hospital's emergency department; and
3) To ensure that emergency medical care is not delayed or denied based on:
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Maryland Legislature, dealt with this issue through an amendment to its
existing HMO law.259

b.

The Second Round

California, the "birthplace of HMOs," and the state with one of the
highest HMO enrollments,260 was one of the first to take a more
comprehensive legislative approach to the problem of managed care and
emergency care. The California Medical Association sponsored a bill,
which passed and then took effect on January 1, 1995.261 Since
California passed its broad law, a handful of other states also have
adopted more comprehensive legislation to address this problem?62
Common features of these statutes include (1) a new definition of
emergency services; (2) restrictions on the use of prior authorization; (3)
twenty-four hour telephone access for authorization for treatment of
non-emergency conditions by an out-of-network provider; and (4)
required coverage for federally mandated ED screening and treatment.

a) A person's ability to pay for expenses incurred during a medical emergency;
or
b) Prospective authorization of treatment by an insurance company, health
maintenance organization, hospital medical service corporation, health
benefit plan, or any other insurer.
Ark. Code Ann.§ 20-9-309(b) (Michie Supp. 1995).
259. Va. Code Ann.§ 38.2-4300 (Michie Supp. 1996).
260. See Western Market Characterized by Extremes, but Choice Seen as Common Thread,
Managed Care Outlook, Nov. 29, 1996, at 1, 5.
261. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1371.4 (Deering Supp. 1996). Although comprehensive in
nature, the legislation includes an exemption. The law provides that most of the requirements do
not apply
with respect to either a provider with which the health care service plan has a contract that
includes the provision of emergency services and care and necessacy medical care or a health
care service plan that has 3,500,000 enrollees and maintains a prior authorization system that
includes telephone availability (within 30 minutes) of an emergency physician who is on duty
at an emergency department of a general acute care hospital.

!d. Based on this provision, California's largest HMO, Kaiser Permanente, as well as hospitals
contracted by HMOs to provide emergency care for their members are exempt from the law's
emergency requirements. See Health Letter, supra note 12, at 3.
262 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 20-821,-923,-1068, -1137, -2801 to -2804 (West Supp.
1996); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 641.513 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 31-11-80 to -82, (1996);
Ga. Code Ann.§§ 33-20A-l to -10,33-21-1,-13,-18.1 (Supp. 1996); New York Regulation of the
Delivelj' of Managed Care Act, S. 7553, 219th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996). Macyland also
passed a second statute making its coverage of the issue more comprehensive. Md. Code Ann.,
Health-Gen. II§§ 19-705.l(b), -712.5,-716 (Supp. 1996).
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While some statutes include more unique features, 263 these four are the
predominant elements of most legislation and are discussed in more
detail below.

1)

Definition ofEmergency Services

Some states taking a more comprehensive approach have adopted the
prudent layperson standard originally passed in Marylan.d.264 However,
other states have not modified their definition of emergency services or
have adopted a slightly different formulation of the prudent layperson
standard. The California statute, for example, requires that plans pay for
emergency services provided by a non-participating hospital without
prior authorization unless the patient did not need emergency care and
reasonably should have known that an emergency did not exist.265
Minnesota and Pennsylvania also take a slightly different approach to
determining what constitutes emergency for the purposes of plan
coverage. Pennsylvania law provides that in making a de-cision whether
263. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803 (requiring health plans. to have physician
specialists available 24 hours per day to provide emergency specialty care and if plan fails to
provide appropriate specialist within reasonable time of request for specialty consultation,
provision of necessary medical care by any available provider is deemed authorized by plan, and
payment for such care may not be denied). Specialty consultation for treatm~nt of an immediate
life-threatening medical condition is deemed authorized by plan and payment filr such care may not
be denied. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803. Florida requires:
[In] providing for emergency services and care as a covered service, a hr~lth maintenance
organization may not ... (b) Indicate that emergencies are covered only if care is secured
within a certain period of time; (c) Use terms such as "life threatening" or "bona fide" to
qualify the kind of emergency that is covered; (d) Deny payment based on the subscriber's
failure to notify the health maintenance organization in advance of seeking treatment or within
a certain period of time after the care is given.
Fla Stat. Ann.§ 641.513 (West 1996); see Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4(d) (providing for
dispute resolution mechanisms between plans and providers). California Jaw provides that in
disputes between plans and examining physician over need for further care aiter patient has been
stabilized, plan must have its own medical staff take over case or transfer patit:nt to hospital under
contract with plan. § 1371.4(d). If the plan fails to do so, further treatment at first hospital will be
deemed authorized and payment for it shall not be denied. § 1371.4(d). Arizona Jaw provides that
in any disputes between plans and emergency department providers over medical necessity of
specific emergency services, plan must assume care of enrollee within reasonable period of time
after disagreement and if it does not, plan may not deny coverage for medically-necessary
emergency services provided due to lack of prior authorization. See Ariz. Rt:v. Stat. Ann. § 202803(0); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2804 (including provisions regaroing patient payment
for care; generally, providing that if it is determined that care was not emergency, patient may be
responsible for payment to hospital and provider); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 614.51J(3Xa) (same); H.R.
859, 1996 Md. Laws ch. 503 (same).
264. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann.§ 33-20A-3(2); S. 7553 (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996).
265. Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4(c).
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to reimburse a member of a managed care plan for emergency services,
a plan must consider the patient's presenting symptoms and the services
provided.266 Also, in Minnesota, instead of adopting the "prudent
layperson" terminology, regulations provide that emergency services are
those that "a reasonable person" would have believed could not wait
until the next work day or until an appointment could be made.267

2)

Restrictions on Plans' Ability To Require Preauthorization for
Emergency Services

Most of the states that have passed legislation in this area have
provisions in their laws addressing prior authorization for emergency
care.268 Most prohibit any preauthorization requirement as a condition
for reimbursement of any services necessary to comply with federal law.
For example, the California law states that as long as federal or state law
requires that emergency services and care be provided without first
questioning the patient's ability to pay, a health care services plan shall
not require a provider to obtain authorization prior to the provision of
emergency services and care.269 A few states limit the prohibition on
prior authorization to services that a reasonable person or prudent
layperson would think are necessary to treat an emergency condition.270
Finally, a few state statutes set limits on plan requirements for prior
authorization for post-stabilization treatment or nonemergency treatment
for someone who seeks care at the ED. For example, the Arizona law
provides:
A health care services plan may require as a condition of coverage
prior authorization for health care services arising after the initial
medical screening examination and immediately necessary
stabilizing treatment. Prior authorization is granted unless denied
or direction of the enrollee's care is initiated by the plan within a

266. Pennsylvania Hospital Emergency Insurer Reimbursement Act, No. 112, 1996 Pa Legis.
Serv. 464 (West).
267. Minn. R. 4685.1010 (7XE) (1996).
268. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 20-2803; Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4; Fla. Stat.
Ann.§ 614.513(1Xa) (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann.§§ 33-20A-5, -20A-9 (Supp. 1996); Md.
Code Ann., Health-Gen. II § 19-712.S(d) (Supp. 1996); W.Va Code§ 33-25A-8d (Supp. 1996);
S. 7553 (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996).
269. Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4(c); see also Fla Stat. Ann. § 641.513(1Xa); Md. Code
Ann., Health-Gen. II§ 19-712.S(c) (Supp. 1996).
270. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1371.4(c); Ga Code Ann. §§ 33-20A-3, -20A-9
(Supp. 1996).
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reasonable period of time after the plan receives the prior
authorization request. 271
3) Twenty-Four Hour Access Requirements to Emergem:y Care
and/or Telephone Access to Plan for Prior Authorization

A few statutes state explicitly that a plan must provide twenty-four
hour access to emergency care. Legislation in Maryland, for example,
provides that an HMO must have a system "for provid'ing a member
with 24-hour access to a physician in cases where there is an immediate
need for medical services, including providing 24-hour access by
telephone to a person who is able to appropriately respond to calls from
members and providers concerning after-hours care."272 To meet this
requirement, Maryland law states that the plan may "prmide for access
to a physician who does not have a contract with the HMO or a facility,
such as a hospital emergency room."273
A few states have required that plans have in place a tw1enty-four hour
telephone access number if any type of preauthorization for ED use is
required.274 Because most of the legislation prohibits preauthorization
for initial screening and stabilization, the twenty-four hour access is
required for authorization for post stabilization treatment. For example,
Arizona law states that a plan that requires prior authorization after
screening and stabilization must provide twenty-four hour access by
phone or fax to respond to requests, and plan personnel must have access
to a physician if necessary to assist in making the determination. 275
4)

Requiring Plans To Reimburse Emergency Care Providers for
Services That Are Required Under Federal Law

Many of the new laws not only prohibit a pr.eauthorization
requirement for emergency services mandated by EMfALA,276 but also
require that plans cover these screening and stabilization services. The
271. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803(C). The statute also states that a provider must attempt to
comply with instructions received after a reasonable period of time, but the plan must cover all
costs incurred up until that time. § 20-2803(C).
272. Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II § 19-705.1 (bX2) (Supp. 1996).
273. § 19-705.1(bX2).
274. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803(0) (West Supp. 1996); Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 1371.4(a) {Deering Supp. 1996); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II § 19-705.l(bX2)
(requiring 24-hour telephone access whether or not preauthorization is required).
275. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803(0).
276. See supra Part II.C.l.
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Arizona law, for example, provides that "[a] health care services plan
shall provide coverage for an initial medical screening examination and
any immediately necessary stabilizing treatment required by the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act."277 In some cases,
coverage is limited to situations where the care is determined to be an
emergency under a prudent layperson standard278 or a reasonable person
standard.279

2.

Unsuccessfol Efforts

In states where this type of legislation has been proposed, it has
generally been supported by emergency care providers and opposed by
managed care plans. In two states, bills that passed the legislature were
subsequently vetoed by the govemor.28 For example, in 1995, the
Maryland Legislature passed and the Governor vetoed House Bill615.281
The bill would have required all managed care plans to pay for any
services provided to its enrollees in a hospital emergency facility
whether or not a reasonable person would have believed they required
emergency services.282 In 1995, proposed legislation on this issue also

°

277. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 20-2803(A) (West Supp. 1996); see also Cal. Health & Safety Code
§ 371.4(b) (Deering Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 641.513 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann.§
33-20A-9 (Supp. 1996); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II § 19-712.5(c) (Supp. 1996); Va. Code
Ann. § 38.2-4300 (Michie Supp. 1996); Minn. R. 4685.1010 (1996); 25 Tex. Admin. Code §
119.52 (1996).
278. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann.§ 33-20A-3, -20A-9 (Supp. 1996); Va. Code Ann.§ 38.2-4300.
279. See Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4; Minn. R. 4685.1010.
280. See infra notes 281-284 and accompanying text.
281. H.R. 615, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1995).
282 In his Jetter to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, the Governor explained his position
on the bill:
The decision to veto this bill was a most difficult one because the bill is an attempt to balance
the interests, sometimes competing, of the major elements in our health care delivezy systemhospitals, emergency room health care providers, health maintenance organizations, and most
importantly, patients. However, the bill is sufficiently burdened with legal and substantive
flaws that fairness requires that it be vetoed.
Letter from Governor Parris N. Glendening to The Honorable Casper R. Taylor, Jr., Speaker of the
House of Delegates, Mazyland General Assembly (May 24, 1995) (on file with Washington Law
Review). The Governor was particularly concerned about changes made by members of the
Conference Committee after the bill had passed both houses. As introduced and passed by the
House, the bill compelled HMOs to reimburse health care providers for "emergency" services
provided in a hospital emergency room. Id. However, the Conference Committee of the House and
Senate significantly expanded the scope of the bill to cover any service rendered in an emergency
room setting. !d. This change and others, the Governor wrote,
have the potential for a significant, unanticipated financial impact not only on the HMO
industzy, and ultimately their subscribers, but on the State as well. Care provided in an
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passed the Texas legislature, but it ultimately was vetoed by Governor
Bush.283 The bill was strongly opposed by the state's managed care
industry.284

3.

Limitations on Effictiveness ofState Statutes-Foiled by ERISA
Again

Although many of these reforms conceptually have merit, the enacted
state laws-even the most comprehensive ones-will be greatly limited
in their effectiveness. A significant obstacle to implementation of state
legislative reforms to address this problem is ERISA. In addition to
preempting state common law claims for malpractice and denial of
benefits, the law also may preempt state statutes attempting to regulate
employee benefit plans.

emergency room is the most expensive way to deliver health care. The bill removes any
financial disincentive for subscribers to seek care in costly settings such as emergency rooms.
For example, under the bill as finally passed, an HMO subscriber including a State employee
in a managed care plan, or a client of the State Medicaid program, could seek treatment at a
hospital emergency room in contravention of the rules of the HMO, ... and yet the HMO or
the State would be liable for payment to the provider.•.. Given that Maryland is currently
shifting toward having a greater percentage of Medicaid patients in manago:d care plans, the
ultimate fiscal impact on the State could be substantial ..•.
/d.

283. On June 16, 1995, Governor Bush vetoed The Patient Protection Act, H.B. 2766, 74th Leg.,
Regular Sess. (Tex. 1995), which, among other significant regulations of managed care plans,
would have set standards for emergency care coverage. In vetoing the bill, the Governor stated:
This Bill attempted the difficult task of balancing the often conflicting interests of the parties
in the health care delivery system while attempting to preserve consumer affordability. Had
that focus remained sharp, good law would have resulted. Unfortunately, the final Bill imposes
numerous new regulations on managed care organizations, adds potentially significant costs to
state and local governments and private employers, and contains exemptions which may give a
competitive advantage to some managed care organizations. The result was tc•o little protection
for patients and much too much protection for special interests.
George W. Bush, Governor of Texas, Proclamation by the Governor of the Stat•! of Texas (June 16,
1995) (transcript on file with Washington Law Review).
284. According to the President of the Texas Medical Association,
No piece of legislation in recent session [of the legislature] was lobbied a> intensely as the
Patient Protection Act. The opponents to this legislation-principally the managed care
industry, the Texas Business Group on Health, and the Texas Association of Business and
Chambers of Commerce-conducted a high-profile advertising campaign that relentlessly
propagandized the legislation..•. These tactics were disingenuous at best. Some local mayors,
chambers of commerce, and even some physicians, panicked by this calculated technique, took
those alerts at face value and appealed to the governor to veto the bill.
Governor Bush Vetoes Patient Protection Act: Message from TMA President Mark J. Kubala, MD,
Action (Texas Med. Ass'n), July 5, 1995, at 2.
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Whether a state law would be preempted requires an analysis of the
state law under ERISA's several preemption provisions. These include
''the 'preemption' clause, the 'savings' clause, and the 'deemer'
clause."285 Under the preemption clause, ERISA preempts state laws
insofar as they "relate to any employee benefit plan."286 The savings
clause creates an exception to this preemption provision for state laws
that regulate insurance "out of deference to the traditional state
regulatory roles in these areas."287 The deemer clause, however,
prohibits states from enlarging the scope of their accepted regulatory
authority in the area of insurance by "providing that states may not treat
self-insured ERISA plans as insurers in order to subject them to state
insurance regulation." 288
Thus, the first step in detennining whether state laws regulating
managed care provision and coverage of emergency care would be
preempted by ERISA is to determine whether they "relate to" an
employee benefit plan. This preemption provision289 historically has
been interpreted expansively by federal courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court.290 However, a more recent decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court suggests that the Court may be contracting its interpretation of the
preemptive reach of the provision. In New York State Conference ofBlue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,291 several
commercial insurers, managed care plans, and their trade organizations
challenged New York's rate setting system for payment of hospital bills
by third party payors on the ground that they were preempted by
ERISA. 292 Both the district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals
285. Roth, supra note 153, at 3 (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)).
286. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
287. Roth, supra note 153, at 3 (commenting on rationale behind 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA)
(1994), which states that "[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B) [(the deemer clause)], nothing
in [ERISA] shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities").
288. Christine C. Rinn, ERISA and Managed Care: The Impact of Travelers, Health Law., Early
Spring 1996, at 19, 19 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XB) (1994), which states that certain
employee benefit plans and trusts shall not be "deemed to be an insurance company [or similar] for
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regular insurance companies, insurance contracts,
banks, trust companies, or investment companies"); see infra notes 282-92 and accompanying text.
289. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
290. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (i987).
291. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
292 /d. at 1675. Under the New York law, ''patients with Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage,
Medicaid patients, and HMO participants are billed at a hospital's DRG rate. Patients covered by
commercial insurers and self-insured plans are billed at the DRG plus a 13% surcharge, which is
retained by the hospital, and an additional 11% surcharge, which is given to the state. HMOs are
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found that the rate setting system "related to ERISA plans because they
could indirectly increase plan costs and influence an ERISA plan's
choice for obtaining medical insurance."293 The U.S. 8upreme Court
reversed. The Court stated that "such state laws [which have only an
indirect economic impact on ERISA plans] do not bear the requisite
'connection with' ERISA plans to trigger pre-emption."294 Thus,
Travelers somewhat narrowed the scope of ERISA preemption and
paved the way for some adjustments to previous broad interpretations of
the "relates to" language.
In CIGNA Healthplan v. Louisiana,295 decided by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals after Travelers, the court found that a state's "any
willing provider'' law-which requires that all licensed health providers
who agree to terms of a preferred provider contract must be accepted as
providers in a preferred provider organization (PPO}-was preempted
by ERISA.296 This decision was based, in part, on an initial
determination that the state law "relates to" employee: benefit plans
within the meaning of ERISA's preemption clause.297 In making its
decision, the court in CIGNA cited the consistent position of the U.S.
Supreme Court that ERISA preempts "state laws that mandat[e]
employee benefit structures or their administration."298
Based on this criterion alone, it would appear that state laws
regulating emergency care for purposes of managed care coverage
would "relate to" ERISA benefit plans. Such statutes arguably mandate
broader coverage than plans might otherwise provide for emergency
care. This appears to be the case even after Travelers' narrowing of
ERISA's preemptive scope.

subject to surcharges as high as 9"/o depending on the number of Medir.aid recipients they
enrolled." Id. at 1674; Rinn, supra note 288, at 19.
293. Travelers, 115 S. Ct at 1675-76; Rinn, supra note 288, at 19.
294. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680. In part, the Court explained its detennination by concluding
that ERISA preemption was not designed to assure cost uniformity and as long as the law did not
"bind plan administrators to any particular choice [for medical insurance or] ••. preclude uniform
administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package," it would not be
preempted. Id. at 1679-80.
295. 82 F.3d 642 (5thCir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 387 (1996).
296. Id. at 650.
297. Id. at 648.
298. Id. at 647 (quoting Travelers, 115 S. Ct. 1678 (1995)). But see Napoletano v. CIGNA
Healthcare, 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996) (holding that "Connecticut's somewhat different version of
an 'any willing provider' law did not relate to employee benefit plans and so was not pre-empted"),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1106 (1997); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Refuse Case on Whether
Health Care Networks Must Be Open to All Doctors, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1996, at Al6.
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The second step in the ERISA preemption analysis is whether the
state law is ''saved" because it regulates insurance.299 In Metropolitan
Lifo Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 300 the U.S. Supreme Court set forth
the requirements that a statute must meet to come within the savings
clause. First, the statute must fit the "common sense" definition of
insurance regulation.301 Second, the statute must satisfy each of the
following tests: (1) it must have the effect of spreading the
policyholders' risk; (2) the practice that it attempts to regulate must be
an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and (3) the statute must be limited to entities within the
insurance industry.302 In CIGNA, the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana's
"any willing provider'' statute did not fit within the savings clause
because it did not satisfy the third element of the second prong of the
test-the statute was not limited to "entities within the insurance
industry."303 The statute stated specifically that it also applied to "'selffunded organizations, Taft-Hartley trusts, or employers who establish or
participate in self-funded trusts or programs,' [as well as] 'health care
financiers, third party administrators, providers, or other
intermediaries. "'304 Thus, under the rationale applied in CIGNA, whether
a state statute regulating emergency care is preempted under ERISA for
all ERISA plans will depend on the types of entities to which the statute
applies. Existing state statutes regulating emergency care typically apply
to health insurance carriers through amendments to the state insurance
laws and to HMOs through the state's HMO Act. Most states now have
such statutes regulating HMOs.305 Although these statutes would appear
to be safe from ERISA attack,306 that conclusion is not certain.307
299. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA) (1994).
300. 471 u.s. 724 (1985).
301. /d. at 740.
302 /d. at 743.
303. CIGNA, 82 F.3d at 650. But see Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management,
995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that Virginia statute that prohibits insurance companies from
unreasonably discriminating in establishing preferred provider organizations was not preempted by
ERISA because it fell within ERISA's savings clause).
304. CIGNA, 82 F.3d at 650 (footnote omitted).
305. See Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 56.
306. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 1986, 1987 (1996).
Because ERISA contains an exception allowing states to regulate insurance, state laws can
force insurance companies and managed -care organizations to include specific 'mandated'
benefits and certain other provisions in the insurance contracts they sell.... The effect of [this]
exceptionO, according to a 1985 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, is to permit states to
regulate the benefits covered by policies sold by insurance companies ...•
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If the state statute was determined to come under the savings clause,
however, the "deemer'' clause would still apply. 308 The "deemer clause,"
as mentioned above, limits the reach of the savings clause: by prohibiting
states from including self-insured plans309 as insurance 1:ompanies. For
this reason, if the state statute meets the "relates to" criteria and if the
plan in question is a self-insured plan, the plan is not su~ject to the state
law. This provision greatly limits the effectiveness of many state laws
regulating health insurance plans.310 As of 1990, more than half of all
U.S. workers were covered by self-insured plans.311
As a result, state laws attempting to regulate managed care plan
coverage of emergency care are likely to have little impa.ct on managed
care plans. Clearly, all self-insured plans will not be required to comply
with them. Also, depending on how such statutes are written and how
the savings clause is interpreted, it is possible that all ERISA plans may
be exempt from such state laws. The ambiguity of the law, moreover,
and the uncertainty of most employees regarding whether they are part
of an ERISA plan, make many state statutes practically ineffective.312

/d. (citations omitted).
307. Federal courts have held that HMOs are not insurers as a matter oflaw. See Travelers Ins.
Co. v. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 14 F.3cl 708 (2d Cir. 1993),
rev'd, 514 U.S. 645 (1995); O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1990); Deannas v. AvMed, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D. Fla. 1993). However, one author points out that these decisions
"do not appear to apply the Supreme Court's test for what is the business of insurance." Butler &
Polzer, supra note 195, at 56. In addition, at least one district court has held that HMOs are in the
business of insurance. See Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 673 F. Supp.
903 (W.O. Mich. 1987).
308. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XB) (1994); see supra notes 285-287 and accompanying text.
309. Self-insured plans are those where the employer assumes the risk of me:lical claims.
310. However, some types of managed care plans, such as HMOs, may not be considered selfinsured if an employer pays the HMO on a capitation basis and shifts all the insurance risk to the
plan.
311. Sharon Silow-Carroll et al., Economic & Social Research Inst., Wash., D.C., In Sickness
and in Health? The Marriage Between Employees and Health Care IS (1995). But see Gregozy
Acs et al., Self-Insured Employer Health Plans: Prevalence, Profit, Provisiom,, and Premiums, IS
Health Aff. 267 (1996) (estimating that about 40% of employees with health coverage are in selfinsured plans, defined as plans not buying coverage from health insurers or HMOs).
312 For example, in states that prohibit prior authorization for emergency services, if the patient
does not know whether or not he or she is in an ERISA plan the state's protective statute will not
be of any assistance to the patient, and hospital ED personnel, also unsure of whether the state
statute applies, will likely believe they need to obtain the plan's prior authcorization in order to
ensure coverage of the patients' services.
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V.

THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL SOLUTION

A.

The Goals ofFederal Legislation

Given the significant limitations of the market and existing law to
deal with the problems created by the conflicts between managed care
and emergency care, a federal legislative solution is needed. This
solution must recognize the health and safety needs of plan members
and the validity of reasonable efforts by managed care plans to contain
health care costs. Moreover, the solution must include a fair mechanism
to apportion burdens among the various stakeholders.

1.

Protecting the Consumer

When individuals must wait for hours for plan approval before
receiving emergency care, or are denied preapproval by health care plan
personnel who have not examined them, they may face significant risks
to their life and health. This is truly the case for those experiencing
"real" emergencies. In order to prevent death, disability, or other serious
harms to the consumer, federal legislation that will protect consumers
from such risks is warranted. Congress, through its enactment of
EMfALA, already has recognized a role for the federal government in
ensuring that individuals who need emergency care receive it and are not
thwarted by inability to pay or other obstacles.313 Efforts by managed
care plans to discourage plan members from seeking emergency care
may not technically violate the terms of EMfALA, but arguably they
violate the spirit of that legislation. The irony of the current state of
affairs is that due to EMfALA and managed care policy, individuals
without health insurance may have more access to emergency care than
those with health insurance-a result that undermines the broad goals of
EMf~.314

313. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a); see also Alicia K. Dowdy et al., The Anatomy ofEMTALA: A
Litigator's Guide, 27 St. Mary's L.J. 463, 465 (1996) ("Although concerns regarding the
availability of emergency medical care for the poor or uninsured prompted the drafting of
EMTALA, the statute applies to the treatment of all patients, regardless of a patient's ability to pay
or insurance coverage.") (citing Correa v. Hospital of S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1193 (1st Cir. 1995)
(noting that presence of insurance coverage is irrelevant for purposes of EMTALA because
hospital's motive is not necessary element for establishing liability under statute), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1423 (1996); Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., 996 F.2d 708, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that EMTALA applies to all patients with emergency medical conditions, regardless of
whether they have insurance to pay for treatment)).
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Government also has historically played a role in the r:egulation of the
insurance industry, protecting consumers from ''unscrupulous" insurers
and insurance practices. While most of this regulation has taken place at
the state level (pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Acf 15), Congress has
also recognized the need, in certain situations, to protect individuals
from abuses of the insurance industry. For example, in 1982, Congress
passed amendments to the Medicare law aimed at protecting the elderly
from unfair practices in the sale and administration of Medigap
insurance policies.316 More recently, Congress pass,ed the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (IllPAA),317 which
prevents insurers from denying coverage to individuals based on preexisting medical conditions or limiting periods of ineligibility for
coverage due to a pre-existing condition and requires employers to make
insurance coverage available to certain individuals who have previously
lost other coverage.318 Finally, and most recently, Congress passed the
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996319 and the
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996.320 The former amends ERISA.to
prohibit a health plan or insurer from restricting "benefits for any
hospital length of stay in connection with child birth fo::- the mother or
newborn child, following a normal vaginal delivery, to less than 48
hours, or for women giving birth by Cesarean section, to less than 96
hours."321 The latter requires that plans provide some types of parity in
coverage between medical and surgical benefits and mental health

315. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994) ("Congress declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest.").
316. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 507(b), 94 Stat. 441
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (1994 & Supp. I 1995)). Medigap policies "are
designed to cover the gaps in Medicare coverage-primarily by paying the required hospital and
physician bill deductibles •.. and required coinsurance." Julie Rovner, Climbing Medigap
Premiums Draw Attention on Hill, Cong. Q., Feb. 17, 1990, at 527. Further amendments regulating
Medigap insurance were passed by Congress in 1990. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4352, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-129 (1990) (codifi•!d as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1395ss).
317. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
318. 110 Stat. 1936.
319. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874, 2934-44, tit. VI (1996) (codified in scattered sections
of29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
320. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944-50, tit. VII (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
321. Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996 § 711,29 U.S.C. § 1185 (1996).
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benefits.322 Thus, congressional action in this area is not without
precedent.323

2.

Controlling Health Care Costs

Managed care has been encouraged by federal policy as a mechanism
to control our seemingly uncontrollable health care costs. This policy
goal is still important as health care costs continue to climb324 and take
up a significant proportion of our gross domestic product.325 Therefore,
federal legislation aimed at curbing managed care denials of ED care
and coverage must not overreach in a way that excessively limits or
stifles the ability of plans to exercise control over utilization of
expensive sources of medical care.

3.

Fair Apportionment ofBurdenAmong the Stakeholders

Apart from the health risks to consumers posed by plan policies that
excessively discourage ED use, the 'conflict between managed care plans
and EDs is essentially one of who should bear the cost of emergency
care for plan members. Managed care plan administrators want to
control unnecessary health care costs and presumably believe that it is
fair to make providers or patients responsible for payment of these
services in situations that are not truly emergencies. Patients do not want
to be responsible for paying for these services when they sincerely
believed they were experiencing emergencies because of extreme pain,
shortness of breath, loss of blood, or other symptoms that would prompt
most people to conclude that they need to seek medical care
immediately. Finally, hospitals and emergency physicians argue that it is
not patients who actually get saddled with payment for the unreimbursed

322 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 §§ 712, 2705, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5
(1996).
323. Moreover, there is now developing a broad consensus of the need for consumer protections
against managed care plans. See Toner, supra note 53, § 4 ("President Clinton ... has announced
that he will appoint a panel of experts to recommend ways of protecting consumers in this fierce
new health care marketplace.... [B]ipartisan consensus [on this issue] reflects the broad popularity
of these regulatory moves.'').
324. Note that although growth of health care costs have slowed for some large employers,
overall growth in health care costs continues to climb. See Milt Freudenheim, Survey Finds Health
Costs Rose in '95, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1996, at Dl.
325. In 1991, the United States spent 13.2% of its gross domestic product for health care while
Gennany spent 8.5%, Japan spent 6.8%, and the United Kingdom spent only 6.6%. See Furrow et
al., supra note 36, at 853.
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care; it is typically the health care providers who must seek payment
from patients or absorb the costs of their care.326
What is fair in this context requires consideration of ( 1) the
provisions of the insurance policy, which in virtually all cases will cover
emergency care and (2) determination of what constitutes an emergency
and who makes that determination. A fair solution in general terms
would appear to be one that made the insurer/plan responsible for
coverage of services necessary to treat potential emergencies;327
providers responsible for costs above and beyond what is necessary to
treat such emergencies; and patients responsible for the costs associated
with ED visits that are obvious non-emergencies. The challenge for
legislators will be to create a process that fairly distinguishes potential or
highly probable emergencies from the rest.

B.

Proposed Federal Legislation

Significant headway has already been made toward a federal solution
to this problem. On February 25, 1997, U.S. Representative Benjamin
Cardin (Democrat, Maryland), introduced House Bi11815,328 and Senator
Bob Graham (Democrat, Florida) introduced Senate Bill 356.329 The
identical bills, both titled "Access to Emergency Medical Services Act,"
adopt features of many of the existing state statutes. For example, they
prohibit managed care plans from requiring prior authorization for
emergency medical care330 and establish a uniform definition of
emergency medical condition that protects patients through the adoption
of a prudent layperson standard.331 Plans that cover emergency services
326. See Clark, supra note 57, at 7 (reporting physicians' argument that, "for HMOs to take the
final diagnosis and then say they won't pay is immoral"). "We're made to look like bad guys
because we must then send a bill back to the patient. Payment should be decided not on the final
diagnosis but on the presenting complaint." Id.
327. Potential emergencies would be those that appear to be emergencies based on presenting
systems prior to treatment and ultimate diagnosis by a medical professional.
328. Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, H.R. 815, IOSth Cong. (1997).
329. Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, S. 356, IOSth Cong. (1997). Cardin
previously had introduced a similar bill, H.R. 2011, 104th Con g. (1995), on July 11, 1995 and a
parallel bill had been introduced in the Senate by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski. SeeS. 1233, 104th
Cong. (1995). Although neither bill passed in the 104th Congress, H.R. 2011 had 154 cosponsors
and S. 1233 had 11.
330. H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4.
331. H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4. Emergency medical condition is defined as
a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including
severe pain) such that a prudent layperson, who possesses an average knowledge of health and
medicine, could reasonably expect the absence of immediate medical attenti•Jn to result i~i)
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would be required to cover services provided to a patient in an ED if the
patient presented with symptoms that a prudent layperson possessing an
average knowledge of health and medicine could reasonably expect to
result in serious impairment to the patient's health. In addition, the bills
establish coverage standards for out-of-plan emergency care to protect
patients who, under reasonable circumstances, seek care in an out-ofplan emergency department. These standards provide that health plans
must cover services received in an out-of-plan emergency department if
(1) the patient was unable to reach an in-plan emergency department due
to circumstances beyond his or her control, (2) the patient reasonably
believed he or she could not safely reach an in-plan emergency
department without suffering from adverse consequences to his or her
health, or (3) the health plan directed the patient to an emergency
department other than a participating emergency department.332 The bills
further provide that if a patient does not meet any of these conditions, a
plan may deny or otherwise limit coverage of such services.333
Moreover, the plans may also impose different cost sharing
arrangements for use of out-of-plan EDs, as long as such differences are
"reasonable."334 In addition, the bills allow plans greater control over
care received once a patient has been stabilized. In these circumstances,
an ED is:
required to contact the patient's health plan to obtain authorization
of any medically necessary services (other than emergency
services) identified by the treating physician within 30 minutes of
the point that a physician determines that the patient is stabilized.
The health plan would be required to either deny or approve the
request within 30 minutes of the time when it is notified. If the
health plan denies the request, the treating physician may request a
consultation with one of the health plan's participating physicians
within 30 minutes of the time the health plan is notified of the
request for consultation. If the [ED] does not call the health plan,
the health plan is not responsible for payment of any services
provided after stabilization of the patient. If the health plan does
not respond to the [ED] in a timely fashion, the health plan can not

placing the health of the individual ••• in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impainnent to bodily
functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part."
H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4.
332 H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4.
333. H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4.
334. H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4.
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retrospectively deny payment for post-stabilization services unless
those services were subsequently determined to be medically
unnecessary.335
Finally the bills require that health plans educate members about
"coverage of emergency services, the process for obtaining emergency
services, the location of participating medical facilities and cost-sharing
provisions for emergency and other medical services, as well as the
appropriate use of emergency medical services" such as the 911
telephone number?36 The bills have been enthusiastically supported by
ACEP as well as by a number of provider and consumer groups. 337

1.

Essential Elements and a Justification

The proposed legislation meets the goals of a federal solution to this
problem by including (1) provisions that eliminate managed care
obstacles to ED use for reasonably perceived emergencies, and (2) a
mechanism that allows plans, providers, and consumers to distinguish
fairly reasonably-perceived emergencies from other ED visits. These
provisions are the prohibition of a requirement for prior authorization
for emergency services and the adoption of a "prudent lay person"
standard in defining what constitutes an emergency for purposes of plan
coverage. The proposed legislation implements these provisions by
335. Office of Representative Benjamin Cardin, Detailed Summary, Access to Emergency
Medical Services Act of 1997 2 (Feb. 1997) (on file with Washington Law Re~iew). Moreover, the
bill provides:
[If] an emergency physician in a non-participating hospital and a health plan cannot agree on a
course of treatment after a patient is stabilized, the health plan must either cover the
recommended services, subject to a review of whether those services were medically
necessacy, or send a physician with privileges at the hospital to assume responsibility for the
patient. The health plan must cover medically necessacy services required to maintain the
patient in a stable condition.
!d.
336. Id.
337. Similar bills introduced in the 104th Congress were supported by Public Citizen, Citizen
Action, the American Heart Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the International
Association of Fire Fighters, the National Association of EMS Physicians, and' the Emergency
Nurses Association. Clark, supra note 57, at 16. Kaiser Permanente, the nation's largest HMO, also
has expressed its support for most provisions of the bill. Doug Levy, Taking guesswork out ofER
coverage, USA Today, Aug. 19, 1996, at Dl. Most recently, the American Association of Health
Plans (AAHP), which represents the majority of the nation's managed care health plans, although
not announcing support of federal legislation on the issue, said that their member plans "should
cover emergency-room screening and stabilization as needed for conditions that reasonably appear
to constitute an emergency, based on the patient's presenting symptoms." AAHP, Press Release,
Health Plans Announce Policies on Appeal Rights and Emergency Care Coverage, Jan. 30, 1997.
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mandating that insurers incorporate them in the policies they offer. A
justification for each of these elements and for mandating that all
policies include them is provided below.

a.

Prohibition on Prior Approval

Without prior screening, some individuals who do not need
emergency care will go to the ED. But with a prior approval
requirement, some individuals who truly need emergency care may not
get to the ED. The issue is: On which side should we err? Managed care
plan administrators argue that the prior approval system is necessary to
avoid loss of control by and significant costs to the plan. As one plan
executive stated:
The purpose of the emergency room authorization process is to
keep medical treatment of a patient under the medical supervision
of their primary care physician. This physician knows the patient's
medical history and is the best judge of care needed. In the case of
a true emergency, the PCP can notify the emergency room of the
patient's pending arrival and give direction for the specific needs
of the patient. This saves the patient time waiting in the emergency
room, saves them the discomfort and risk associated with
unnecessary diagnostic tests, and provides continuity of care.338
But at least some research has shown that preauthorization in the ED
context does not necessarily alter patient behavior, may not cut costs in
the long run, and may cause harm to patients.339 In addition, in the
338. Letter from Elizabeth J. Misek, President, Prudential Health Care Plan, to The Honorable
Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 21, 1995) (discussing "Access to
Emergency Medical Services Act of 1995'') (on file with Washington Law Review).
339. See, e.g., Anne M. Gadomski et a!., Diverting Managed Care Medicaid Patients From
Pediatric Emergency Department Use, 95 Pediatrics 170, 177 (1995). This study, which evaluated
the health outcomes of managed care Medicaid children with nonemergent conditions who were
not authorized to be seen in the ED by their primary care provider, was motivated by reports from
the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, where two adyerse outcomes in children denied ED visits
(respiratozy arrest in a two-month old infant with a "cold," and febrile convulsion requiring
intubation in another child) led to termination of gatekeeping and assumption of costs of
unauthorized visits by the hospital. Id. at 170-71. The study, based on Mazyland Medicaid patients,
did not find any adverse health outcomes because of delay in health care delivezy but concluded
that although the practice of preapproval for emergency care can be safe in the short term, denial of
an ED visit has no impact on subsequent ED utilization by Medicaid participants and may be
associated with higher hospitalization rates. Id. at 170. Thus, "[g]atekeeping in this setting does not
necessarily change the health care seeking behavior of these patients." Id.; see also Shaw et al.,
supra note 77, at 61 (concluding in study that "parents of indigent children who are denied ED care
may not contact their primacy care physician or take their child to physician" even if ED classified
child's case as ''urgent'').
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current health care system, few patients actually have a physician who
knows them at all, let alone one who is intimately familiar with their
medical history.
. Although preapproval has much merit for cost savings in the context
of non-emergency car~for _specialty care or expensive treatment of
questionable valu~it is not appropriate in the emergency context,
where there is not time for extensive analysis and r.crutiny of the
patient's condition. Because emergencies cannot easily be determined
without a professional medical examination,340 it is wholly inappropriate
that the obstacle of prior authorization to an ED visit be allowed to
stand. In these situations, it is appropriate to err on the side of the
patient.341 Moreover, justice requires some modification to the
preauthorization requirement because most plan members have no
redress when plans deny authorization for emergency care and, as a
result, members do not receive emergency treatment and suffer harm.
Under ERISA, as discussed above, most plans are insulated from
liability for a negligent determination and are not held responsible for
the consequences of their actions. It is the patient who suffers. This
outcome alone argues for elimination of a prior authorization
requirement or, alternatively, that a plan be subject to liability if it
chooses to maintain a prior authorization requirement and negligently
denies preapproval.
While this provision in federal legislation will help protect consumers
who need emergency care, arguably it will limit a plan's ability to
control unnecessary ED use. However, plans have other mechanisms to
achieve this goal. In order to avoid unnecessary use of the emergency
room by enrollees, plans will need to develop alternative strategies or
may need to build these costs into the premium structure of the plan.
Patients should be provided with educational materials or even courses
to understand when ED use is appropriate.342 Managed care plans that
want to cut unnecessary ED use must make alternative options available
to individuals at times and places that are accessible to them. This may

340. In some cases, it is difficult to detennine if a patient is experiencing an emergency, even
with a professional medical exam.
341. As Steinbrook argues, "some emergency department care for patient> who do not present
true emergencies is unavoidable and must be provided unless we are to miss patients with real
emergencies." Steinbrook, supra note 126, at 658.
342 Some studies have shown that inappropriate ED visits can be reducf:d in a population by
means of a patient education program. See, e.g., J.R. Benz & J.C. Shank, Alteration ofEmergency
Room Usage in a Family Practice Residency Program, IS J. Fam. Prac. 1135 (1982).
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mean opening twenty-four hour urgent care centers or contracting with
EDs for care at a discounted rate.343
Economic incentives, such as guaranteeing coverage if prior
authorization is obtained or requiring copayments, may also alter frontend use. A recent study of the effect of imposing a copayment on Kaiser
Permanente enrollees for ED use found that the copayments
significantly reduced utilization344 without affecting health outcomes for
the population studied.345
While cost-sharing for emergency services may be an option for
privately-insured individuals, cost-sharing for Medicaid beneficiaries
enrolled in HMOs is explicitly prohibited.346 This population thus
presents special challenges. A number of studies have shown that it is
the lack of a PCP that pushes many Medicaid patients to the ED for
nonurgent care. Therefore, placing Medicaid beneficiaries in managed
343. As regards use of EDs for pediatric visits, Gadomski et al., supra note 339, at 177, argue
that practices other than gatekeeping may be necessaxy to divert nonemergent ED utilization
toward use of a primacy health care provider (PHCP). /d. at 177.
Factors such as convenience, accessibility of PHCP, parental employment, age of the child,
perception of severity of illness, and waiting times to be seen may all influence a parent's
choice for an ER as a source of care. Unless these factors are addressed by expanding hours of
PHCP accessibility and improving waiting times and ~y addressing parental perception of
disease severity, it is unlikely that onsite PED visit denial will decrease PED utilization for
nonemergent conditions in the long term.

/d.
344. See Joe V. Selby et al., Effect of a Copayment on Use of the Emergency Department in
Health Maintenance Organizations, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 635, 638 (1996). This study looked at
over 30,000 subjects who were members of Kaiser Permanente in northern California. /d. at 635.
The population was divided into an experimental and a control group. /d. The experimental group
was assessed a copayment of $25 to $35 for their use of the ED. The researchers found that there
was a significant decline in the number of ED visits in the copayment group. /d. at 638.
345. /d. The authors tentatively concluded that "[a]lthough our ability to detect any adverse
effects of the copayment was limited, there was no suggestion of excess adverse events in the
copayment group, such as increases in mortality or in the number of potentially avoidable
hospitalizations." /d. at 635. However, the authors also warned that their results "should not be
generalized to apply to low-income groups or the elderly, particularly as regards the possibility that
imposing a copayment could lead to adverse effects." /d. at 640; see also Steinbrook, supra note
126. In reviewing the study by Selby and his co-authors., Steinbrook argued that although the
authors did not detect any adverse outcomes from the copayment policy, the results of their study
are troubling because there was a significant decline in emergency department visits among
patients with diagnoses classified as "often an emergency" in the copayment group as compared
with the control group. /d. at 657. Individuals in this group had diagnoses such as "head trauma,
sickle cell crisis, complications of pregnancy, pelvic inflammatory disease, pancreatitis, asthma,
transient ischemic attack, and chest pain." /d. According to Steinbrook, "By any standard, a
substantial proportion of patients with these diagnoses should be evaluated in the emergency
department." /d.
346. See Social Security Act ofl935 § 1916(aX2XD), (bX2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 1396o (1994).
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care plans where they are assigned to a provider who will see them
should make a difference. Beyond that, plans will have to devote
additional resources to educating this group about appropriate ED use
and to changing old patterns of use.

b.

A Prudent Layperson Standard

What is fair in allocating the cost of ED care is in. part based on
expectations of the parties and their understanding of what would be
covered under the plan's policy. When a policy states that it covers
emergency care and the patient (prior to a medical exam) believed that
he or she was experiencing a medical emergency, but the plan upon
retrospective review of medical records determines there was no
emergency, the question becomes: Whose determination should govern?
The prudent layperson standard offers a compromise between the
subjective views of the parties. Though not without critics in the context
of emergency care,347 the standard appears to be a "close relative" of the
reasonable person standard and is consistent with long-standing
principles of contract, insurance, and tort law. In the insurance law
context, which has its roots in fundamental contract law,
Courts are uniquely willing to construe the meaning of an
insurance contract against an insurer, in spite of the evident
meaning of the policy. Theories for denying insurers range from
perceptions that the policy is unclear, ambiguous, or incomplete, to
sympathetic reaction to the view that it is a contract of adhesion to
be construed against its drafter. The doctrine of reasonable
expectations of consumers, and the recognition of rights at
variance with policy provisions figure prominently in so construing
insurance contracts.348
Courts and juries tend to view disputes over policy provisions as
issues of faimess. 349 Most courts give effect to the "objectively
347. Although managed care plans are concerned that a prudent layperson standard will require
them to pay for inappropriate ED use, some argue that it is not protective enough of managed care
enrollees. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 57, at 18. At least one health care provider who is critical of
the prudent layperson standard has remarked that the ability of any layperson to act rationally and
make prudent decisions when they are in great pain and emotionally distraught or fearful may be
unrealistic. !d. According to this critic, ''to expect a patient who hurts [to make rational decisions
about emergency care is] unrealistic and punitive." Id. (quoting Casey Jason, Acucare President).
348. 1 Bertram Harnett & Irving I. Lesnick, The Law ofLife and Health Insurance§ 1.08, at 190 (1991); see also Jerry, supra note 185, at 141-47.
349. They tend to see cases in terms of "well capitalized insurers . . . seeking to escape the
liabilities to ordinruy people and small business that the insurers had presumably undertaken by
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reasonable expectations" of the insured in order ''to render fair
the New Jersey
interpretations of insurance coverage."350 As stated by
0
Supreme Court:
When members of the public purchase policies of insurance they
are entitled to the broad measure of protection necessary to fulfill
their reasonable expectations. They should not be subjected to
technical encumbrances or hidden pitfalls and their policies should
be construed liberally in their favor to the end that coverage is
afforded ''to the full extent that any fair interpretation will
allow."3si
Under this doctrine, courts will construe policies "as any laymen
would" seeking "an objective standard of a reasonable layman
[whereby] insurers should not be able to escape coverage with
qualifications and exceptions that are not consistent with reasonable
expectations of a policyholder possessing ordinary familiarity with the
coverage involved."352
The application of a prudent layperson standard in the context of
insurance coverage for emergency care is consistent with this reasoning.
In disputes over coverage for emergency services where an insured's
policy states that it will cover "emergency medical care," and a
reasonable person would think what is occurring is an emergency, the
insured will have reasonably expected that the emergency services
would be covered.
Both insurance and tort law not only generally favor an objective
patient standard over a medically based standard353 but also favor it over
a subjective patient standard. In tort law, what is considered negligence
is based on whether the actions of the defendant are consistent with what
a "reasonable and prudent" person would have done in the same or
accepting premium money." 1 Harnett & Lesnick, supra note 348, § 1.08, at 1-91. Consequently,
"[i]n modem light, technicality and small print generally do not go down easily in court, and
insurnnce, with its heavy freight of dependency by the insureds, is particularly vulnerable. This
point is essentially an ethical one." Id.
350. But see Jeny, supra note 185, at 145. ("[A]lthough the doctrine . . . speaks to the
'objectively reasonable' expectations of the insured, the extent to which an insured actually,
subjectively expects coverage is relevant.'') (emphasis added).
351. Meier v. New Jersey Life Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 862, 869-70 (N.J. 1986) (quoting Kievit v.
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961)).
352 l Harnett & Lesnick, supra note348, § 1.08[3], at 1-100.
353. In tort law, one exception to this general rule is the law on infonned consent. In
detennining what is a "material" risk for purposes of disclosure, a slight majority of jurisdictions
apply a physician-centered detennination, while a slight minority favor a reasonable person
standard. See Furmw et al., supra note 36, at 268--69.
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similar circumstances.354 The basis for the rule is multifaceted. In part, it
is one of administrative ease-it is difficult to truly ascertain how a
particular individual would act in a given situation. But the standard has
also been defended as necessary to ensure at least some "fairness" in
interactions between members of a community. Without some
requirement that all members of a managed care plan meet some
minimum standard of conduct, some members of the plan consistently
will benefit at the expense of others.355 To adopt a subjective standard
wherein ED visits would be covered as long as a particular patient, no
matter his individual peculiarities, felt he had a medical condition that
could not wait to be treated, would undermine any effort on the part of
managed care plans to control ED use.
Conceptually, the prudent layperson standard is useful to apply to the
conflict over who pays for emergency care that is not truly an
emergency. The actual wording of the proposed federal law and the state
statutes that have adopted the standard, however, may cr•::late problems in
its application. The language that has been incorporated in the majority
of these statutes is that of "a prudent lay person, who possesses an
average knowledge of health and medicine."356 HCFA has argued that
this standard is more stringent than the standard HCFA applies in its
manual instructions for Medicare managed care contractors.357 In
comments on the proposed federal legislation, the agency stated: "We
are concerned that the 'prudent layperson' standard as d·~fined in the bill
could actually narrow the liability of managed care plans in dealing with
people of less than 'average knowledge'-i.e. It appears to offer less
protection for vulnerable patients than does current Medicare policy."358
354. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law ofToru· § 32, at 174 (5th ed.
1984).
355. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 108 (1881).
When men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities
going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for instance, a man is born
hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt
his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no Jess
troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect.
I d.
356. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II§ 19-70l(d) (1996) (emphasis added); see also
Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-309(cXl) (Michie Supp. 1995); Ga Code Ann. §§ 33-20A-3, -20A-9
(Supp. 1996); Va Code Ann. § 38.2-4300 (Michie Supp. 1996); New Y.:~rk Regulation of the
Delivery of Managed Care Act, S. 7553, 219th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996).
357. See supra Part IV.C.
358. Letter from Joan Steiber, Health Care Financing Administration, Office of Legislative &
Inter-Governmental Affairs to Bruce Lesley, Office of Senator Bob Graham (Oct. 19, 1995) (on file
with Washington Law Review).
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Moreover, in interpreting the "reasonable person" or the "reasonable
expectations of the insured," courts, in the context of tort and insurance
law, more often use the term "ordinary" person than "average" person,~ 59
and the use of the term "average knowledge" may be more confusing
than helpful. The potential problem lies in the fact that the term
"average" has two definitions--one of a more empirical nature and one
of a more general nature.360 Though the intent of the drafters may be to
apply the ordinary person standard, the potential for the application of a
more technical definition actually may raise the standard. If interpreted
as a higher standard by the courts, the language may be particularly
harmful to individuals from different cultural backgrounds who have
very different ideas about the concepts of health and disease.361 In
addition, the standard would seem to harm those who are not well
educated and may be particularly harsh for Medicaid beneficiaries.

c.

A New Mandated Benefit

As a public policy matter, the most likely criticism of the proposed
federal legislation is that it mandates that insurers provide certain health
benefits that they might not otherwise provide, such as visits to an ED
that are not preauthorized or that, on retrospective review, turn out not to
have been an emergency. While emergency care is a mandated benefit
359. In the insurance law context, although judicial concepts of what constitutes a reasonable
expeclation of coverage in the insurance contract are not "monolithic," there is a common factor
running through the majority of the cases. See Jerry, supra note 185, at 143 (citing Kenneth S.
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of
the Insured, 61 Va. L. Rev. liS I, ll53 (1981)). According to Abraham: "[t]he. insured is an
ordinazy, unsophisticated consumer, possessing an understanding of only the most rudimentazy
aspects of the coverage. Thus, the reasonable expeclations doctrine is used by courts to protect
consumers, not to adjust a commercial relationship between parties with roughly equal bargaining
power." /d. In the context of tort law, the level of knowledge to attribute to the "reasonable person"
has been "[o]ne of the most difficult questions in connection with negligence." Keeton eta!., supra
note 354, § 32, at 182. According to Prosser and Keeton, a reasonable person must be held to a
"minimum standard of knowledge, based upon what is common to the community." /d. at 184. But
above this minimum, ''the individual will not be held to knowledge of risks which are not known or
apparent to him." /d.
360. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 123-24 (6th ed. 1990) ("In ordinazy usage the term
signifies the mean between two or more quantities, measures, or numbers. If applied to something
which is incapable of expression in terms of measure or amount, it signifies that the thing or person
referred to is of the ordinazy or usual type.'').
361. Davidson argues that "medical and insurance professionals define 'emergency' differently
from the way laymen of different cultures and social groups define it [and that differences in] age,
ethnic group, social class, and sex influence significantly what individuals perceive as an
emergency." Davidson, supra note 43, at 276-77 (citing Clifford V. Colman & Howard Robboy,
The Social Construction ofa Medical Emergency, 1 Topics Emergency Med. 61, 66 (1980)).
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under the Federal HMO Acf 62 and many state HMO Acts, insurers
would argue that the emergency benefit is limited to "medically
necessary" emergency care. Thus, plans are at liberty to incorporate
mechanisms in their policies to screen out care that is apparently not
medically necessary either before the fact, through prior approval, or
after the fact, through denial of coverage.
If these restrictive practices were challenged in the courts, however,
courts would likely require plans to cover such visits on the grounds that
the plan's policy provisions were "vague" or "ambigum1s" and did not
meet the "reasonable expectations" of the insured.3 63 H:>wever, current
law does nothing to prevent insurers from modifying their insurance
provisions to be very clear that they will only cover ED visits for which
the patient receives prior approval or that are determined retrospectively,
after review of clinical test results, to have constituted an emergency.364
If such policies were significantly less expensive than others that did not
require prior approval and that covered ED services based on a "prudent
layperson" standard, economists would argue that it would be more
efficient, from a market perspective, to let consumers choose which of
these policies to purchase, based on willingness to pay. Thus, they
would argue that rather than mandating the less reBtrictive policy,
Congress should simply mandate that insurers offer both the less
restrictive and the more restrictive policy-a "mandated offering''
approach.
For a number of reasons, this argument is flawed. For example, the
solution would not apply to Medicaid beneficiaries, who do not pay
premiums, yet are the most likely group to use th•~ ED for nonemergencies. Moreover, as regards the privately insured, the
assumptions underlying the argument for a mandated offering-a
significant cost differential between the plans, informed choice on the
part of consumers, willingness to pay, and insignificant or negligible
externalities-are unfounded.

362 42 U.S.C. § 300e to 300e-l (1994).
363. See Part V.B.l.b.
364. Under such provisions, courts would be less likely to find for the insured. See Jerry, supra
note 185, at 147.
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1)

Costs

State mandated health insurance benefits365 have been criticized by
insurers, HMOs, and health plan administrators as "adding unnecessary
costs" to our health care system, increasing health insurance premiums,
and potentially reducing the number of employers who offer and
individuals who purchase health care insurance.3 66 However, tP.ere is
limited data on the effect of mandated benefits on insurance premiums,
and most research has not taken into account the possibility that some
mandates may actually reduce health care costs.367
As regards emergency care, this cost-saving potential may be
relevant. If individuals are inappropriately denied prior approval for ED
access because of an inaccurate assessment of their condition and, as a
result, their condition is worsened, they may ultimately require more
expensive and extensive medical treatment than they would have
required if seen in the ED on initial manifestation of their symptoms.368
Second, the differential in price between the relevant policies is not
that between emergency care and no emergency care or between
unlimited emergency care and restricted emergency care. Rather, it is
between (1) coverage of emergency care based on prior approval and a

365. Such benefits vary from state to state but common examples include "covering newborns
from the date of birth (49 states), mammography screening (46 states), alcoholism treatment (39
states}, ••. services of optometrists (46 states}, ••• chiropractors (43 states) and psychologists (42
states)." Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 25-26. Other less common mandated benefits include
in vitro fertilization, scalp hair prosthesis for alopecia areata, and acupuncture. See id. at 34-36, tbl.
4.1; see also Jeny, supra note 185, at 437. Most recently, the federal government has mandated
that all health insurers cover up to at least 48 hours of inpatient hospital care after a mother has had
an uncomplicated vaginal delivery or 96 hours following a Cesarean-section for both the mother
and newborn and that plans that offer mental health benefits provide some elements of parity in the
provision of those benefits and medical and surgical benefits. See supra notes 321-322.
366. But see Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 30 (citing John R. Gabel & Gail A. Jensen, The
Price ofState-Mandated Benpfits, 26 Inquiry 419, 431 (1989)).
The authors [of the study] ••• examined the effect of [mandated health benefits] on a small
employer's likelihood of offering health insurance in each state. The authors found that several
individual mandates, such as mental health, alcoholism, and drug abuse treatment were not
statistically significantly associated with the probability that small employers would not
insure.

!d.
367. Although mandated treatment for substance abuse and outpatient mental health care has
been shown to increase premiums by 8.8% and 12.8 % respectively, home health care and nursing
home care have been shown to lower them by between 3.2% and 3.6%. Id.
368. At least one study of pediatric Medicaid patients concluded that denial of an ED visit may
be associated with subsequent higher hospitalization rates. See Gadomski et al., supra note 339, at
170.
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retrospective assessment of whether the condition was truly an
emergency and (2) coverage of care based on a "prudent layperson"
standard. This cost differential will primarily be based on the costs of
care for those who go to the ED with symptoms that a prudent layperson
would regard as indicative of an emergency but that turn out not to be
related to an emergency after appropriate screening and diagnostic tests.
Examples of such cases would include patients who experience chest
pains, excessive bleeding, a severe and sudden headache, or a painful
arm after a serious fall. Based on this more limited distinction, the cost
differential is unlikely to be significant, and the difference in premiums
between these two types of policies may be negligible? 69

2)

Consumer Choice and Willingness To Pay

If, however, for purposes of discussion, premiums for the two types
of policies were significantly different, economists would argue that a
mandated benefit would force employers to offer only this more
expensive plan to their employees and force employees and others who
do not wish to pay the additional premium cost to do so. This argument
assumes that consumers, in fact, are able to assess accurately the risks of
needing the more expensive policy and that they will have sufficient
information to make an informed choice as to how the need for ED care
will be assessed by the plan.
If the debate focused simply on plans that covered and did not cover
any emergency care, arguably there would be no consumer demand for
the latter.370 However, given the choice between a plan that covered
emergency care only with prior authorization and retrospective
assessment of emergency ("Type 1") and a plan that cov•::red emergency
care under a prudent layperson standard ("Type 2"), some market
segmentation might occur based on the price of the policies.371 Whether
369. In any case, empirical data regarding this differential cost could advance the debate by
clarifying the extent of the cost implications. For instance, a recent article found that the marginal
cost of a nonurgent ER visit was only $24.40. See Williams, supra note 45, at 24.
370. See Peter Passell, Editorial, Economic Scene: When Politicians Seek to Please on Medical
Benefits, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1996, at D2 (arguing that certain mandated health benefits, such as
recent requirement that plans cover at least 48 hours of inpatient hospital care after woman has had
uncomplicated vaginal delivery, might be avoided if consumers make choices among health plans
that do and don't offer such coverage but that other types of benefits, such as trauma care, do not
merit even offering consumers choice because "[h]ardly anyone, presumably, would choose to opt
out of the right to trauma care in the emergency room in order to save on insutance premiums").
371. It is questionable under a mandated offering approach, however, whether employers would
offer the more restricted policy in light of experience with "bare bones" insurance policies
authorized by about half the states in 1990 and 1991 for small firms. These p•llicies, which limited

396
HeinOnline -- 72 Wash. L. Rev. 396 1997

Emergency Care and Managed Care
the decision to choose one policy over another, however, would be truly
informed and ''voluntary," that is, based on willingness to pay as
opposed to ability to pay, is open to debate. As discussed above,
individuals generally have a difficult time assessing the significance to
be given small probabilities of potentially catastrophic outcomes372 (for
example, being denied prior authorization for ED treatment when
experiencing chest pains that tum out to be symptoms of a heart attack).
Second, even with a requirement that policies disclose the fact that an
individual's ED treatment will not be covered unless the individual
receives prior authorization or the treatment is determined
retrospectively to be for a true medical emergency, consumers will be
unlikely to have sufficient information about how those mechanisms
will be implemented to make an informed choice. The type of
information that would be important would include: (1) the average
waiting or response time from initial calls requesting approval for an ED
visit to a decision on the part of the plan; (2) who is making the decision
for the plan-a physician or someone without medical expertise; (3) the
financial incentives, in terms of limiting ED visits, of the person making
the decision; and (4) the number of individuals denied prior approval for
emergency care and details about their experience-pain and suffering
due to delay in receipt of care, how soon they were able to see a plan
physician, their ultimate health outcome Oength of time ill, lost time at
work, inability to function, or residual pain). This information would
likely be significant to an individual's determination yet possibly would
be more costly to provide than the unrestricted benefit.
Finally, there is an argument that an individual's decision between the
two policies may be made more on ability to pay than on willingness to
pay. This argument will have more merit as the premium differential
between the two plan types increases. If the broader coverage is
mandated, however, the additional costs of the broader benefit will be
spread among a larger population and the per-person cost will decline,
making the coverage available to some who might otherwise not be able
to afford it.373

services below what most considered standard coverage, were generally not attractive to employers
or their workers. Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 30.
372 See supra note 146 and accompanying text
373. This across-the-board increase, however, also must be evaluated in terms of the number of
individuals who might decide, as a result of the incremental increase in cost, not to buy insurance
at all.
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Externalities

Finally, a modified market-based approach mandating that plans offer
the two types of policies overlooks some significant cost8 to society that
may result from those who purchase the Type 1 plan. The most
significant cost is the loss of life or productive capacity for an individual
who is inappropriately denied timely prior approval, who does not get to
the ED as a result, and who suffers a catastrophic outcome-either death
or significant injury. The cases of Lewis Hand and Jara.es Adams are
illustrations of such outcomes.374 These outcomes not only will affect the
families of these individuals but also will affect society. In many cases,
the state will contribute to the support of these individuals throughout
the remainder of their lives or to the support of their families, in cases
where death results.
This argument clearly has more strength when applied to the
prohibition on prior approval, but also has some rel.evance to the
requirement of a prudent layperson standard. The argument about
externalities based on risks to life and health will apply to the prudent
layperson standard to the extent that the more restrictive policy
provision, that is, retrospective assessment of whether the condition was
truly an emergency, "over-deters" individuals from obtaining necessary
emergency care. There are no data on whether retrospective review has
such an effect, although there is some anecdotal evidence from ED
physicians that individuals who do not receive affirmative indication
from their plan that a test or procedure will be covered (prior to receipt
of the test or procedure) are reluctant to obtain the test or undergo the
procedure.
The requirement of a prudent layperson standard, however, also can
be justified on the basis of other externalities resulting from a plan that
denies coverage when a prudent layperson would have thought an
emergency existed. In those cases, the ED likely will have to cover the
costs associated with the patient's screening and treatm;lnt. This has a
number of implications for health care costs and access to ED care. First,
to the extent a hospital is able to cross-subsidize losses in the ED with
higher prices to other "insured" patients, costs and ultimately premiums
for this group will increase. Second, if these costs cannot be recovered
through cross-subsidization, eventually the ED may have to close
because of fmancial inability to sustain itself. These externalities
potentially could be avoided by mandating that managed care plans
374. See supra Parts IV.B.3, .Lb.
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cover these services. Although infrequent, there are cases where
governments mandate insurance coverage to reduce such externalities.
Most recognized is the requirement that automobile owners purchase
liability insurance to cover costs to person or property of others who
may be harmed as a result of the owner's driving.375
The public policy debate over mandated benefits generally boils down
to a question of "[t]o what extent ... health benefits policy [should]
protect a vulnerable minority or advance the larger community's interest
in containing health care costs."376 That question, in tum, is influenced
by "citizens' often imperfectly estimated perceptions of their personal
risks of contracting certain conditions and by their belief in the
community's responsibility to share in the misfortunes of its individual
members."377 This trade-off was acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,318 when it
found that "sharing the risk of the need for mental health care to assure
its affordability for those who might need it was the essence of the
'business of insurance,' which ERISA permits states to regulate."379
Given the life and death stakes that may be associated with policies
requiring prior approval, the uncertainty associated with experiencing a
true emergency, the difficulty for consumers to be informed about this
issue, and the potential inability of some segments of the population to
afford a policy with less restrictive benefits, there is a strong argument
for mandating the less restrictive coverage and for spreading the costs
associated with that coverage among the community of insureds.

315. SeeJerry,supranote 185,at847.

Currently, forty-two states and the District of Columbia require every person registering a
motor vehicle in the state to present a certificate stating that he or she has liability insurance in
at least a specified minimum amount. These statutes provide victims of automobile accidents
with access to funds to cover their loss by requiring each vehicle owner in the state to have
"security for any judgments that may be registered against the owner of the vehicle arising out
of the vehicle's operation.
!d.
376. Butler&Polzer,supranote 195,at30.
377. Id.
378. 471 u.s. 724 (1985).
379. See Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 32 n.60.
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2.

Strengths and Potential Weaknesses ofthe Federal Proposal

a.

Strengths-A Compromise Between Controlling Costs and
Safeguarding Patients

The primary strength of the proposed Federal Acces:; to Emergency
Medical Services Act (FAEMSA) is the balance it achieves between
controlling costs and safeguarding patients. In addition to the prudent
layperson standard that ensures that only ED visits that are "reasonable"
will be reimbursed, the law does not prevent plans from requiring prior
approval for further care once a patient has been stabiliz,ed. This type of
requirement on the part of plans is well-founded and will deter EDs from
providing care that can be as effectively provided by a plan physician.
Moreover, the proposed legislation permits plans to impose a copayment
on ED visits as a way to control inappropriate ED us•e380 and, unlike
some state laws, does not require plans to cover all costs associated with
mandated screening under EMTALA.381 In addition, nothing in the
legislation deters an ED physician from eliminating all possible risks of
catastrophic outcome for patients that come to the ED. The legislation
does not alter ED physician incentives to rule out even small
probabilities of serious outcomes before transferring or discharging a
patient. As such, it is a reasonable compromise in its effort to protect
consumers yet allow plans to discourage inappropriate ED use.

b.

Potential Weaknesses-Enforcement Provisions

The proposed federal law follows the complex structural contours of
the recently enacted Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(IllPAA) and would be implemented through amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), ERISA, and the Public Health Service
(PHS) Act. As a result, the enforcement mechanisms vary according to
the enforcement provisions in each of these Acts for violations of
HIPAA. The FAEMSA would require compliance by private health

380. Although the bill places limits on a plan's ability to impose cost-sharing for services
provided at an ED (that is, such cost-sharing may not be greater than that imposed for comparable
services in other settings, often 20%), a health plan "may impose a reasonable copayment (as
determined in accordance with standards established by the Secretary) ... to deter inappropriate
use of services of hospital [EDs]." Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1995, H.R. 2011,
104th Cong. § 3(bX1}-(2) (1995).
381. These state provisions, by requiring plans to pay for all federally maJ19llted screening and
treatment, arguably undermine the goals of the "prudent layperson" standard.
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plans in both the group and individual market, by insurance issuers, and
by plans serving the Medicare or Medicaid population.
The provisions regarding group health plans are enforced under both
the IRC and ERISA. Under the IRC, a group health plan is defined as:
[A] plan (including a self-insured plan) of, or contributed to by, an
employer (including a self-employed person) or employee
organization to provide health care (directly or otherwise) to the
employees, former employees, the employer, others associated or
formerly associated with the employer in a business relationship,
or their families. 382
Failure of a group health plan to comply with the provisions of
FAEMSA would be governed by the relevant enforcement provisions of
the IRC. These provide that a tax of up to one hundred dollars for each
day of noncompliance with respect to each individual may be imposed
on the employer sponsoring the plan383 or on the plan in the case of a
multiemployer plan.384 There are exceptions to the application of the tax.
In general, no tax or a limited tax will be imposed if the violation was
unintentional385 or corrected within thirty days.386 Moreover, no tax may
be imposed "on a small employer (defined as an employer who
employed an average of 50 or fewer employees on business days during
the preceding calendar year) that provides health care benefits through a
contract with an insurer or HMO and the violation is solely because of
the coverage offered by the insurer or HM0."387
In amending ERISA, the Act would adopt that law's existing
enforcement mechanisms, as modified by IllPAA. Under ERISA, the

382 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000{bXl) (West Supp. 1997).
383. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(eXl) (West Supp. 1997); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at
316 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990,2129.
384. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(b) (West Supp. 1997).
385. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(cXl) (West Supp. 1997).
386. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(cX2) (West Supp. 1997).
The maximum tax for unintentional violations that can be imposed generally is the lesser of (1)
10 percent of the employer's payments during the taxable year in which the failure occurred
under group health plans (or 10 percent of the amount paid by the multiemployer plan or
multiple employer welfare arrangement during the plan year in which the failure occurred for
medical care, if applicable), or (2) $500,000. The Secretaiy may waive all or part of the tax to
the extent that payment of the tax would be excessive relative to the failure involved.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 316-17 (referring to 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(cX3), (4) (West Supp.
1997)), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2129-30.
387. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 316 (referring to 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(d) (West Supp.
1997)), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2129.

401
HeinOnline -- 72 Wash. L. Rev. 401 1997

Washington Law Review

Vol. 72:315, 1997

enforcement mechanisms are somewhat different depending on whether
the party is a "group health plan"388 or is a health insurance issuer.389
Relevant provisions with respect to group health plans allow for civil
actions by beneficiaries "to recover benefits due ... under the terms of
[the]plan,"390 and to enforce their rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify rights to future benefits.391 In addition, a beiJ.eficiary or the
Secretary of Labor may sue a plan (1) to enjoin any act or practice that
violates any provision of the law regarding protection of employee
benefits or violates the terms of the plan, or (2) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations or to enforce any
provisions of the law regarding protection of employee benefits or
violations of the terms of the plan.l 92 Regarding the provisions of the law
applicable to health insurance issuers, enforcement provisions are
limited to ERISA's private rights of action for beneficiaries.393 Civil
monetary penalties also may be levied against either state or local health
plans or insurance issuers, but not under ERISA. They are based on such
remedies established under HIPAA amendments to the PHS Act. 394
Under the PHS Act, each state may require that health insurance
issuers (but not health plans) meet the Act's requirements.395 States have
significant discretion in how they enforce the law.396 In the case of a
determination by the Secretary of HHS that a state has failed to enforce
substmitially a provision of the Act, the Secretary would enforce the
provision or provisions.397
388. Group health plan is defined in ERISA as "an employee welfare benefit plan to the extent
that the plan provides medical care ... to employees or their dependents ... directly or through
insurance, reimbursement, or otherwise." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1191b(aX1) (West Supp. 1997).
389. A health insurance issuer is defined as "an insurance company, insurance service, or
insurance organization (including a health maintenance organization . . • which is licensed to
engage in the business of insurance in a State and which is subject to State law which regulates
insurance .•.. Such term does not include a group health plan." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1191b(bX2) (West
Supp. 1997).
390. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX1)(B) (1994).
391. § 1132(aX1)(B).
392 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX3), (5) (1994). Civil monetary penalties are limited to violations of the
information and reporting requirements of the law, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1994}, and violations by
fiduciaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i), (I), (m) (1994).
393. 29 U.S.C.A. § I 132(bX3) (West Supp. 1997).
394. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22 (West Supp. 1997); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 192,
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 2005.
395. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(aX1).
396. The Act provides no guidelines for states in enforcing the provisions o:? the law.
397. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(aX2) (West Supp. 1997); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at
193 ("Secretarial enforcement would apply only in the absence of state enforcement and with
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The PHS Act amendments provide that in the case where a health
insurance issuer fails to comply with the Act's provisions, a civil
monetary penalty is to be levied directly on the issuer.398 Where a
nonfederal governmental health plan fails to comply with the Act's
requirements, the plan is liable if it is sponsored by two or more
employers (that is, governmental entities); otherwise, the employer is
liable.399 The maximum penalty which could be levied is "$100 for each
day for each individual with respect to which such a failure occurs." 400
In determining the penalty amount, the Secretary of HHS would
have to take into account the previous record of compliance and
the gravity of the violation. No penalty could be assessed if the
failure was not intentional or if the failure was corrected within 30
days. A procedure would be available for administrative and
judicial review of a penalty assessment. Collected penalties would
be paid to the Secretary of HHS and would be available for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions with respect to which the
penalty was imposed.401

The enforcement provisions also require that the Secretaries of
Treasury, Labor, and HHS "ensure, through execution of an interagency
memorandum of understanding, that regulations, rulings, and
interpretations are administered so as to have the same effect at all
times.'>402 In addition, "[i]t requires the Secretaries to coordinate
enforcement policies for the same requirements to avoid duplication of
enforcement efforts and assign priorities in enforcement.'>403
FAEMSA also would require compliance by insurers offering policies
in the individual market. These provisions would be enforced in a
manner similar to the enforcement provisions for the large group
market.404 Each state could require such issuers to meet the FAEMSA's

respect to group health plans that are nonfedeml governmental plans."), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2006.
398. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(bX2XBXi) (West Supp. 1997).
399. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(bX2XBXii) (West Supp. 1997); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104736, at 194, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2007.
400. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(bX2XCXi) (West Supp. 1997).
401. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 194, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2007; see also 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(bX2XC), (D), (E), (G) (West Supp. 1997).
402 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 194, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2007.
403. !d.
404. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-61 (West Supp. 1997).
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requirements. If a state failed to enforce the provisions of the law, the
Secretary ofHHS would be responsible for their enforcement.405
Finally, the Access to Emergency Medical Services Act amends the
Medicare and Medicaid laws to require that all plans enrolling Medicare
beneficiaries or Medicaid recipients comply with the Act.406 For
Medicare plans that fail to comply with the provisions of the Act, the
Secretary of HHS may terminate the plan's Medicare contract407 or may
impose one of a number of intermediate sanctions such as civil monetary
penalties, suspension of enrollment of individuals, or suspension of
payment to the organization.408 These actions only may be taken,
however, where the Secretary determines that a plan has ''substantially"
failed to carry out the contract or "substantially" fails to carry out certain
"applicable conditions.',4Q9
Regarding enforcement of the provisions of FAEMSA applicable to
Medicaid plans, a state Medicaid plan will not be approved by the
Secretary of llliS unless the "plan requires each health insurance issuer
or other entity with a contract with such plan to provide coverage or
benefits to individuals eligible for medical assistance under the plan to
comply with [the provisions of the Act.]',.; 10
Whether or not the law is followed will depend primarily on two
factors: (1) the effectiveness of the substantive enforcem•:mt provisions;
and (2) the ability of each of the responsible agencies to enforce their
respective portions of the law. As regards the first factor, the substantive
provisions themselves leave some doubt as to the likely effectiveness of
the law. Although states have significant discretion in how they will
enforce the law and are free to set higher civil monetary penalties than
are available to the Secretary ofllliS, there is no indication, as yet, as to
how well states will implement the relevant provisions of the law or
what type of substantive enforcement mechanisms they will impose. In
addition, where states fail to enforce the law against health insurance
issuers and when enforcement action is necessary against health plans,
the penalties that may be imposed by DllliS are relatively minor, that is,
either a one hundred dollar tax or civil monetary penalty for each day of
violation per individual. For plans or issuers that vic.Jate the prior

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-61.
H.R. 815, 105th Cong. § 6 (1997).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(iX1) (West Supp. 1997).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(iX6XB), (C) (West Supp. 1997).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(iXI).
H.R. 815, 105th Cong. § 6.
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approval provisions or prudent layperson standard, it is unclear how the
violations would be counted. A plan that had a written policy requiring
prior approval for emergency care conceivably could be fined for each
day the policy is in place after the effective date of the law multiplied by
the number of individuals enrolled in the plan. A cap of $500,000 would
apply for group plans, but no such cap would apply to health insurers.
However, if a plan did not have a written policy of prior authorization
but instead plan personnel occasionally told enrollees over the phone
that they should not go to the ED because the plan would not cover it,
the infraction probably would be considered only a one-time violation
(each time the plan personnel told this to an individual) and thus only
subject to a fine of up to one hundred dollars. This hardly seems likely
to be effective at changing plan behavior, given that the cost of
emergency care avoided is likely to be less than the penalty involved.
As regards violation of the prudent layperson standard, which would
arise upon plan review of a claim for payment, this probably also would
be considered a one-time (day) violation for each time a plan made a
decision that clearly was based on a retrospective review of clinical
records rather than a prospective review of patient symptoms. As a
result, the plan would only be subject to a one hundred dollar penalty.
Again, this seems insufficient to motivate plans to change their behavior.
The private right of action provisions may also lack the teeth
necessary to ensure compliance with the law. They are limited to the
private right of action provisions currently in ERISA and, as discussed
supra,411 are quite limited and inadequate for individuals who have
suffered injury. This is most likely to occur where a plan requires prior
approval for emergency care and as a result an individual either does not
receive necessary emergency treatment or receives it ''too late."
Moreover, even in those cases where the harm is solely economic, that
is, payment of a large ED bill, individuals may have difficulty asserting
a private right of action. Although the bill may be large to an individual,
it often is insufficient in terms of attorney time and payment to warrant
an attorney's interest or willingness to take the case.
The provisions for Medicare and Medicaid plans may be more
effective in terms of achieving compliance although this is not wholly
clear. Although Medicare administrators have some effective
intermediate sanctions that can be imposed for failure to comply with
the provisions of the proposed law, the violations must meet a
"substantiality" test. Whether an occasional requirement of prior
411. See supra Part IV.B.l.a.
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approval for emergency services or denial of coverage based on a
clinical retrospective review would meet the test is unclear. For
Medicaid to take action, a similar substantiality test is not imposed and
HCFA's ability to dictate the terms of plan participation should ensure
that plans, at a minimum, do not have written policies at odds with the
Act's requirements.
The second part of the enforcement equation is whethc::r the agencies
responsible for implementing the provisions of the law will be effective
at doing so. This will depend in large part on staffing and resources
devoted to the effort as well as adequate coordination among the
agencies.
Those individuals who are responsible for implementing HIPAA will
likely also be responsible for implementing the provisions ofFAEMSA.
HIPAA itself has yet to be enforced and enforcement action is not likely
to begin until January 1, 1998. Thus, it is too early to tell how effective
these agencies will be at implementing the provisions of that law.
However, some judgments can be made about the likely e:ffectiveness of
the agencies in implementing the law. One noteworthy factor is that
Congress did not appropriate funds or personnel (FTEs) to implement
HIPAA. As a result, unless future appropriations are made for
implementation of HIPAA or as a result of the passage ofFAEMSA, the
agencies will be limited in their ability to enforce the provisions of the
laws. In addition, the responsible agencies have limited experience in
implementing similar laws from which to extrapolate~ their likely
effectiveness in enforcing the provisions of a new law.412
As a result, there is considerable uncertainty as to how effective the
enforcement provisions of the proposed Access to Emergency Medical
Services Act law will be and without significant attention to their
implementation, they could prove a potential obstacle to its overall
success.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it is appropriate and understandable that managed care
plans seek to control unnecessary health care costs, a check is needed on
some of their overly broad efforts to limit health care spending,

412 Analogous efforts might be those by the IRS to ensure insurer compliance with the health
care insurance continuation rules (the COBRA requirements) and by the Department of Labor to
enforce the provisions of ERISA as they apply to employee health plans. Yet there is little, if any,
published data on how well these agencies have enforced these provisions.
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especially when a potential emergency is involved. The current practice
of managed care plans to deny or discourage access to emergency care
for plan members is placing in jeopardy members who truly need
emergency care. Moreover, plan practices that retroactively deny
coverage for emergency care are unfair when the plan members had
good reason to believe that they were experiencing emergencies. In these
situations it is often the ED providers who are left covering the cost of
the care they provide. This puts the burden of "gatekeeper" on the
emergency medical personnel-an unfair and impossible task when they
are required under federal law to screen all individuals who come to the
hospital seeking emergency care. Furthermore, it shifts the insurance
"risk" to the provider when it is the managed care plan that has agreed to
accept the financial risk associated with providing health care for their
subscribers.
Current law and policies to address these ''unfair'' practices on the
part of managed care plans are limited in their effectiveness in large part
by ERISA, which in many cases prevents suits against plans for
negligent denial of prior authorization for emergency care and preempts
state statutory efforts to address the problem. As a result, a federal
solution to the problem is necessary. Essential elements of a federal
solution must include a prohibition on prior authorization requirements
for emergency care and a requirement that plans cover ED care obtained
in circumstances that a ''prudent lay person" would consider to be an
emergency. These provisions will insure some balance among the
concerns of (1) managed care plans in reducing utilization of
unnecessary or inefficient use of health care resources, (2) plan members
in receiving emergency treatment and not being left with a large bill
when emergency care appears warranted, and (3) emergency care
providers in being adequately compensated for patients that they treat.
Without such efforts to regulate plan decisions and protect subscribers,
individuals who join managed care plans unknowingly face risks to their
health, their lives, and their pocketbooks.
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